

The Charles S. Peirce Society  
and the  
Charles S. Peirce Foundation  
present

**The 2014 Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress  
Peirce 2014: Invigorating Philosophy for the 21st Century**

**Expanded Program (with Abstracts)**

*Last Updated Wednesday 16 July, 1 p.m.*

University of Massachusetts Lowell  
July 16-19

In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary  
of the death of Charles S. Peirce

## Note to the Reader

The primary purpose of this expanded program is to provide Congress attendees with abstracts of the papers to be presented; we also list errata in the printed (hard copy) program that came to light since that document went to press. Every effort has been made to ensure consistency of this expanded program with the printed program. In the event (unlikely, we hope!) that the two programs contradict one another, the printed program should be taken as authoritative, *except for* the errata noted below.

We hope that this expanded program will help you to make the most of your time at the Peirce Centennial Congress. Should further updates be necessary, a modified version of this document will be posted on the Congress website, with an indication of the most recent revision date on the title page, and in the running head.

Rosa Mayorga & Matthew Moore  
Co-Chairs, Program Committee

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## **Errata in the Printed (Hard Copy) Program**

Professor Nicholas Rescher is unable to attend the conference. The session that had been scheduled as his plenary address (Friday 5:30-7:00 p.m., Grand Ballroom) will now be a discussion of his paper “Peirce’s Epistemological Eschatology”, which is available online at the following address: <http://peirce-foundation.org/rescher.pdf>.

Rubén Darío Henao Ciro’s paper “The Relationship between the Literary Text and the Scientific Text as a Means for the Development of Aesthetic Reasonableness in Math Teachers: A Teaching Strategy for Higher Education” (Session I-8, Sat. 1:00-2:30, Hamilton 2) will be delivered in Spanish, with a projected English translation.

Fernando Zalamea will be commenting on Jérôme Havenel’s paper “Was Peirce’s Last Conception of Continuity a Failure?” (Session G-10, Fri. 1:30-3:00, Lower Lock 2).

Antonio Correa will not be speaking at the panel on “Pragmatism and Peirce in Cuba” (Session A-6, Wed. 1:00-2:30, Merrimack 1).

Mi-Jung Kang, who had been scheduled to present “Abduction, Forced Choice, and the New Unconscious” in Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15) has been rescheduled to present it in Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30, Merrimack 2).

The Chair for Claudine Tiercelin’s plenary address (Saturday, 10:15-11:45) will be Cheryl Misak.

## Conference Schedule

### Wednesday, July 16

- 9:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. Registration (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)  
Book and Poster Exhibit (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 11:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Open Forum on the Role of the Charles S. Peirce Society within  
Peirce Scholarship (*Lower Lock 1*)
- 12:00–1:00 p.m. Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee Meeting  
(*Tsongas Boardroom*)
- 12:00–1:00 p.m. Lunch on your own
- 1:00–2:30 p.m. Concurrent Sessions A
- 2:30–2:45 p.m. Break
- 2:45–4:15 p.m. Concurrent Sessions B
- 4:15–4:35 p.m. Refreshment Break
- 4:35–4:45 p.m. Words of Welcome (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Chancellor Marty Meehan, University of Massachusetts Lowell
- 4:45–6:15 p.m. Plenary 1 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Susan Haack (University of Miami),  
[“Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry”](#)  
*Chair:* Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (Aristotle University of  
Thessaloniki)
- 6:15–6:30 p.m. Break
- 6:30–7:30 p.m. Plenary 2 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Douglas Anderson (Southern Illinois University Carbondale),  
[“The Past, Present and Future of Peirce Scholarship”](#)  
*Chair:* John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell)
- 7:30–8:30 p.m. Wine and Cheese Reception (*Junior Ballroom*)

Thursday, July 17

- 7:30–8:30 a.m. Continental Breakfast (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. Registration (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)  
Book and Poster Exhibit (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:30–10:00 a.m. Concurrent Sessions C
- 10:00–10:30 a.m. Break
- 10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Concurrent Sessions D
- 12:00–1:30 p.m. Lunch (*Student Dining Room; Patio, weather permitting*)
- 1:30–3:00 p.m. Plenary 3 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Christopher J. Hookway (University of Sheffield),  
[“Community, Inquiry and the Good”](#)  
*Chair:* Vincent Colapietro (The Pennsylvania State University)
- 3:00–3:30 p.m. Break
- 3:30–5:00 p.m. Plenary 4 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Ivo Ibrí (Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo),  
[“The Esthetic Basis of Peirce’s Pragmaticism”](#)  
*Chair:* Robert E. Innis (University of Massachusetts Lowell)  
*Commentator:* Douglas Anderson (Southern Illinois University  
Carbondale)
- 5:00–6:00 p.m. Break
- 6:00–7:00 p.m. Plenary 5 (*Memorial Meeting, St. Anne’s Episcopal Church*)  
Nathan Houser (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis),  
[“Peirce’s Tragic Struggle with Destiny”](#)  
*Chair:* John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

**Friday, July 18**

- 7:30–8:30 a.m. Continental Breakfast (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:00a.m.–6:00 p.m. Registration (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)  
Book and Poster Exhibit (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:30–10:00 a.m. Concurrent Sessions E
- 10:00–10:30 a.m. Break
- 10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Concurrent Sessions F
- 12:00–1:30 p.m. Lunch (*Student Dining Room; Junior Ballroom*)
- 1:30–3:00 p.m. Concurrent Sessions G
- 3:00–3:30 p.m. Break
- 3:30–5:00 p.m. Plenary 6 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto),  
[“Peirce and Ramsey on Truth”](#)  
*Chair:* Catherine Legg (University of Waikato)  
*Commentator:* Robert Sinclair (Brooklyn College)
- 5:00–5:30 p.m. Break
- 5:30–7:00 p.m. Plenary 7 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Discussion of “Peirce’s Epistemological Eschatology” (available  
online: <http://peirce-foundation.org/rescher.pdf>) by  
Nicholas Rescher (University of Pittsburgh)  
*Chair:* Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)

**Saturday, July 19**

- 7:30–8:30 a.m. Continental Breakfast (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. Registration (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)  
Book and Poster Exhibit (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)
- 8:30–10:00 a.m. Concurrent Sessions H
- 10:00–10:15 a.m. Break
- 10:15–11:45 a.m. Plenary 8 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France),  
[“C.S. Peirce and the Possibility of Metaphysical Knowledge”](#)  
*Chair:* Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto)
- 11:45 a.m.–1:00 p.m. Lunch (*Student Dining Room; Junior Ballroom*)
- 1:00–2:30 p.m. Concurrent Sessions I
- 2:30–2:45 p.m. Break
- 2:45–4:15 p.m. Plenary 9 (*Grand Ballroom*)  
Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia),  
[“Peirce’s Continuity: Mathematical and Logical, Then and Now”](#)  
*Chair:* Matthew E. Moore (Brooklyn College)  
*Commentator:* Giovanni Maddalena (Università del Molise)
- 4:15–4:30 p.m. Break
- 4:30–6:00 p.m. Concurrent Sessions J
- 6:00–6:30 p.m. Break
- 6:30–9:00 p.m. Plenary 10 (*Banquet, Grand Ballroom*)  
Vincent Colapietro (The Pennsylvania State University),  
[“Experimental Intelligence, Dramatic Narrative, and  
Philosophical Self-Understanding”](#)  
*Chair:* Jaime Nubiola (University of Navarra)

**Concurrent Sessions A**  
**Wednesday, July 16**  
**1:00 p.m. –2:30 p.m.**

**A-1. Abstraction and Theorematic Reasoning** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki; Tallinn University of Technology)

Speakers:

Frederik Stjernfelt (University of Copenhagen)  
[“Types of Theorematic Reasoning”](#)

Sun-Joo Shin (Yale University)  
[“Mystery of Deduction and Peirce’s Abduction”](#)

Matthew E. Moore (Brooklyn College)  
[“Theorematic Incompleteness”](#)

**A-2. Peirce's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* Chung-ying Cheng (University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)

Speakers:

Chung-ying Cheng (University of Hawai‘i at Manoa)  
[“Peirce's Semiotics and Yijing Symbolics”](#)

Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)  
[“Fallibilism in Early Confucian Philosophy”](#)

Mathew A. Foust (Central Connecticut State University)  
[“Confucius, Peirce and the Fixation of Belief”](#)

**A-3. Contributed Paper Session 1** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Aaron Wilson (South Texas College)

Speakers:

Catherine Legg (University of Waikato)  
[“Perceiving Necessity”](#)

Evelyn Vargas (Universidad Nacional de La Plata)  
[“Perception as Inference”](#)



**A-4. Contributed Paper Session 2** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Kathleen A. Hull

Speakers:

André De Tienne (Peirce Edition Project; Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“Celebrating the Sesquicentennial of Peirce's Search for the Categories”](#)

Oscar P. Zelis (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

Gabriel O. Pulice (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

[“The Proper Name according to C.S. Peirce and J. Lacan: Some Relationships”](#)

**A-5. Invited Session: Lee Smolin** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)

Speakers:

Lee Smolin (Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics)

[“Laws Must Evolve to be Explained: A Physicist’s Perspective on a Proposal of Peirce”](#)

Cornelis de Waal (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“Space, Time and Natural Law: A Peircean Look at Smolin’s Temporal Naturalism”](#)

**A-6. Pragmatism and Peirce in Cuba** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Rosa Maria Mayorga (Miami Dade College)

Speakers:

Rosa Maria Mayorga (Miami Dade College)

[“Peirce and Cuba”](#)

Bernie Cantens (Moravian College)

“Comments”

**A-7. Contributed Paper Session 3** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Tony Jappy (University of Perpignan)

Speakers:

Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)

[“What Is an Ultimate Interpretant?”](#)

Jeffrey Downard (Northern Arizona University)

[“Peirce’s Interpretant and the Essential Triad”](#)

**A-8. Contributed Paper Session 4** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Mathias Girel (Ecole normale supérieure, Paris)

Speakers:

Priscila Monteiro Borges (Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto)

[“What Can Assure an Argument?”](#)

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France, Paris)

Amirouche Moktefi (Tallinn University of Technology)

[“Senility vs. Stupidity: On Peirce’s Image in Couturat’s Looking-Glass”](#)

**A-9. Contributed Paper Session 5** (*Hamilton 2*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Daniel J. Brunson (Morgan State University)

Speakers:

Ignacio Redondo (International University of La Rioja)

[“Finding One’s Place in the Work of Creation”](#)

Alessandro Topa (American University in Cairo)

[“‘A Transition to the World of Spirit’: Categoriality, Normativity and Processuality, a Schillerian Matrix of Peircean Themes”](#)

**A-10. Short Contribution Session 1** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Greg Moses (Texas State University)

Speakers:

Maria de Lourdes Bacha (Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie)

[“Peirce on the History of Science: ‘The Epistle of Petrus Peregrinus on the Lodestone’ ”](#)

Victor R. Baker (University of Arizona)

[“Charles S. Peirce and the Slaty Cleavage Controversy”](#)

Paul Eduardo Femenia (Universidad Nacional de San Juan (Argentina))

[“Peirce, Secondness and Teaching by Example of Kuhn in Teaching Engineering”](#)

Dennis Knepp (Big Bend Community College)

[“On Being and Education: Harris and Peirce on Obedience versus Cooperative Investigation”](#)

Edison Torres (Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá; Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, Campus Cajicá; Centro de Sistemática Peirceana)

[“L465: Charles Peirce’s Unrealized Visit to the Glenmore Summer School of the Cultural Sciences”](#)

**Concurrent Sessions B**  
**Wednesday, July 16**  
**2:45 p.m.–4:15 p.m.**

**B-1. A New Pragmatist View of Gesture** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Speakers:

Rossella Fabbrichesi (Università di Milano)

[“The Iconic Ground of Gestures: A Threshold between Semiotics and Pragmatism”](#)

Giovanni Maddalena (Università del Molise)

[“Complete Gestures as a Tool for Education”](#)

**B-2. Peirce and Economics** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* James Wible (University of New Hampshire)

Speakers:

Kevin D. Hoover (Duke University)

James Wible (University of New Hampshire)

[“Charles S. Peirce on the Science of Economics”](#)

James Wible (University of New Hampshire)

[“Peirce's Economic Model in the First Harvard Lecture on Pragmatism”](#)

**B-3. Short Contribution Session 2** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* David Boersema (Pacific University)

Speakers:

Richard Kenneth Atkins (Iona College)

[“Can Perceptions Justify Beliefs? Peirce’s Prescient Reply to Davidson”](#)

David Boersema (Pacific University)

[“Peirce and Virtue Epistemology”](#)

Joseph L. Esposito (University of Arizona)

[“Peirce and Holmes”](#)

Mariana Vitti Rodrigues (UNESP/Marilia)

Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez (UNESP/Marilia)

[“The Role of Information in Abductive Reasoning”](#)

**B-4. Contributed Paper Session 6** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Arnold Oostra (Universidad del Tolima)

Speakers:

Paniel Reyes Cardenas (University of Sheffield)

[“Pragmatism and the ‘Science of Inquiry’: Peirce’s Plea for Realism and Diagrammatic Reasoning”](#)

David E. Pfeifer (Institute for American Thought; Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“Inquiry and Peirce's Fourth Grade of Clearness”](#)

**B-5. Contributed Paper Session 7** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Kathleen A. Hull

Speakers:

Nikolaus Bezruczko

[“Peirce's Semiotics Inspire Pre-literacy Assessment Model”](#)

Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)

[“Towards a Peircean Metaphysics of Sex”](#)

**B-6. Peirce in China** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Yi Jiang (Beijing Normal University)

Speakers:

Yi Jiang (Beijing Normal University)

[“Peirce Study in China in the 21st Century”](#)

Liu-hua Zhang (East China Normal University)

[“Peirce on the Phenomena of Reasoning”](#)

**B-7. Peirce and the Pittsburgh School** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Steven A. Miller (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Speakers:

Preston Stovall (University of Pittsburgh)

[“Purpose, Command, and What Might Have Been”](#)

Steven A. Miller (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

[“‘Despite Peirce’s Valiant Efforts . . .’: Ethical Community in a Sellarsian Vein”](#)

Dave Beisecker (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

[“Is Peirce a \(Hyper-\)Inferentialist?”](#)

Catherine Legg (University of Waikato)

[“Perceptual Inferentialism: Rich Epistemological Resource or Contradiction in Terms?”](#)

**B-8. Contributed Paper Session 8** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)

Speakers:

Bill Kartalopoulos (School of Visual Arts)

[“Developing a Peircean Semiotics of the Comics Page”](#)

Seymour Simmons (Winthrop University)

[“C.S. Peirce and the Teaching of Drawing”](#)

**B-9. Contributed Paper Session 9** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Vitaly Kiryuschenko (Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg; York University, Toronto)

Speakers:

Cornelis de Waal (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“Charles S. Peirce and the Abduction of Einstein”](#)

Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)

[“Why Study Logic?”](#)

**B-10. Contributed Paper Session 10** (*Hamilton 2*)

*Session Chair:* Kelly A. Parker (Grand Valley State University)

Speakers:

Maria Regina Brioschi (State University of Milan)

[“Hints toward Cosmology: The Need for Cosmology in Peirce’s Thought”](#)

Philip Rose (University of Windsor)

[“Peirce’s Cosmology Made Clear, Then Extended \(Deriving Something from Nothing\)”](#)

**Concurrent Sessions C**  
**Thursday, July 17**  
**8:30 a.m.–10:00 a.m.**

**C-1. The Future of Abduction and the Abduction of the Future I** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Woosuk Park (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Speakers:

John Woods (University of British Columbia)

[“What Abduction Does to Knowledge”](#)

Lorenzo Magnani (Università di Pavia)

[“Abductive Virtues Vindicated: The Eco-Cognitive Model”](#)

**C-2. Peirce's Importance for Modern Aesthetics: Music, Dance, Photography and Poetry** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Luís Malta Louceiro (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

Speakers:

Luís Malta Louceiro (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

[“Peirce's Architectonic in the Architecture of a Poem”](#)

Maria Celeste de Almeida Wanner (Federal University of Bahia, CNPq's Scholar)

[“Theoretical Elements in Peirce's Semiotics toward a Reflection on the Nature of Photography”](#)

Carina Gonzalez (University of São Paulo)

[“Some Considerations on the Role of Firstness in Natural and Artistic Beauty in the Light of Peirce's Philosophy”](#)

**C-3. Epistemology and Ontology in Peirce's Philosophy: Abduction, Reality, God** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Cassiano Terra Rodrigues (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

Speakers:

Rodrigo Vieira de Almeida (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

[“Some Reflections on the Ontological Aspects of the Symbol and its Relationship to the Cognoscibility of God, within the Religious Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce”](#)

Marcelo Silvano Madeira (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

[“Charles S. Peirce's Ontological Epistemology and the Co-Naturality between Thought and World”](#)

Cassiano Terra Rodrigues (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

[“Peirce's Naturalism: The Continuity of Instinct and Rationality and the Heuristic Power of Abduction”](#)

**C-4. Charles S. Peirce on Habits** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Aaron Massecar (King's University College at Western University)

Speakers:

Aaron Wilson (South Texas College)

["Habit, Semeiotic Naturalism, and the Unity of the Sciences"](#)

Aaron Massecar (King's University College at Western University)

["The Esthetics of Habit Development"](#)

Robert Main (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)

["Habit, Hope and Progress"](#)

**C-5. Contributed Paper Session 11** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* André De Tienne (Peirce Edition Project; Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

Speakers:

John Deely (University of St. Thomas, Houston)

["The Terms 'Sign' and 'Representamen' in Peirce"](#)

Andrew Diversey (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

["The Correct Order of Peirce's Ten Sign Trichotomies"](#)

**C-6. Contributed Paper Session 12** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Richard Kenneth Atkins (Iona College)

Speakers:

Michael May (University of Copenhagen)

["Semiotics and Didactics of Graph and Model Comprehension in Enzyme Kinetics"](#)

Cesare Romagnoli (Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Western Ontario)

James A. Overton

["C.S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Medical Imaging"](#)

**C-7. Contributed Paper Session 13** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)

Speakers:

Javier Legris (IIEP-BAIRES, CONICET and University of Buenos Aires)

["Existential Graphs as Structural Reasoning"](#)

Francisco Vargas (Liceo Leonardo da Vinci de Bogotá; Pädagogische Hochschule-Ludwigsburg)

["A Model for Peirce's Continuum"](#)

**C-8. Contributed Paper Session 14** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Evelyn Vargas (Universidad Nacional de La Plata)

Speakers:

Samuel V. Bruton (University of Southern Mississippi)

[“Peircean Methodetic and the Ethics of Scientific Research”](#)

Frederic R. Kellogg (George Washington University)

[“Holmes, Peirce, Whewell and the Social Dimensions of Thought: Law and Science in the Formative Years of Pragmatism”](#)

**C-9. Contributed Paper Session 15** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Maria de Lourdes Bacha (Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie)

Speakers:

Sergio Gallegos (Metropolitan State University of Denver)

[“Peirce and Self-knowledge”](#)

Vera Saller

[“Perception, Experience and Unconscious in Peirce and Psychoanalysis”](#)



**Concurrent Sessions D**  
**Thursday, July 17**  
**10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m.**

**D-1. The Cosmopolitan Peirce: The Impact of his European Experience** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Jaime Nubiola (University of Navarra)

Speakers:

Nathan Houser (Institute for American Thought; Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“Peirce’s Cosmopolitan Thought”](#)

Sara Barrena (University of Navarra)

[“Charles S. Peirce in Europe: The Aesthetic Letters”](#)

Jaime Nubiola (University of Navarra)

[“Scientific Community and Cooperation in Peirce’s European Letters”](#)

**D-2. Peirce and Pragmatist Aesthetics** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Rosa Maria Mayorga (Miami Dade College)

Speakers:

Richard Shusterman (Florida Atlantic University)

[“The Aesthetic Imperative: Reflections after Peirce”](#)

Robert E. Innis (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

[“Dewey’s Peircean Aesthetics”](#)

**D-3. Origins of Biosemiosis and Peirce’s Notion of Self as Sign** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* Terrence W. Deacon (University of California, Berkeley)

Speakers:

Terrence W. Deacon (University of California, Berkeley)

[“Origins of Biosemiosis and Peirce’s Notion of Self as Sign”](#)

Jesper Hoffmeyer (University of Copenhagen)

[“Commentary: Origin of Life = Origin of Semiosis”](#)

**D-4. Contributed Paper Session 16** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Aaron Wilson (South Texas College)

Speakers:

Thomas M. Olshewsky (University of Kentucky; New College of Florida)

[“Peirce’s Intuitionism”](#)

Arnold Oostra (Universidad del Tolima)

[“Was Peirce a Precursor of Intuitionistic Logic?”](#)

**D-5. The Future of Abduction and the Abduction of the Future II** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Woosuk Park (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Speakers:

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki; Tallinn University of Technology)

[“Guessing at the Unknown Unknowns”](#)

Woosuk Park (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

[“From Visual Abduction to Abductive Vision”](#)

**D-6. Landmarks in Peirce Scholarship (Carolyn Eisele)** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Joseph W. Dauben (Lehman College and the Graduate Center, CUNY)

Speakers:

Mary Louise Gleason

[“Carolyn Eisele at Harvard: Her ‘Charlie’ ”](#)

Joseph W. Dauben (Lehman College and the Graduate Center, CUNY)

[“Peirce, the Mathematician: Eisele’s Crusade”](#)

Matthew E. Moore (Brooklyn College)

[“The Future of Peirce’s Mathematics”](#)

**D-7. Contributed Paper Session 17** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Christos Pechlivanidis (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki; ACT/Anatolia College)

Speakers:

Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University, Bakersfield)

[“Ignoring History: Free Will as a Non-Problem: A Debate Based on False Assumptions Critiqued by Peirce and Royce”](#)

Tullio Viola (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

[“Peirce’s Philosophy of Action and its Current Interpretation: An Aristotelian Approach”](#)

**D-8. Contributed Paper Session 18** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Kelly A. Parker (Grand Valley State University)

Speakers:

Joan Fontrodona (IESE Business School)

[“Peirce and Management Inquiry: Some Insights for a New Paradigm in Business”](#)

Clancy Smith (Duquesne University)

[“The Gospel of Greed: Ruminations on a Possible Peircean Critical Theory”](#)

**D-9. Contributed Paper Session 19** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Aaron Masecar (King's University College at Western University)

Speakers:

Joshua Black (University of Sheffield)

["Habit and Peirce's Theory/Practice Distinction"](#)

Serge Grigoriev (Ithaca College)

["Peirce's Separation of Theory from Practice"](#)

**Concurrent Sessions E**  
**Friday, July 18**  
**8:30 a.m.–10:00 a.m.**

**E-1. Material Semeiotics I** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Alexander A. Bauer (Queens College, CUNY)

Speakers:

Zoë Crossland (Columbia University)  
Alexander A. Bauer (Queens College, CUNY)  
[“Material Semeiotics: Unmediated First Thoughts”](#)

Patrycja Filipowicz (Adam Mickiewicz University)  
[“Images of the Lost World: The Peircean Perspective on Çatalhöyük Imagery in the Chalcolithic”](#)

Christopher J. Hookway (University of Sheffield)  
“Comments”

**E-2. Discovering the Future in the Past by Reconstructing Peirce's Manuscripts**  
(*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* Mary Keeler (VivoMind Research, LLC)

Speakers:

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki; Tallinn University of Technology)  
[“Steps toward Peirce’s World”](#)

John F. Sowa (VivoMind Research, LLC)  
[“Bringing Peirce into the Mainstream of Cognitive Science”](#)

Mary Keeler (VivoMind Research, LLC)  
Heather D. Pfeiffer (Akamai Physics, Inc)  
Uta Priss (Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences)  
[“Exploring the Challenge of Reconstructing Peirce’s Manuscripts”](#)

**E-3. Regaining a Sense of the World: The Significance of Peirce's Philosophy for Catholic Theology Today** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Greg Zuschlag (Oblate School of Theology)

Speakers:

Greg Zuschlag (Oblate School of Theology)  
["Moving Beyond 'High' and 'Low Christology': Peirce's Contribution to Gelpi's Chalcedonian Christology"](#)

Bill O'Brien (Saint Louis University)  
["Understanding the Sacraments in Light of Peirce's Semeiotics"](#)

**E-4. Aspects of Peirce's Critical Common-Sensism** (*Concord 2*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Daniel J. Brunson (Morgan State University)

Speakers:

Daniel J. Brunson (Morgan State University)  
["Common-Sensism, Fallibilism, Pragmatism"](#)

Marco Stango (Università degli Studi di Macerata; The Pennsylvania State University)  
["Vagueness and Developmental Teleology. Peirce on the 'Role' of the Human Being"](#)

Francesco Poggiani (The Pennsylvania State University)  
["How Far Does Self-control Go? Peirce's Mature Understanding of the Connection between Pragmatism and Critical Common-Sensism"](#)

**E-5. Contributed Paper Session 20** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Dennis Knepp (Big Bend Community College)

Speakers:

Jorge Alejandro Flórez (Universidad de Caldas)  
["Development of Peirce's Concept of Induction"](#)

Giovanni Tuzet (Bocconi University)  
["Is Qualitative Induction a Kind of Induction?"](#)

**E-6. Contributed Paper Session 21** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Steven A. Miller (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Speakers:

Julián Fernando Trujillo Amaya (University of Valle)  
[“Real Possibility and Peirce's Pragmatism”](#)

José Santiago Pons (Faculty of Theology San Vicente Ferrer de Valencia)  
[“Is Law Second?”](#)

**E-7. Contributed Paper Session 22** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Jamin Pelkey (Ryerson University)

Speakers:

Kenneth Boyd (University of Toronto)  
[“Peirce on Illocutionary Acts, Assertion and Commitments”](#)

Diana Heney (University of Toronto)  
[“The Methadone Man? Peirce vs. Price on Truth and Assertion”](#)

**E-8. Contributed Paper Session 23** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Adrian Ivakhiv (University of Vermont)

Speakers:

Dave Beisecker (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)  
[“Peirce and the Consequences of Denial: A Lesson from the Trees”](#)

Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton)  
[“Peirce, Grounding, Circularity and Regress”](#)

**E-9. Contributed Paper Session 24** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Kathleen A. Hull

Speakers:

Kathleen A. Hull  
[“Out of His Life and Thought: Peirce as ‘Picture Thinker’ and its Implications for a Deeper Understanding of Mathematics”](#)

William James McCurdy (Idaho State University)  
[“Peirce’s Theory of Information and a New Diagrammatic Logic for Intensional and Extensional Syllogistic”](#)

**Concurrent Sessions F**  
**Friday, July 18**  
**10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m.**

**F-1. 1914–2014: One Hundred Years of Editing and Publishing Peirce**  
*(Lower Lock 1)*

*Session Chair:* David E. Pfeifer (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

Speakers:

André De Tienne (Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“1914–2014: One Hundred Years of Editing and Publishing Peirce”](#)

**F-2. Existential Graphs** *(Lower Lock 2)*

*Session Chair:* Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)

Speakers:

John F. Sowa (VivoMind Research, LLC)

[“Peirce Improved on His Successors”](#)

Frederik Stjernfelt (University of Copenhagen)

[“Iconicity of Logic”](#)

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki, Tallinn University of Technology)

[“The Future of Logic”](#)

Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

[“Geometry and Plasticity”](#)

Jaakko Hintikka (Boston University)

[“Which Mathematical Logic is the Logic of Mathematics?”](#)

**F-3. Material Semeiotics II** *(Concord 1)*

*Session Chair:* Alexander A. Bauer (Queens College, CUNY)

Speakers:

Robert W. Preucel (Brown University)

[“Words and Things: The Semiotic Mediation of Culture”](#)

Anna S. Agbe-Davies (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

[“Are Beads Good to Think?”](#)

Craig N. Cipolla (University of Leicester)

[“What Difference Does Peirce Make? Considering Community-based Entanglements in the Archaeology of Colonialism”](#)

Paul Kockelman (Columbia University)

[“Material Substances and Semiotic Processes”](#)

Michael Silverstein (University of Chicago)

“Comments”

**F-4. Contributed Paper Session 25** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Philip Rose (University of Windsor)

Speakers:

Richard Kenneth Atkins (Iona College)

[“Geometrical Optical Illusions and Peirce's ‘Fourth’ Cotary Proposition”](#)

Paul Forster (University of Ottawa)

[“First Philosophy Naturalized: Peirce’s Place in the Analytic Tradition”](#)

**F-5. Contributed Paper Session 26** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Thomas M. Olshewsky (University of Kentucky; New College of Florida)

Speakers:

Francesco Bellucci (Tallinn University of Technology; Università di Bologna)

[“Peirce and the Structure of the Proposition”](#)

Claudio Paolucci (Università di Bologna)

[“From Maps of Cognition to ‘The Law of Mind’: Logic of Relatives, Semiotics and Theory of Proposition in C.S. Peirce”](#)

**F-6. Contributed Paper Session 27** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Gabriele Gava (Goethe Universität)

Speakers:

Victor R. Baker (University of Arizona)

[“Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Geology”](#)

Jesper Hoffmeyer (University of Copenhagen)

[“Biology: The Peircean Connection”](#)

**F-7. Contributed Paper Session 28** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Iris Smith Fischer (University of Kansas)

Speakers:

Mary Magada-Ward (Middle Tennessee State University)

[“What is the American Sublime? Ruminations on Peircean Phenomenology and the Paintings of Barnett Newman”](#)

Kelly A. Parker (Grand Valley State University)

[“Foundations for Semeiotic Aesthetics: Mimesis and Iconicity”](#)

**F-8. Contributed Paper Session 29** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Joshua Black (University of Sheffield)

Speakers:

Fernando Andacht (University of Ottawa)

[“A Metaphorical Road to Peircean Realism: You Can Have the World's Reality and Semiosis Too”](#)

Benjamin J. Chicka (Claremont Graduate University)

[“Pragmatic Constructive Realism: Peirce on Theology and Science”](#)



**F-9. Charles Peirce's Philosophical Roots in New England Transcendentalism**

*(Merrimack 3)*

*Session Chair:* Nicholas Guardiano (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Speakers:

David L. O'Hara (Augustana College)

["In the Neighborhood of Transcendentalism: Platonism, Idealism, and Transcendentalism in Peirce's Thought"](#)

David A. Dilworth (State University of New York Stony Brook)

["Seeds of Peirce's Trichotomic Semeiosis in Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel"](#)

**Concurrent Sessions G**  
**Friday, July 18**  
**1:30 p.m.–3:00 p.m.**

**G-1. Landmarks in Peirce Scholarship: Murray Murphey** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Michael L. Raposa (Lehigh University)

Speakers:

Robert Almeder (Georgia State University)

["The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond"](#)

Terry Godlove (Hofstra University)

["The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond"](#)

Christopher Klemek (The George Washington University)

["The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond"](#)

Michael L. Raposa (Lehigh University)

["The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond"](#)

**G-2. Pragmatism, Inquiry, and the Philosophy of Science** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* José Renato Salatiel (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

Speakers:

Luiz Adelino de Almeida Prado (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

["Belief: A Starting-point in Philosophical Inquiry"](#)

Auro Key Honda (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

["Abduction in Peirce"](#)

José Renato Salatiel (Center for Pragmatism Studies, PUC-SP)

["Some Remarks on Peirce's Tychism: Ontological Chance and Logical Possibility in its Greek Sources"](#)

**G-3. Contributed Paper Session 30** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Vinicius Romanini (University of São Paulo)

Speakers:

Jamin Pelkey (Ryerson University)

["Peircean Evolutionary Linguistics: A Prospectus"](#)

Michael Shapiro (Brown University; Columbia University)

["Reconceiving Linguistics in the Light of Pragmaticism: Language Analysis as Hermeneutic"](#)

**G-4. Contributed Paper Session 31** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Giovanni Tuzet (Bocconi University)

Speakers:

Douglas Niño (Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano)

[“Peirce’s Abduction and Induction: a Proposal for their Explication”](#)

Sami Paavola (University of Helsinki)

[“From Steps and Phases to Dynamically Evolving Abduction”](#)

**G-5. Contributed Paper Session 32** (*Hamilton 2*)

*Session Chair:* Seymour Simmons (Winthrop University)

Speakers:

Daniel Röhe Salomon da Rosa Rodrigues (Universidade de Brasília)

Francisco Moacir de Melo Catunda Martins (Universidade Católica de Brasília)

[“Music: Semiotics and Meaning in Mozart's \*Die Zauberflöte\*”](#)

Henrique Rochelle (Universidade Estadual de Campinas)

[“Semiosis in the Communication of Dance as a Language”](#)

**G-6. Peirce and Royce in Arisbe** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Kipton E. Jensen (Morehouse College)

Speakers:

Randall Auxier (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

[“Once a Future Logic: Peirce, Royce and the Formal Norms of Thinking”](#)

Kelly A. Parker (Grand Valley State University)

[“Peirce Schooling Royce: Methodology, Metaphysics, and Absolute Truth”](#)

Scott Pratt (University of Oregon)

[“Error and the Community of Science”](#)

Kipton E. Jensen (Morehouse College)

[“The Possible Evolves the Actual: Peirce and Royce on Hegel”](#)

**G-7. The Battle for Origins: History and Meaning in Vico and Peirce** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Amadeu Viana S. Andrés (Universitat de Lleida)

Speakers:

Anna Makolkin (Frank Iacobucci Center for Italian-Canadian Studies)

[“The Triadic Continuum in Time: Aristotle, Vico and Charles S. Peirce”](#)

Jürgen Trabant (Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und Verkörperung)

Tullio Viola (Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und Verkörperung)

[“Embodiment in Vico and Peirce: Poiesis, Praxis and Semiosis”](#)

Amadeu Viana S. Andrés (Universitat de Lleida)

Tullio Viola (Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und Verkörperung)

[“Round Table on Vico and Peirce: A Comparative Approach”](#)

**G-8. Contributed Paper Session 33** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Jeff Kasser (Colorado State University)

Speakers:

Hedy Boero (Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos, Argentina Section)

[“Self-controlled Action and Conscience in Peirce’s Ethics”](#)

Daniel G. Campos (Brooklyn College)

[“The Role of Mathematical Reasoning in Ethical Deliberation”](#)

**G-9. Contributed Paper Session 34** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* David L. O’Hara (Augustana College)

Speakers:

Douglas Hare

[“Reconsidering the Neglected Argument”](#)

Robert Whitaker (Marquette University)

[“Implicit Agapism in Peirce’s ‘Neglected Argument’ ”](#)

**G-10. Peirce and the Continuum** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Speakers:

Jérôme Havenel (Collège Ahuntsic)

[“Was Peirce’s Last Conception of Continuity a Failure?”](#)

Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

“Comments”

**Concurrent Sessions H**  
**Saturday, July 19**  
**8:30 a.m.–10:00 a.m.**

**H-1. Two Normative Interpretations of “The Fixation of Belief”** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Samuel V. Bruton (University of Southern Mississippi)

Speakers:

William Knorpp (James Madison University)

[“Smyth’s Normative Interpretation of ‘The Fixation of Belief’ ”](#)

Samuel V. Bruton (University of Southern Mississippi)

[“Short on Smyth on \*FoB\*”](#)

Terry Moore (University of Tennessee)

[“Experience and Aesthetics in Normative Accounts of ‘Fixation’ ”](#)

Charles F. Murray

[“Classification of the Four Methods in Peirce’s ‘The Fixation of Belief’ ”](#)

**H-2. Peirce and Kant on the Nature and Function of Aesthetic Ideals** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

Speakers:

Thomas Adajian (James Madison University)

[“Peirce’s Aesthetic Ideals and Kant’s Ideals of Beauty”](#)

Jeffrey Downard (Northern Arizona University)

[“Kant’s Horizon of Experience and Peirce’s Aesthetic Ideals”](#)

**H-3. The Impact of Peircean Ideas on Biosemiotics** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Eliseo Fernández (Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology)

Speakers:

Victoria N. Alexander (Dactyl Foundation for the Arts and Humanities)

[“A Biosemiotic Definition of Semiotic Object”](#)

Eliseo Fernández (Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology)

[“Biosemiotics, Evolution and Peircean Generalization”](#)

Vinicius Romanini (University of São Paulo)

[“Semeiosis as a Living Process”](#)

**H-4. Indexicality and Beyond: Peirce, Photography and Measurement** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Tullio Viola (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Speakers:

Mirjam Wittmann (Art Academy Duesseldorf)

[“The Image behind the Scene”](#)

Chiara Ambrosio (University College London)

[“Peirce and Galton on Composite Photographs”](#)

Aud Sissel Hoel (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

[“Photography as Measurement Technology”](#)

**H-5. Contributed Paper Session 35** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Preston Stovall (University of Pittsburgh)

Speakers:

Daniel Cerqueira Baiardi (Federal University of Bahia)

[“Semantic Fitness and the Peircean Account of Natural Kind Terms”](#)

Carlos Andrés Garzón Rodríguez (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

[“Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification \(A Peircean Approach\)”](#)

**H-6. Contributed Paper Session 36** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Demetra Sfondoni-Mentzou (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki)

Speakers:

Christos Pechlivanidis (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki; ACT/Anatolia College)

[“What is Behind the Logic of Scientific Discovery? Aristotle and Charles S. Peirce on Imagination”](#)

Miroslava Trajkovski (University of Belgrade)

[“Reasoning by Signs: Peirce and Aristotle”](#)

**H-7. Contributed Paper Session 37** (*Hamilton 2*)

*Session Chair:* Jim Scow (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Speakers:

Jeff Kasser (Colorado State University)

[“Weight of Evidence and the Doubt-Belief Theory of Inquiry”](#)

Juan Eliseo Montoya Marín (Pontificia Bolivariana University)

[“Peirce and Toulmin: Reasonableness, Between Abduction and Argumentation”](#)

**H-8. Contributed Paper Session 38** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University, Bakersfield)

Speakers:

Masato Ishida (University of Hawai'i at Manoa)

["Was Peirce an Unconfused Pragmatist? Kant's Phenomenalism and Peirce's 1878 Pragmatic Maxim"](#)

Uta Priss (Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences)

["A Pragmatist Theory of Learning"](#)

**H-9. Contributed Paper Session 39** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Paul Forster (University of Ottawa)

Speakers:

Joseph E. Earley (Georgetown University)

["Structures, Causes, and Irreversible \('Finious'\) Processes"](#)

José Higuera Rubio (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

["Semiophysics: a Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics for the 21st Century"](#)

**H-10. Peirce's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* Matthew E. Moore (Brooklyn College)

Speakers:

Randall R. Dipert (University at Buffalo)

["Peirce's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind"](#)

**Concurrent Sessions I**  
**Saturday, July 19**  
**1:00 p.m.–2:30 p.m.**

**I-1. Rhetoric and Methodeutic** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)

Speakers:

Gabriele Gava (Goethe Universität)

[“Peirce’s Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing’ and the Relationship between Methodeutic and Speculative Rhetoric”](#)

James Jakób Liszka (State University of New York, Plattsburgh)

[“Peirce’s Rhetoric as a Theory of Inquiry: The Issue of Solidarity versus Truth”](#)

Tony Jappy (University of Perpignan)

[“Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-systems”](#)

Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)

[“Rhetorical Vagueness in Peirce’s Methodeutic”](#)

**I-2. Peirce and the History of Semiotics** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Sponsored by the Peirce Edition Project*

*Session Chair:* Rossella Fabbrichesi (Università di Milano)

Speakers:

Costantino Marmo (Università di Bologna)

[“Peirce’s Use and Interpretation of Medieval Logic and Grammar”](#)

Francesco Bellucci (Tallinn University of Technology; Università di Bologna)

[“Peirce and Modern Semiotics: Locke, Leibniz and the ‘Threshold of Pragmatism’ ”](#)

Claudio Paolucci (Università di Bologna)

[“Schemata, Signs, Representations, and Phenomena: Peirce, Kant, and Husserl”](#)

**I-3. Peirce and the Imagination** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

Speakers:

John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

[“Thinking through the Imagination: Peirce on Creativity”](#)

Robert King (University of Utah)

[“Signs of Imagination: The Value of Peirce for American Literary Studies”](#)

Michael Ventimiglia (Sacred Heart University)

[“Peircean Creativity in the 21st Century: The Case of Burning Man”](#)



**I-4. Contributed Paper Session 40** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Jeffrey Brian Downard (Northern Arizona University)

Speakers:

Asuncion L. Magsino (University of Asia and the Pacific)  
[“Grounding Peircean Realism on the Aristotelian Form”](#)

Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki)  
[“Peirce and Aristotle: A Neo-Aristotelian Version of Scientific Realism”](#)

**I-5. Contributed Paper Session 41** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Alessandro Topa (American University in Cairo)

Speakers:

Mathias Girel (Ecole normale supérieure, Paris)  
[“How Many A Priori Methods? Still Another Look at ‘Fixation’ ”](#)

Charles F. Murray  
[“Platonic Sources for Peirce's Selection of His Four Methods in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ ”](#)

**I-6. Contributed Paper Session 42** (*Merrimack 1*)

*Session Chair:* Vera Saller

Speakers:

Joseph Brent (University of the District of Columbia)  
[“C.S. Peirce: How the Personal Informed the Philosophical”](#)

Iris Smith Fischer (University of Kansas)  
[“Theater in the Life of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1884-1888”](#)

**I-7. Contributed Paper Session 43** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Serge Grigoriev (Ithaca College)

Speakers:

Niall Roe (University of Calgary)  
[“Speculation Unbridled: Scepticism about the External World in Peirce's Philosophy”](#)

Aaron Wilson (South Texas College)  
[“How Peirce ‘Expands our Perception’ ”](#)

**I-8. Contributed Paper Session 44** (*Hamilton 2*)

*Session Chair:* Masato Ishida (University of Hawai'i at Manoa)

Speakers:

Phyllis Chiasson

["Black Swans, Meteor Showers and the Finnish Anomaly: Transforming Education with Peircean-based Proto-Reasoning Skills"](#)

Rubén Darío Henao Ciro (Universidad de Antioquia)

["The Relationship between the Literary Text and the Scientific Text as a Means for the Development of Aesthetic Reasonableness in Math Teachers: A Teaching Strategy for Higher Education"](#) (to be delivered in Spanish, with projected English translation)

**I-9. Short Contribution Session 3** (*Merrimack 2*)

*Session Chair:* Joan Fontrodona (IESE Business School)

Speakers:

Paniel Reyes Cardenas (University of Sheffield)

["Pragmaticism and Models of Rationality and Paraconsistency"](#)

Isabel Jungk (Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo)

["Iconicity in Linguistic Signs and a Semiotical Approach of Etymology"](#)

Mi-Jung Kang (Seoul National University)

["Abduction, Forced Choice, and the New Unconscious"](#)

Amirouche Moktefi (Tallinn University of Technology)

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France, Paris)

["Peirce's Inclusional Notation for Class Logic"](#)

Jim Scow (Virginia Commonwealth University)

["Solving Peirce's Solution to the Liar Paradox"](#)

**I-10. Contributed Paper Session 45** (*Merrimack 3*)

*Session Chair:* Henrique Rochelle (Universidade Estadual de Campinas)

Speakers:

Chihab El Khachab (Wolfson College, Oxford University)

["The Incorporation of Peirce in Deleuze's Cinema"](#)

Adrian Ivakhiv (University of Vermont)

["Peirce and the Film Viewer: Toward a Logico-Ethico-Aesthetics of the Cinema Event"](#)

**Concurrent Sessions J**  
**Saturday, July 19**  
**4:30 p.m.–6:00 p.m.**

**J-1. Gamma Graphs and Modal Logic** (*Lower Lock 2*)

*Session Chair:* Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki; Tallinn University of Technology)

Speakers:

Shigeyuki Atarashi (Doshisha University)

[“An Iconic Treatment of Modality in the Gamma Part of Existential Graphs”](#)

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki; Tallinn University of Technology)

[“Peirce's \(and Other\) Systems of Modal Gamma Graphs”](#)

**J-2. Landmarks in Peirce Scholarship: Max Fisch** (*Lower Lock 1*)

*Session Chair:* David E. Pfeifer (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

Speakers:

David E. Pfeifer (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“University of Illinois and Early Biography Work Years ”](#)

Kenneth L. Ketner (Texas Tech University)

[“Texas Tech and the Harvard Archives Work Years ”](#)

Nathan Houser (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)

[“IUPUI and the Chronological Edition Work Years ”](#)

**J-3. Short Contribution Session 4** (*Concord 1*)

*Session Chair:* Paniel Reyes Cardenas (University of Sheffield)

Speakers:

John Deely (University of St. Thomas, Houston)

[“Thirdness in Nature”](#)

Sascha Freyberg (Max Planck Institute)

[“Cosmology and Culture: Edgar Wind's Continuation of Peircean Logic of Research”](#)

Lorena Ham (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

[“An Aion-Kairos-Kronos Construction for the Continuity of Time and Identity”](#)

Simone Morgagni (LIAS-IMM)

[“Affordances, Valencies and Values”](#)

Stephen Sparks (University of St. Thomas, Houston)

[“Peirce, Kierkegaard and Theosemiotics: Framing the God-Relationship”](#)

**J-4. Contributed Paper Session 46** (*Concord 2*)

*Session Chair:* Ivo Ibri (Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo)

Speakers:

Benoit Gaultier (Collège de France)

[“Pragmatism, Clifford's Principle, and the Doxastic Role of Truth”](#)

James Jakób Liszka (State University of New York, Plattsburgh)

[“Revisiting Peirce's Convergence Theory of Truth”](#)

**J-5. Contributed Paper Session 47** (*Concord 3*)

*Session Chair:* Javier Legris (IIEP-BAIRES, CONICET, and University of Buenos Aires)

Speakers:

Tony Jappy (University of Perpignan)

[“Distinguishing the Literal from the Figurative in Peirce's Mature Conception of Semiosis”](#)

Greg Moses (Texas State University)

[“How to Make our Satisfactions Clear: Critical Pragmatism, Semiotic and the Logic of Nonviolence”](#)

**J-6. Contributed Paper Session 48** (*Hamilton 1*)

*Session Chair:* Sergio Gallegos (Metropolitan State University of Denver)

Speakers:

Harry Procter (University of Hertfordshire)

[“Toward a Peircean Psychology: C.S. Peirce and G.A. Kelly”](#)

Carlos Vidales (University of Guadalajara)

[“A Semiotic Multi-level Approach for the Study of Theoretical Relativism in Communication Research”](#)

**Posters** (*Foyer, Grand Ballroom*)

Mats Bergman (University of Helsinki)  
João Queiroz (Federal University of Juiz de Fora)  
Sami Paavola (University of Helsinki)

[“Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce”](#)

Jesung Park (Tohoku University)

[“Derivation of Categories in Peirce’s ‘New List’: A Schematization”](#)

Vinicius Romanini (University of São Paulo)

[“The Periodic Table of Classes of Signs”](#)

Linda Treude (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

[“Peirce and Knowledge Organization”](#)

## **Committees and Acknowledgments**

### **International Organizing Committee**

*President and Steering Committee Chair:* Jaime Nubiola (University of Navarra)

Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)  
Nathan Houser (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)  
Ivo Ibri (Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo)  
Robert E. Innis (University of Massachusetts Lowell)  
John Kaag (University of Massachusetts Lowell), Steering Committee  
Robert Lane (University of West Georgia), Steering Committee  
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## Program Participants and Contributions

Thomas Adajian, [“Peirce’s Aesthetic Ideals and Kant’s Ideal of Beauty.”](#) Session H-2 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.

In the first presentation, we will examine section 17 in the third *Critique*, where Kant discusses the “Ideal of Beauty.” The goal of this presentation is to examine a number of similarities and dissimilarities between Kant’s and Peirce’s respective accounts of the nature of an aesthetic ideal. In particular, we will examine Kant’s explanation of the way a normal idea is formed and try to use this to clarify Peirce’s comments about the manner in which different pictures and images might be fused into a more coherent and systematic representation.

Anna S. Agbe-Davies, [“Are Beads Good to Think?”](#) Session F-3 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.

Much of the information historical archaeologists have about symbolic meanings comes from documents and from ethnography. A framework that prioritizes the material qualities of signs suits an historical archaeology that seeks to liberate interpretations from a tyranny of texts and symbolic meanings. African diaspora archaeology in particular places great value on survivals, markers, etc., yet pays less attention how these traditions operated within specific cultural contexts. This paper examines beads recovered from slave quarters occupied in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and investigates their legendary qualities—for the people who owned them and the people who find them.

Victoria N. Alexander, [“A Biosemiotic Definition of Semiotic Object.”](#) Session H-3 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.

The semiotic object is sometimes described as a physical thing with material properties and sometimes as an idea. I argue that biosemiotics must be careful to avoid defining semiotic objects in these ways: using materialism on the one hand and mentalism on the other. I claim the “semiotic object” is always ultimately the objective of self-affirmation (of habits, physical or mental) and/or self-preservation; it is never an actual physical thing or idea. If “semiotic objects” are effects more than things, their similarity to “emergent objects,” “intentional objects,” and “objectives” is more obvious, and we can better integrate the various fields from which these similar concepts derive.

Robert Almeder, [“The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond.”](#) Session G-1 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 1.

This panel will explore Murray Murphey’s groundbreaking scholarship devoted to the philosophy of Charles Peirce, beginning with his landmark study of *The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy* (1961), and continuing with the publication of numerous seminal books and articles over a period of 50 years. Panelists will discuss how Murphey transformed our understanding of Peirce’s thought, illuminating its nuances and development, as well as its relationship to the work of other thinkers (such as Kant and Duns Scotus). They

will also link Murphey's work on Peirce to his explication of broader themes in American history and the philosophy of history.

**Chiara Ambrosio, [“Peirce and Galton on Composite Photographs.”](#) Session H-4 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

Composite photographs constitute one of the most powerful metaphors in Peirce's writings. I analyse the origins of Peirce's use of the metaphor and trace it back to his interest in the works of Francis Galton. I claim that it is the very experimental character of Galton's process, and its connections with measurement, which is particularly appealing for Peirce. Thus construed, composite photographs offer an invaluable angle on Peirce's broader views on the formation of ideas and the nature of iconic and diagrammatic representations, and reflect Peirce's standpoint on broader questions, such as scientific measurement and objectivity.

**Fernando Andacht, [“A Metaphorical Road to Peircean Realism: You Can Have the World's Reality and Semiosis Too.”](#) Session F-8 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Hamilton 1.**

The paper revisits one of the three 1868 anti-Cartesian papers, the Cognition Series so as to consider a rhetorical device used in one of them, the rainbow metaphor of “Some consequences of four incapacities”. This verbal image is considered a fundamental discourse strategy to present an early version of what will become the mature, synechistic version of semiotic realism. In order to bring out its relevance for contemporary epistemological discussions (e.g. social constructionism), the text is contrasted with a 1906 lecture on pragmatism by William James. The latter's account of the relationship between representations and reality foregrounds the nominalistic/idealistic present day theories of social constructionism.

**Douglas Anderson, “Comments.” Plenary 4 (Thu. 3:30-5:00), Grand Ballroom.**

**Douglas Anderson, [“The Past, Present and Future of Peirce Scholarship.”](#) Plenary 2 (Wed. 6:30-7:30), Grand Ballroom.**

I will focus a bit on the relationship between history and philosophy, and look at what Peirce had to say about reading historical documents. In particular I will explore his concerns about Zeller's readings of the ancients. I will apply these concerns to the development of Peirce scholarship in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and will then consider what we might do moving forward. I don't believe there is a single recipe for good scholarship, but if we, as a community of scholars, are clear about our purposes and aims in reading Peirce, I believe we can continue to learn from each other even when our readings of Peirce's work are deeply at odds.

**Shigeyuki Atarashi, [“An Iconic Treatment of Modality in the Gamma Part of Existential Graphs.”](#) Session J-1 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Lower Lock 2.**

My aim is to present some ideas for developing the gamma part of Existential Graphs as a system of modal logic. Closed curves drawn by broken lines, i.e., broken cuts, are used for expressing a modal notion of possibility diagrammatically. We scribe graphs on a flat surface, which Peirce calls the sheet of assertion. It may be regarded as a possible world. I bring in a sequence of sheets of assertion, which means an arranged set of possible worlds. I clarify the scope and limit of these devices in the graphical organization of modal predicate logic of the first order.

**Richard Kenneth Atkins, [“Can Perceptions Justify Beliefs? Peirce’s Prescient Reply to Davidson.”](#) Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 1.**

In “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” Donald Davidson argues that perceptions cannot justify beliefs because they lack the appropriate propositional structure. Nearly 80 years earlier, Peirce had a sense of this problem and, in 1903, developed a novel theory to resolve it. This essay is a brief explication of Peirce’s solution in comparison and contrast with contemporary views.

**Richard Kenneth Atkins, [“Geometrical Optical Illusions and Peirce’s ‘Fourth’ Cotary Proposition.”](#) Session F-4 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 2.**

After delivering the seventh of his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, Peirce added a passage to the manuscript stating, but not defending, what I call his fourth cotary proposition: The process that results in a perceptual judgment, and the steps that constitute that process, if subjected to logical analysis, would all be found to have the form of an abductive inference. This paper argues that the contemporary research of cognitive scientists into geometrical optical illusions supports Peirce’s claim.

**Randall Auxier, [“Once a Future Logic: Peirce, Royce and the Formal Norms of Thinking.”](#) Session G-6 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 3.**

Royce and Peirce discussed logic following Peirce's 1898 lectures at Harvard. One cannot help wondering how the conversation progressed. Only a few pieces now survive in their correspondence. Royce defended tetradic logic and achieved results that no Peircean or pragmatist can afford to ignore. What role each played in the other’s logical development is worth exploring. I will attempt to reconstruct the exchange, based on the existing evidence, and to extrapolate toward an answer to the question of where each was tending in his logical explorations.

**Maria de Lourdes Bacha, [“Peirce on the History of Science: ‘The Epistle of Petrus Peregrinus on the Lodestone’.”](#) Session A-10 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

The main objective of this work is to analyze Peirce’s fragment of the transcription and translation of “The Epistle of Petrus Peregrinus on the Loadstone”, in the context of the History of Science. This fragment has been chosen for synthesizing some of the main

topics presented in this article, so what is intended to emphasize is that Peirce seems to be aligned with the 19th-century thought, mainly when it comes to the idea of progress and the importance of experimental science.

**Daniel Cerqueira Baiardi, [“Semantic Fitness and the Peircean Account of Natural Kind Terms.”](#) Session H-5 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.**

The purpose of this paper is to present a new reading for Peirce’s theory of meaning when applied to natural kind terms. This interpretation is essentially naturalized and works with an gradualist and evolutionary approach to epistemology and philosophy of language, aspiring to shed light over some of the main claims of this strategic philosophical movement under the light of contemporary debate around natural kinds. In recent cognitive computing studies was introduced the concept of semantic fitness to model an optimum level of abstraction in order to produce more meaningful representations into a given ontological domain, classifying particular objects in a dynamic and progressive way. I will introduce here this concept for an evolutionary interpretation of Peirce’s theory of meaning and try to expose the advantages of this framework.

**Victor R. Baker, [“Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Geology.”](#) Session F-6 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 1.**

Reasoning in geology has traditionally emphasized synthetic thinking: the continuous activity of comparing, connecting, and putting together thoughts and perceptions. The classical methodological studies of geological reasoning emphasize the formulation of hypotheses and the consideration of the consequential effects of their adoption. In the late 19th century papers by the geologists William Morris Davis (1850-1934), Grove Karl Gilbert (1843-1918) and Thomas Chrowder Chamberlin (1843-1928) all held that hypotheses are suggested by experience with nature itself rather than by theories of nature. There is much evidence from which to infer that all these geologists were influenced by their contacts with Charles Sanders Peirce, who in turn was influenced by geological modes of thinking employed by Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) and Clarence King (1842-1901).

**Victor R. Baker, [“Charles S. Peirce and the Slaty Cleavage Controversy.”](#) Session A-10 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

In 1897 Charles Peirce produced a report for the U.S. Geological Survey evaluating the competing theories for the origin of slaty cleavage posed by Charles Van Hise, and by his friend, George Becker. Peirce concluded that Becker’s otherwise brilliant mathematical analysis did not invalidate critical geological observations summarized by Van Hise. Unfortunately the report was never published, with the result that progress on this problem was impeded for another 50 years.

Sara Barrena, [“Charles S. Peirce in Europe: The Aesthetic Letters.”](#) Session D-1 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.

While Peirce claims not being well acquainted with aesthetics, he always was interested in that field. In spite of the fact that Peirce did not develop the issue in depth, aesthetics is located in his general conception as the foundation of the other normative sciences. Perhaps the trips through Europe and the contemplation of so many works of art and of historic places left in his memory the impressions that are at the basis of the importance that Peirce would assign in his later years to art and aesthetics.

Alexander A. Bauer, [“Material Semeiotics: Unmediated First Thoughts.”](#) Session E-1 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.

This paper lays out how we see the relational view of semeiosis developed by CS Peirce articulating with current thinking about materiality, and explores what Peirce might offer. Peirce's semiotic has long been employed in discourse-centered approaches to language and culture, but it also offers significant possibilities for thinking through the semeiotic processes at work in and through the material world. While this approach builds upon recent work on the pragmatics of archaeological engagement, we suggest that a Peircean approach can cut across intra-disciplinary discourses on materiality to bring questions of biology, practice, and representation within the same analytical frame.

Dave Beisecker, [“Is Peirce a \(Hyper-\)Inferentialist?”](#) Session B-7 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 2.

According to the semantic inferentialism so closely associated with the so-called Pittsburgh School, the contents of claims are to be understood by their locations in an inferentially articulated “space of reasons.” In this paper, I will make a case that Peirce can be read as endorsing a theory of meaning that is broadly inferentialist in orientation. Thus Peirce should be thought of as an important precursor to the Pittsburgh school. The question then is how strong we should take his inferentialism to be; that is, whether he makes room for there to be non-inferential dimensions of concept mastery.

Dave Beisecker, [“Peirce and the Consequences of Denial: A Lesson from the Trees.”](#) Session E-8 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.

In his later, post-1900 formulations of the pragmatic maxim, Peirce instructs us to look not only at the consequences of *affirming* some claim or concept, but also at the consequences of *denying* it. While Peirce isn't forthcoming about why he includes the consequences of denying claims, I argue that this inclusion is important, indeed prescient, and also under-appreciated. Specifically, after aligning these later formulations of the pragmatic maxim with Tableau systems of logical proof, I show how they serve to defuse an objection that Brandom has raised against the semantic project of the classical pragmatists, namely that it subscribes to an insufficiently one-sided view of meaning.

Francesco Bellucci, [“Peirce and Modern Semiotics: Locke, Leibniz and the ‘Threshold of Pragmatism’.”](#) Session I-2 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.

This paper centers on Peirce’s interest in 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>- century theories of signs, especially Locke, whom he followed in considering logic as a doctrine of signs, or Semeiotic, and Leibniz, whose theory of *cognitio caeca sive symbolica* he knew and admired; further, the paper seeks to clear up the reasons behind Peirce’s claim that, through his semiotics, Leibniz had reached the “threshold of pragmatism.”

Francesco Bellucci, [“Peirce and the Structure of the Proposition.”](#) Session F-5 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 3.

In the third section of the 1903 *Syllabus*, Peirce set forth an argument designed to prove that propositions, conceived as those entities that are either true or false, are necessarily composed of two parts: a subject-index and a predicate-icon. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Peirce’s argument. It may be divided into three main steps. In the first, he starts with a provisional definition of proposition. In the second step, he proves that the proposition, in order to conform to that definition, must be internally structured. In the third step, he shows what the parts of the propositional structure are.

Mats Bergman, [“Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.

The poster presents a novel platform The Commens Digital Companion to Charles S. Peirce (<http://www.commens.org>) which was born 2012-2013 by merging Helsinki-based Commens site and Brazilian Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce together. New versions of the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms and the Commens Encyclopedia are presented. The site contains other new features like News, and Bibliography and resources and tools for helping to use and find materials in the site. The aim is to provide new possibilities for the user input and collaboration especially around the dictionary and the encyclopedia.

Mats Bergman, [“Rhetorical Vagueness in Peirce’s Methodeutic.”](#) Session I-1 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.

This paper identifies different ways of reconstructing the relationship between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘methodeutic’, proceeding to a closer examination of the inclusive proposal according to which ‘rhetoric’ and ‘methodeutic’ should be understood as sub-divisions of the third branch of semeiotic. It is argued that this solution, although generally reasonable, may inadvertently obscure several significant Peircean insights concerning the rhetorical character of inquiry. The paper illustrates this claim by highlighting Peirce’s contention that findings must *actually be made* public in order to be properly scientific as well as the vital function of vernacular, figurative, and vague conceptions in his ethics of terminology.

**Mats Bergman, [“What Is an Ultimate Interpretant?”](#) Session A-7 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.**

In Peirce's re-articulation of pragmatism in light of semeiotic and his later conception of the normative sciences, only such habits at the core of adequately examined concepts or beliefs are entitled to the laudatory position of ultimate logical interpretant. At the same time, Peirce occasionally confers this status on *habit-change*, without explicating how this viewpoint fits into the broader pragmatic account of signification. In this paper, I argue that Peirce's rich "Pragmatism" (1907) suggests a solution in its incomplete division of the logical interpretant, which exposes a higher level of clarification beyond that of the ultimate interpretant as habit.

**Nikolaus Bezruczko, [“Peirce's Semiotics Inspire Pre-literacy Assessment Model.”](#) Session B-5 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 3.**

A goal of this presentation is to present several ideas of Peirce that were instrumental in formulating a semiotic construct to measure pre-literacy development of young children. First, semiotic philosophy and contemporary cognition research were conceptually integrated to establish theoretical foundations for a pre-literacy test model. Then characteristics associated with Peirce's semiotics were rated in authentic child drawings and narratives (N = 120). Ratings were transformed with a probabilistic Rasch model, which estimated linear item parameter values that accounted for 79 percent of rater variance. Further analysis indicated sensorimotor, iconic, and abstract symbolic components accounted for 70 percent of item difficulty variance, which provides substantial for this theoretical approach to pre-literacy measurement. Finally, validation analyses found positive correlations between semiotic construct measures and preschool literacy outcomes.

**Joshua Black, [“Habit and Peirce's Theory/Practice Distinction.”](#) Session D-9 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 3.**

Peirce's distinction between theory and practice has been a sticking point for many otherwise sympathetic interpreters. One of the main issues at stake is his place within the wider pragmatist tradition. If Peirce does claim a rigid distinction between the two, then it is hard to see how he can fit into a tradition that emphasises the claim that theoretical inquiry is one amongst our many forms of practical interaction with the world. In this paper I argue that the tension between Peirce's distinction and his place in the pragmatist tradition is merely superficial. First, I introduce an interpretation of Peirce's place in that tradition, focusing on his understanding of theory as a practice. According to this interpretation, Peirce offers an account of our practical interaction with our environment as a form of habit development. Second, I turn to the theory/practice distinction and, in particular, the "no-belief" thesis. I argue that the distinction is ultimately between two "attitude[s] to facts" (RLT:177), and is a consequence of Peirce's understanding of theoretical inquiry as the practice directed to the truth.



**Hedy Boero, [“Self-controlled Action and Conscience in Peirce’s Ethics.”](#) Session G-8 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 2.**

Self-controlled action is one of the keys to the development of Peirce’s ethics. It is not only the object of study of ethics, but also the means to prove the subordination of logic to ethics and one of the explanatory doctrines of his pragmatism. Between 1902 and 1903, Peirce makes a thorough analysis of the nature and internal structure of self-controlled action. He insists particularly on the self-critical character inherent in deliberate conduct, giving to conscience an essential role in moral phenomenon. The aim of this paper is to explore Peirce’s conceptions of self-controlled action and conscience in the context of his ethics. The two points of special interest are: first, his analysis of how reason operates in the process by which a person comes to a deliberate decision; second, the description of conscience as the reflexive judgment of reason in which human agents review their actions and judge them.

**David Boersema, [“Peirce and Virtue Epistemology.”](#) Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 1.**

An important approach to recent analytic epistemology is what has come to be called “virtue epistemology.” Distancing itself from earlier approaches, this approach argues that epistemology is a normative discipline and emphasizes epistemic (or intellectual) virtues as fundamental to the nature of knowing (as a process) and knowledge (as a product), either in terms of reliable cognitive faculties or of reliable knowledge-seeking character traits. I claim that this approach still treats knowledge essentially as a means of passively representing the world, while neglecting Peirce’s insistence that knowing and knowledge are more concerned with actively forecasting future states of the world.

**Priscila Monteiro Borges, [“What Can Assure an Argument?”](#) Session A-8 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 1.**

The paper explores the idea of an argument as a sign class in the ten and in the sixty-six sign classes system. While the system of ten sign classes have only one class of sign identified as an argument, the expanded system has three classes of signs that are identified as an argument. The paper will present the characteristics that define and the ones that distinguish the three classes of arguments in the sixty-six sign classes and discuss their importance to the system of signs, in special, according to the assurance of the signs in the process of signifying.

**Kenneth Boyd, [“Peirce on Illocutionary Acts, Assertion and Commitments.”](#) Session E-7 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 2.**

C.S. Peirce endorsed what is called a “commitment view” of assertion: by asserting we undertake certain commitments, typically to be able to provide reason to believe what we are asserting, or, in Peirce’s terms, to “take responsibility” for its truth. A problem raised for commitment views is that there seem to be instances in which we perform an illocutionary act in which, by doing so, we take responsibility for the truth of a proposition, yet does not seem to be an instance in which we are asserting that

proposition. I argue here that Peirce did not think that assertion was the sole act that involves taking responsibility. Rather, we take responsibility for something whenever we perform an illocutionary act. What differentiates these acts is what we take responsibility for by performing them. This interpretation immunizes Peirce's view from a prominent criticism of commitment views of assertion.

**Joseph Brent, [“C.S. Peirce: How the Personal Informed the Philosophical.”](#)**  
Session I-6 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 1.

**Maria Regina Brioschi, [“Hints toward Cosmology: The Need for Cosmology in Peirce's Thought.”](#)** Session B-10 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Hamilton 2.

The aim of the present paper is to show the need for cosmology in Peirce's thought. To reach this goal, I first clarify Peirce's definition of cosmology and its place in the classification of sciences. Second, I shed light on the entailment of cosmology in Peirce's understanding of metaphysics and of logic. Third, I elucidate these connections in view of Synechism.

**Daniel J. Brunson, [“Common-Sensism, Fallibilism, Pragmatism.”](#)** Session E-4  
(Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.

This paper concerns the intersections of common-sensism, fallibilism, and pragmatism in an effort to more clearly state the differences between Reid and Peirce. This paper contends that Peirce's several critiques of Reid amount to a claim that Reid is insufficiently fallibilist. This paper will then review Reid's account of his own fallibilism (he uses the very word) and how it serves to distinguish him from Hume. Understanding Reid's fallibilism will help to further clarify Peirce's, as well as what it means to be a *Critical* Common-sensist.

**Samuel V. Bruton, [“Peircean Methodetic and the Ethics of Scientific Research.”](#)**  
Session C-8 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.

Despite writing insightfully and at length about the scientific method, Peirce said little about what is now commonly known as “research ethics” or “scientific integrity.” Nonetheless, his thought has much to offer this comparatively under-theorized area of applied ethics. After first sketching a Peircean framework for the ethics of scientific inquiry, I apply this framework to an area of current regulatory and institutional focus: the financial conflicts of interests (FCOIs) that have become commonplace in academic science. A Peircean perspective suggests that the main threat these interests pose to science is somewhat different than what the most common objections to them claim. Instead of incentivizing scientific misconduct, the greater concern is the way such conflicts influence and shape research hypotheses. In Peircean terms, the dangers posed by FCOIs to scientific abduction are more serious and systematic than the risks they pose to scientific induction.

Samuel V. Bruton, [“Short on Smyth on \*FoB\*.”](#) Session H-1 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.

This paper defends two Kantian aspects of Smyth’s reading that Short overlooks: 1) The deontological ethical core of Peirce’s account of the method of science, and 2) the “rhetorical” moral appeal in *FoB* that echoes the second *Critique’s* Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. These Kantian aspects of *FoB* help to show why some of the most common criticisms of Peirce’s essay miss the mark.

Daniel G. Campos, [“The Role of Mathematical Reasoning in Ethical Deliberation.”](#) Session G-8 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 2.

In the 1903 lecture “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?” Charles Peirce provides a detailed account of the process of ethical deliberation intended to shape right conduct. In the course of doing so he claims that it involves making a resolution of the nature of a plan that he likens to a diagram. Taking this as a cue, this paper develops a detailed account of the role of diagrammatic mathematical reasoning in the process of ethical deliberation according to Peirce. It argues that some stages of ethical deliberation are in fact closely analogous to mathematical experimentation. One upshot is that the semiotic abilities for imaginative experimentation and judicious observation are intrinsic not only to mathematical reasoning but to ethical deliberation.

Bernie Cantens, [“Comments.”](#) Session A-6 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 1.

Paniel Reyes Cardenas, [“Pragmatism and Models of Rationality and Paraconsistency.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.

In this paper I shall take on Peirce’s conceptions and distinctions between *Logica Utens*/*Logica Docens* in order to explore how his distinction comes in particularly handy when thinking about the accounts of paraconsistency developed in recent years. The presentation will highlight the senses in which a pragmatist approach to the matter might be an overly interesting alternative for a viewpoint on how to understand contradiction philosophically: a pragmatist account offers a disambiguation of the concept of contradiction from a fallibilist conception of on-going inquiry.

Paniel Reyes Cardenas, [“Pragmatism and the ‘Science of Inquiry’: Peirce’s Plea for Realism and Diagrammatic Reasoning.”](#) Session B-4 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 2.

Peirce understood the nominalist scruple to individualise concepts for collections having the cost of denying properties of true continua. In the process showed some insightful solutions to vibrant problems, as for example, the classic one of universals. Continuity is accounted by the theory of multitude; it frees his analysis from any constraints of the nominalist theories of reality as integrated by incognizable things-in-themselves. His theory of multitude, instead, can be derived with mathematics: By drawing in the work of the ways of abstraction in diagrammatic reasoning I will show the device of diagrammatic reasoning as a plausible pragmatic tool to represent those continua and make sense of Peirce’s scholastic realism. The analysis of continuity is a good example of

how the method of diagrammatic reasoning helps unblock the road of philosophical inquiry and also helps to clarify other problems as, for example, the applicability of Mathematics. General concepts define continua, and, while the properties of true continua are not reducible to properties of the individuals they comprise, they are still intelligible and necessary to ground any science of inquiry.

**Chung-ying Cheng, [“Peirce’s Semiotics and Yijing Symbolics.”](#) Session A-2 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.**

We may introduce Yijing symbolization (through divination or by way of observation and knowledge) of a changing reality in terms of observation, interpretation and judgment by a human mind in light of Peirce’s semiotic triadic relationship of object, sign and interpretant. This will not only extend the use of Peirce’s theory of signs in understanding the function of interpretant, but will also enable us to link his theory of signs to his cosmological theory by way of the Yijing philosophy of generative ontology and creative cosmology.

**Jean-Marie Chevalier, [“Peirce’s Inclusional Notation for Class Logic.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.**

In the second half of the nineteenth century, several notations were in competition among logicians. Boole and his immediate followers used equational notations. However, Peirce and several of his contemporaries favored inclusional notations. In the early 1880 a dispute took place as to what notation should be adopted to represent the copula and incidentally on what is expected from a good notation, both on the grounds of suggestiveness, convenience and philosophical relevance. This short contribution discusses this neglected dispute and how Peirce’s notation stands among the symbolic schemes of the time.

**Jean-Marie Chevalier, [“Senility vs. Stupidity: On Peirce’s Image in Couturat’s Looking-Glass.”](#) Session A-8 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 1.**

Charles Peirce and Louis Couturat died one century ago. Although they both had faith in the development of the algebra of logic, their very tense relationship shows that they did not manage to work as members of a same community of research. Couturat is known to have been close to Russell, but it is not on behalf of logicism that he criticizes Peirce, held to have efficiently contributed to synthesize mathematics and logic. Couturat rather blames Peirce for his technical obscurity; but did he have the intellectual means to grasp Peirce's inventions? He also rejects pragmatism, without clearly perceiving that Peirce was not James nor Schiller.

Phyllis Chiasson, ["Black Swans, Meteor Showers and the Finnish Anomaly: Transforming Education with Peircean-based Proto-Reasoning Skills."](#) Session I-8 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 2.

"Adoption of the Common Core Standards last fall," writes David Wilson (2013) for the Harvard Graduate School of Education, "has shifted the curricula across the nation to hone aptitudes in critical thinking and problem solving." Yet, "decades of cognitive research" suggest that critical thinking cannot be taught (Willingham 2007). Are those Common Core Standards expecting the impossible? The stunning results of Finland's nation-wide educational reforms (Hancock 2011; Gamerman 2008) suggests that those cognitive researchers may have been looking at results of the wrong kind of training in critical thinking. This paper introduces a set of relatively simple Peircean principles and methods for the development of the proto-reasoning skills necessary for becoming an effective critical thinker, principles adaptable for all grade levels and all subjects.

Benjamin J. Chicka, ["Pragmatic Constructive Realism: Peirce on Theology and Science."](#) Session F-8 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Hamilton 1.

The field of religion and science is facing methodological stagnation. Rather than learning *from* science, some theologians are merely learning *about* science to discover which findings can illustrate their theological concepts. Refuting such theologies with scientific findings they ignore is a trivial task, and an indication that both sides ignore the fallible and ongoing nature of human inquiry. But two theologians, Philip Clayton and Robert Neville, have been using the work of Charles S. Peirce to engage science and yet they reach divergent conclusions. A closer examination of their shared commitments to Peirce may indicate ways this founder of pragmatism can serve as a rejoinder for two important theological projects.

Craig N. Cipolla, ["What Difference Does Peirce Make? Considering Community-based Entanglements in the Archaeology of Colonialism."](#) Session F-3 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.

This paper examines the ways in which pragmatic, Peircian-inspired approaches shed light on current archaeological efforts to become more inclusive. Seen in recent collaborative, indigenous, and participatory archaeologies, these new efforts align well with Peirce's notion of *synechism*. I apply this idea to a recent problem in New England archaeology: the debates over New England's ceremonial stone landscapes, or lack thereof. Over the last few years, indigenous groups in the area have spoken out against standard archaeological interpretations of stone features. I argue that the writings of Peirce have much to contribute to this growing area of tension.

Vincent Colapietro, [“Experimental Intelligence, Dramatic Narrative and Philosophical Self-Understanding.”](#) Plenary 10 (Sat. 6:30-9:00), Grand Ballroom.

It is likely that Peirce held no philosopher in higher esteem than Plato. Even so, he claimed: “Although Plato’s whole philosophy is a philosophy of Thirdness ... he himself only recognizes duality ...” “This misunderstanding, this failure to recognize his own conceptions,” Peirce stresses, “marks Plato throughout.” “It is,” he adds, “characteristic of the man that he sees more deeply into the nature of things than he does into the nature of his own philosophy, and it is a trait to which we cannot altogether refuse our esteem” (*EP* 2, 38). There is no philosopher whom I hold in greater regard than Peirce, but on the centennial of his death it seems especially appropriate to question whether *he* might have misunderstood the character of his own undertaking. In order to render this plausible, however, we need to construct a dramatic narrative in which Peirce’s own avowed purposes and explicit self-portrayals are treated with the utmost respect. This specific instance of (alleged) philosophical self-misunderstanding helps us bring into sharper focus than Peirce ever managed not only the specific shortcomings of his philosophical reflexivity but also the general topic of human self-understanding. Despite seeing more deeply into the nature of things than into that of his own philosophy, hence, Peirce greatly assists us in doing fuller justice to the difficult, delicate task of self-understanding than he ever set out to. Just as the very possibility of experimental intelligence depends on the presence of narrative consciousness, so an adequate characterization of Peirce’s philosophical endeavors rests upon according reflexivity as central a place as experience. In this as in countless other instances, Peirce helps *us* to see what *he* failed to see.

Tim Connolly, [“Fallibilism in Early Confucian Philosophy.”](#) Session A-2 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.

Bryan Van Norden has recently argued that the Confucian tradition would benefit from an epistemological fallibilism, in which beliefs are held to be open to re-examination and revision rather than as absolutely certain. In this paper I examine some potential resources for a fallibilist approach in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. I argue that while Confucian self-correction differs from Peircean self-corrective inquiry in important ways, it nonetheless can be seen as entailing a kind of fallibilism.

Zoë Crossland, [“Material Semeiotics: Unmediated First Thoughts.”](#) Session E-1 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.

This paper lays out how we see the relational view of semeiosis developed by CS Peirce articulating with current thinking about materiality, and explores what Peirce might offer. Peirce’s semiotic has long been employed in discourse-centered approaches to language and culture, but it also offers significant possibilities for thinking through the semeiotic processes at work in and through the material world. While this approach builds upon recent work on the pragmatics of archaeological engagement, we suggest that a Peircean approach can cut across intra-disciplinary discourses on materiality to bring questions of biology, practice, and representation within the same analytical frame.

Joseph W. Dauben, [“Peirce, the Mathematician: Eisele’s Crusade.”](#) Session D-6 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 1.

Carolyn Eisele (1902–2000) was one of the leading Peirce scholars of her generation, and she worked tirelessly to promote what she regarded as the seminal role mathematics played in virtually every aspect of Peirce’s development as a philosopher. Trained as a mathematician at Hunter College, Columbia University, and the University of Chicago, she spent her entire career teaching mathematics and history of mathematics at her alma mater, Hunter College, from 1923 until her retirement in 1972. Her interest in Peirce developed in the late 1940s when she was called upon to teach a course on history of mathematics at Hunter, for which she prepared by studying many of the books in the Plimpton collection of rare mathematical books at Columbia University, where she had earlier studied history of mathematics with D.E. Smith. But it was a thorough analysis Peirce had made of the *Liber Abaci* for Plimpton that Eisele chanced to read in the course of her research that convinced her Peirce was a figure who deserved more attention. Thus began what can only be called her crusade to make the importance of Peirce’s mathematics better known not only among mathematicians, but philosophers and historians as well. Convinced that Peirce’s mathematics had been long neglected, she began to set the record straight in various publications culminating in *The New Elements of Mathematics of Charles S. Peirce* (Mouton, 1976), in five volumes. This presentation will focus on Eisele’s reasons for championing Peirce so vigorously, especially his mathematics, and recount the steps in her career that led to the publication of the *New Elements of Mathematics* in particular.

André De Tienne, [“1914–2014: One Hundred Years of Editing and Publishing Peirce.”](#) Session F-1 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 1.

This presentation will pay homage to all the major figures who, from the time Josiah Royce saved the Peirce papers from oblivion by getting them shipped to his Harvard office, gave years or decades of their lives to the organization, selection, editing, and publications of Peirce's writings. The presentation will also bring into relief the gradual development and increased sophistication of the methods used in reconstituting and editing Peirce's texts, up to the present day, with an overview of the work accomplished by the Peirce Edition Project and a preview of the production platform the Project has been developing recently.

André De Tienne, [“Celebrating the Sesquicentennial of Peirce’s Search for the Categories.”](#) Session A-4 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 3.

It was in 1864-65 that Peirce, after conducting a vigorous struggle with Kant and other philosophers over nearly ten years, finally clarified both the method and the purpose of his fundamental philosophical quest, which was finding the answer to the question "What are the elements that are always present in any process of cognition, no matter what form it may take." One important move that allowed Peirce to go to the root of the problem was to re-conceive the very concept of the "manifold of senses," also known as the starting point of inquiry. Once Peirce redefined that starting-point, it only took him three years to hone the final inductive argument, whose import long remained under-

appreciated or misunderstood both within the scholarship and much of the rest of the philosophical world. This paper will seek to reassess what exactly took place in 1864-65 that led to the event of 1867 that Peirce first rehearsed in the fall of 1866): the advent of the new list of categories. What was that event? And what is it about its consequences that help explain why Peirce was not mistaken to believe, not only immediately after he wrote the final form of his article, but even nearly half a century later after considerable theoretical development, that the argument of the "New List" was and would remain his most lasting contribution to philosophy, not a mere stepping stone, by a genuine keystone in the history of philosophy.

**Cornelis de Waal, [“Charles S. Peirce and the Abduction of Einstein.”](#) Session B-9 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 3.**

The paper uses Peirce’s notion of abduction as a mode of inference to shed light on the reasoning processes that lie behind Einstein’s 1905 “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” which is the de facto birthplace of Einstein’s special theory of relativity.

**Cornelis de Waal, [“Space, Time and Natural Law: A Peircean Look at Smolin’s Temporal Naturalism.”](#) Session A-5 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.**

In *Time Reborn* and elsewhere physicist Lee Smolin identifies Peirce as a precursor to his view that natural laws evolved, a view that runs counter the received opinion within physics that time isn’t real. After discussing Smolin’s arguments for the reality of time, two approaches advocated by Smolin—cosmological natural selection and quantum energetic causal set theory—are discussed in the context of Peirce’s cosmology. It is shown that Peirce’s approach provides a possible ground for a physical theory like quantum energetic causal set theory, opening the way for a full-fledged cosmology that does justice to contemporary physics.

**Shannon Dea, [“Towards a Peircean Metaphysics of Sex.”](#) Session B-5 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 3.**

I consider challenges to traditional sex taxonomies posed by inter-species variation and by human intersex varieties in order to assess the applicability of Peirce’s scientific realism to the metaphysics of sex. I argue that Peirce’s synechism and tychism combine to form the skeleton of a realist account of biological sex that is sufficiently nuanced to handle both the complexity of empirical data and the worries of gender theorists. In particular, synechism helps us to better understand genotypic, phenotypic, and cellular continuities between the sexes. By contrast, tychism leads to a reconception of male and female as bimodal rather than binaristic.

**Terrence W. Deacon, [“Origins of Biosemiosis and Peirce’s Notion of Self as Sign.”](#) Session D-3 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Building on Peirce’s notion of habits-beget-habits (reformulated as constraints-beget-constraints) I show how the reciprocally supportive linkage between two constraint-generating (i.e. self-organizing) physical processes can generate a higher-order formal



constraint that maintains its own persistence against damage and dissolution and persists despite changes in its physical substrates. The ability for a constraint to persist across changes of substrate and dynamics is the necessary and sufficient condition for it to serve as an intrinsic sign. Using this as a model for the transition to life from non-life this reproducible higher-order substrate in-different constraint is shown to constitute the biological “self” that provides both organism unity and also can be transferred in unbroken continuity down a phylogenetic lineage.

**John Deely, [“The Terms ‘Sign’ and ‘Representamen’ in Peirce.”](#) Session C-5 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Starting from (<http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.htm>), Robert Marty’s “76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce”, this presentation adds other Peirce texts and organizes the resultant series chronologically, eighty-four in all (from D1 to D84), from the earliest in 1865 to the latest of 1911. Then, having systematically chronologized the texts defining sign, I examine the entanglement from 1866 to 1911 of Peirce’s usage of the term “representamen” in connection with the term “sign”, in order to determine the respective theoretical import of the two terms. Finally, I show that this correlated usage of the two terms in question reveals what is, historically speaking, unique and revolutionary in Peirce’s “doctrine of signs”, namely, his distinction between Interpretant and Interpreter with the subsequent argument that Interpretants need not be mental, thus opening the way to an understanding of the action of signs perfusing the universe in its totality.

**John Deely, [“Thirdness in Nature.”](#) Session J-3 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 1.**

This paper examines the role of triadic relations in which sign action consists as occurring in physical nature prior to and independently of biological life. Peirce’s idea of “being *in futuro*” as sufficient for the notion of Interpretant opens the way to semiotic understanding of the universe’s physical evolution: when an Interpretant as a physical situation results *indirectly* from a *direct* dyadic interaction that *changes the relation* of the universe in the direction of being closer to being able to sustain life, that *new situation* must be regarded as a Thirdness in comparison with the presupposed Secondness.

**David A. Dilworth, [“Seeds of Peirce’s Trichotomic Semeiosis in Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel.”](#) Session F-9 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 3.**

This paper sketches the big ticket items of Peirce’s objective idealism and semeiotic realism in relation to nineteenth-century European precedents. Peirce participated in a Zeitgeist of scientific, literary, and philosophical transformations of his century. His career overlapped that of Emerson whose writings were a chief conduit of the forms of nineteenth-century Romanticism and Idealism. Peirce carried on Emerson’s trajectory, consciously transforming Kant’s critical idealism by drawing upon Schiller’s *Aesthetic Letters* and the phases of Schelling’s objective idealism, while positioning himself in regard to Hegel’s absolute idealism.

**Randall R. Dipert, [“Peirce’s Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind.”](#) Session H-10 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.**

One current debate in the philosophy of mind is about the metaphysics of mind. Are mental phenomena really nothing but physical phenomena? In a remarkable development in contemporary philosophy, reductions of mental to physical phenomena have been subjected to withering attack by Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, and others. One proposal that has emerged in the “Mind or Matter or Both?” contest is: none of the above. Since some of Peirce’s early work rejected Descartes’ method and conclusions, it is hardly surprising that he would have developed a metaphysics and theory of mind that rejects Descartes’ distinctions. For Peirce, matter is effete mind, that is, it consists of entities that are more, rather than less, governed by fixed dispositions (habits), while mind is more prone to spontaneity. Peirce’s view also and remarkably addresses another major dispute in contemporary ontology: whether there are only dispositional properties (propensities) or categorical properties.

**Andrew Diversey, [“The Correct Order of Peirce’s Ten Sign Trichotomies.”](#) Session C-5 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Despite numerous attempts on the part of Charles S. Peirce and subsequent researchers to solve the ordering problem of Decad, Peirce’s most complex sign typology composed of ten trichotomies, the correct order thereof for the purpose of creating sign combinations would remain elusive for over one hundred years. Based on a reanalysis of Peirce’s concept of determination as it relates to the phenomenological hierarchy of the ten trichotomies, the correct order of Decad has now been discovered. This order has since been subjected to extensive verification and has not been found wanting. It generates only logically possible sign combinations and can thus account for all actually existing signs, including the many empirical examples provided by Peirce. Consequently, Decad has become a sign typology of undeniable practicality and should therefore prove to be of beneficial use in all manner of semiotic investigation.

**Jeffrey Downard, [“Kant’s Horizon of Experience and Peirce’s Aesthetic Ideals.”](#) Session H-2 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

In the second presentation, we will examine Kant’s discussion of the logical, practical and aesthetic dimensions of the horizon of cognition in the *Lectures on Logic*. The aim is to draw on Kant’s account to sort out some of the relationships between the function of the final interpretant, on the one hand, and the functions of the emotional, energetic and logical interpretants, on the other. At the end, we will reflect on some analogies between the idea of the absolute horizon in projective geometry and the Peirce’s conception of absolute truth as an idealization of the limits of inquiry.

Jeffrey Downard, [“Peirce’s Interpretant and the Essential Triad.”](#) Session A-7 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.

In “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” Peirce develops a ten-fold classification of signs. He argues that the triadic relationship between the three correlates is essential for synthetic judgment and inference. A number of different models have been offered to explain the nature of the triad, but they fail to illustrate some key features of the relationships that are involved. In this paper, I return to the basic points Peirce makes about the connections that are forged between the three correlates in the sign relation and build a very simple set of diagrams that can be used to clarify what is special about the triadic relation.

Joseph E. Earley, [“Structures, Causes, and Irreversible \(‘Finious’\) Processes.”](#) Session H-9 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.

Structuralist philosophical approaches to philosophy of science are now widely discussed—but it is not clear whether “structures” can properly be said to exhibit causal efficacy. Peirce argued (CP 1.213) that efficient causes alone cannot account for the definite outcomes of irreversible (“finious”) processes. When entities corresponding to two or more compositional levels interact so as to generate specific results in such a way that each level influences the constitution of the other(s), usual philosophic assumptions regarding causality do not apply. In such cases, closures of networks of relations (structures) determine outcomes of interactions of agents. This is especially evident in processes involving far-from-equilibrium open-system coherences (“dissipative structures”), including—as Peirce (CP 7.395) noted—biological evolution. Consideration of available specific examples of such structural determination might resolve, or at least clarify, some recent controversies among philosophers.

Joseph L. Esposito, [“Peirce and Holmes.”](#) Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 1.

Among Peirce scholars, Peirce and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. influenced each other in the early 1870s Metaphysical Club to the benefit of both legal and logical pragmatism. Holmes’ scholars suggest that Peirce’s influence was either non-existent or transient, a view supported by Holmes’ own life-long disparaging view of Peirce. However, we know that Holmes attended some of Peirce’s 1866 Lowell Lectures and found them stimulating. I argue that at a time when Holmes was beginning to think about questions of the legitimacy of law, Peirce was showing him new ways of thinking about the legitimacy of knowledge.

Rossella Fabbrichesi, [“The Iconic Ground of Gestures: A Threshold between Semiotics and Pragmatism.”](#) Session B-1 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Lower Lock 1.

The gesture is the pragmatic unity par excellence, and it triggers a social response. Principally held by George Herbert Mead, this view has a germinal treatment also in Peirce’s thought. Peirce’s analysis of signs offers many elements to treat the theme of gestures in human cultures. Peirce especially underlined the iconic and metaphoric root of any kind of gesture, and he understood iconism as “mimicry” (Peirce CP 2.280)

between sign and object. That does not mean, however, that gestures have a 'naturalistic' similarity with what they represent, but that they permit a practice of tuning between man and world.

**Paul Eduardo Femenia, [“Peirce, Secondness and Teaching by Example of Kuhn in Teaching Engineering.”](#) Session A-10 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

This work is a preliminary report on an investigation that is being developed at the Faculty of Engineering of the National University of San Juan. More precisely we are studying works of Doctoral candidates formed in the area of the PMU (phasor measurement unit) which is a device used to measure the electrical waves on an electricity grid. The objective of this research is to find ways to develop in doctoral students the ability to generate hypotheses for their doctoral thesis, due to which is the stage in which greatest difficulty we have detected.

**Eliseo Fernández, [“Biosemiotics, Evolution and Peircean Generalization.”](#) Session H-3 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

Current philosophy tends to restrict the term generalization to the intellectual domain of concepts and theories. Peirce, on the contrary, viewed logical generalization as just an analog of concrete generalization taking place in nature. The acquisition and transformation of habits, which are generalizing tendencies, propels the unfolding of cosmic, biological, cultural and technological novelties. I attempt to extend this idea by observing that generalizations preserve as a limit case the conceptions they generalize (e.g., as the real numbers include the integers). I propose that evolutionary novelties analogously preserve aspects of the structures from which they evolved. Multiple examples follow.

**Patrycja Filipowicz, [“Images of the Lost World: The Peircean Perspective on Catalhöyük Imagery in the Chalcolithic.”](#) Session E-1 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.**

Archaeological interests in meaning and significance dominated a considerable segment of archaeological thought in the last thirty years. The debate was largely carried out within the framework of structuralism and poststructuralism. The Charles S. Peirce's semiotics, itself heuristically very powerful, was surprisingly unexplored and its relevance to archaeology remains largely in dark. In my paper I intend to demonstrate a significance of some aspects of the Peirce's semiotics for grasping the nature of the Neolithic imagery and its transformations. In particular, I will be referring to the triadic and pragmatic theory of signs.

**Iris Smith Fischer, [“Theater in the Life of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1884-1888.”](#) Session I-6 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 1.**

Theatre played an important role in the life of Charles Peirce during the mid-1880s. Juliette Peirce pursued the study of acting with the innovative playwright and director Steele Mackaye, who had introduced the ideas of his mentor François Delsarte in the United States and founded the first American school of acting. Peirce's 1888 essay

“Trichotomic” addresses the triadic principles at work in Mackaye’s approach, called “aesthetic expression,” dressing them in Peirce’s own triadic categories of life and experience. Hints of Peirce’s interest in aesthetic expression also appear in “A Guess at the Riddle,” on which he was working in 1887-1888. Mackaye’s aesthetics seemed to be informed by a semeiotic method similar to Peirce’s own. This paper explores the extent to which (1) Mackaye’s aesthetic expression offered a scientific approach to actor training, as he claimed, and (2), Delsarte’s principles engaged actors in what Peirce called inquiry.

**Jorge Alejandro Flórez, [“Development of Peirce’s Concept of Induction.”](#)  
Session E-5 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

This paper aims to present the development of Peirce’s concept of induction. It will be exposed through his writings on logic since his early writings, such as his Harvard Lectures on science in 1865, to his late accounts on induction such as that on Neglected Argument in 1908. As a hypothesis of this work I consider that, following the logic of his synechism and his evolutionary philosophy, Peirce’s idea of induction evolved and growth from a very basic form of inference in logic to a most complex process in the field of theory of inquiry.

**Joan Fontrodona, [“Peirce and Management Inquiry: Some Insights for a New Paradigm in Business.”](#) Session D-8 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 2.**

Peirce had a very negative opinion about business. However, his ideas offer a good basis for a better understanding of what is business about. The dominant paradigm of business, that focuses on maximizing shareholder value, has been challenged from different angles, and alternative proposals have been presented. This paper builds on some of Peirce’s ideas in order to offer a different view of the nature of business and its role in society, as well as the meaning and significance of management, in such a way that even Peirce would feel comfortable.

**Paul Forster, [“First Philosophy Naturalized: Peirce’s Place in the Analytic Tradition.”](#) Session F-4 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 2.**

Peirce is often deemed a Kantian because he believes logic provides the foundation for epistemology and metaphysics and that logical truths are prior to, and independent of, findings of the natural sciences. He is often dubbed a naturalist because he denies there is knowledge firmer or higher than empirical science and insists that claims in logic and natural science are epistemologically and ontologically on a par—that is, both sorts of claims are justified in the same way, true in the same sense and tell us about reality. What is less often discussed is how Peirce manages to maintain these seemingly incompatible outlooks simultaneously. I address this question by comparing Peirce’s view of logic and philosophy to the views of Carnap and Quine. Viewed from this angle, I claim, Peirce’s philosophical outlook is not only coherent but far more ingenious than even many admirers have appreciated.

**Mathew A. Foust, [“Confucius, Peirce and the Fixation of Belief.”](#) Session A-2 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.**

When it comes to normative views concerning the character of inquiry and belief, how closely related are Confucius and Peirce? Are Peirce's views of inquiry and belief Confucian? Barring anachronism, are Confucius's views of inquiry and belief Peircean? Tradition has it that Confucius is the embodiment of the wise sage imparting wisdom to disciples and whoever is near; thus, the method of authority appears to be that which Confucius would endorse. However, there is substantial debate in contemporary Confucian scholarship concerning the relationship between Confucius and 'authority.' Contributing to this discussion, this essay reads the *Analects* through Peircean lenses.

**Sascha Freyberg, [“Cosmology and Culture: Edgar Wind's Continuation of Peircean Logic of Research.”](#) Session J-3 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 1.**

This short presentation introduces part of Edgar Wind's (1900-1971) philosophical work claiming that it constitutes the first reception and continuation of Peirce's ideas in German philosophy and one of their earliest applications in the humanities at all. The context of this reception is especially interesting because it shows how the foundational problems in epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of culture interconnected, when Neo-Kantianism was confronted with Pragmatism. The focus of the argument is theory of experiment which was developed according to the pragmatic maxim.

**Sergio Gallegos, [“Peirce and Self-knowledge.”](#) Session C-9 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.**

In this paper, I argue that, although Peirce rejects some of the main features of the traditional conception of self-knowledge defended by authors such as Descartes or Kant (in particular, the theses that we have an infallible faculty of introspection and that our self-consciousness is intuitive), he still endorses a version of the truism that we have a privileged knowledge of our minds. According to Peirce, this version just consists in the claim that we have a certain tendency to conjecture rightly. I also argue that this conception of privileged self-knowledge enables us to cast light on the source of self-control for Peirce.

**Carlos Andrés Garzón Rodríguez, [“Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification \(A Peircean Approach\).”](#) Session H-5 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.**

In the paper, I present the basis for a pragmatic, contextualist and inferentialist strategy for understanding the concept of *degrees of justification*. I argue that each context has certain inferential criteria in order to do correct assertions, and that there are different standards of justification for an assertion to be regarded as highly, moderately or poorly justified in that context. What is a high, medium or low standard of justification is relative to the community in which certain inferential practices take place. Finally, I identify peircean methods of justification that in every

**Benoit Gaultier, [“Pragmatism, Clifford’s Principle, and the Doxastic Role of Truth.”](#)  
Session J-4 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 2.**

Is pragmatism acceptable when it comes to understand the relationships between belief, evidence, and the goals or values we have in our lives or inquiries? The point I would like to defend, and that I regard as decisive against pragmatism in general, is that moving from doubt to belief is not judging or believing anything about what should be judged or believed on a given question. This idea radically opposes Charles Peirce’s conception of inquiry that wondering whether *p* is wanting “to attain a state of belief unassailable by doubt” (5.416), or that “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion” (5.374). However, there is at least one major figure of pragmatism, Frank Ramsey, who precisely argues for the thesis about belief and inquiry I support and which is in opposition to Peirce’s, James’s, or Levi’s pragmatisms.

**Gabriele Gava, [“Peirce’s ‘Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing’ and the Relationship between Methodetic and Speculative Rhetoric.”](#) Session I-1  
(Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.**

Peirce’s 1904 manuscript “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing” has been used by scholars as a clue to determine the exact relationship between *methodetic* and *speculative rhetoric*. In fact, in this paper Peirce introduces a classification of rhetoric studies, where he includes a rhetoric of science. This has led some commentators to claim that methodetic is nothing but a subclass of speculative rhetoric, e.g. the class considering the rules governing the communication of scientific discoveries. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the identification of the classification introduced in “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing” with a classification of the subclasses of speculative rhetoric.

**Mathias Girel, [“How Many A Priori Methods? Still Another Look at ‘Fixation.’”](#)  
Session I-5 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 3.**

In spite of all the inspiring readings of Peirce’s Illustrations, two problems about the a priori method, believing what pleases reason, seem to be still pending: (1) It differs dramatically, from one version to another, and these variations suggest that it would be careless to think that Peirce’s “list” of methods in the Illustrations is confined to the “four” methods for the settlement of belief. Its function is clearly delimited in a negative way: the method consists entirely in the desire that beliefs are fixed neither by individual whims nor by that of the State, but that still leaves a full register of methods, which overlap without being identical. I’ll study three of them here. (2) One can wonder whether it is a method for the fixation of beliefs and not a mere method for elucidating beliefs that owe nothing to this method to be deeply rooted in us. Is the method useful for telling which beliefs can be retained because they please reason or for revealing what pleases reason?

Mary Louise Gleason, [“Carolyn Eisele at Harvard: Her ‘Charlie.’”](#) Session D-6 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 1.

Carolyn Eisele’s research and publications made Peirce’s writings on mathematics and history of science widely available. Over the course of many years she commuted between teaching mathematics midweek at Hunter College, CUNY, to long weekends researching Peircian archives at Harvard. In Cambridge, she stayed at the former Radcliffe Graduate Center where she hosted graduate students with tea and cookies and chats about life in general and about her “Charlie” in particular. She was a beloved teacher, a brilliant scholar, a woman whose life spanned a century of great change, a pioneer in a newly emerging field of study, and a woman ahead of her time.

Terry Godlove, [“The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond.”](#) Session G-1 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 1.

This panel will explore Murray Murphey’s groundbreaking scholarship devoted to the philosophy of Charles Peirce, beginning with his landmark study of *The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy* (1961), and continuing with the publication of numerous seminal books and articles over a period of 50 years. Panelists will discuss how Murphey transformed our understanding of Peirce’s thought, illuminating its nuances and development, as well as its relationship to the work of other thinkers (such as Kant and Duns Scotus). They will also link Murphey’s work on Peirce to his explication of broader themes in American history and the philosophy of history.

Carina Gonzalez, [“Some Considerations on the Role of Firstness in Natural and Artistic Beauty in the Light of Peirce’s Philosophy.”](#) Session C-2 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.

Our paper’s objective is based on Peirce’s *Objective Idealism*, which upholds that the universe is made up of one only substance, *ideality*, thus upon a kind of *Monism*. We will consider how, by resorting to his phenomenological categories, *Firstness*, *Secondness* and *Thirdness*, his Normative Sciences, and his Metaphysics, to show that the creative processes in Nature are analogous to the ones in man’s cultural processes, particularly in Artistic Beauty, by drawing on examples from the various Arts, such as Dance and Music.

Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez, [“The Role of Information in Abductive Reasoning.”](#) Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 1.

The objective of this work is to analyze the concepts of information and abduction in the context of the creative processes of scientific discovery, stressing the relevance of Charles S. Peirce’s work on contemporaneity. The central question here can be formulated thus: what is the role of information in scientific discovery? In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, we shall analyze the semiotic concept of information and its relation to the abductive reasoning, arguing that scientific discovery can be understood as a form of application of abduction in an endeavor to expand the informational universe.



Serge Grigoriev, [“Peirce’s Separation of Theory from Practice.”](#) Session D-9 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 3.

The paper concerns itself with Peirce’s insistence on the separation of theory from practice. Such separation seems untenable in the light of the fact that science is necessarily a social practice which relies on the establishment of a certain favorable form of life to promote and sustain it. It is argued that we gain a better understanding of Peirce’s position by inquiring about the ultimate moral aims of inquiry. These must consist, according to the analysis offered, in gaining a sense of the concrete reasonableness of the universe and developing the possibility of rational autonomy within the context of universe thus understood. However, it is also argued that the attainment of these normative ideals cannot be separated from reckoning with the utilitarian concerns bound up with the pragmatic mode of the advancement of inquiry.

Susan Haack, [“Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry.”](#) Plenary 1 (Wed. 4:45-6:15), Grand Ballroom.

The first goal is to understand why Peirce describes this motto as a corollary of the “first rule of reason,” why he believes it deserves to be inscribed on every wall of the city of philosophy, and what he has in mind when he characterizes the various barricades philosophers set up, the many obstacles they put in the path of inquiry. This soon leads us to important, substantive themes in Peirce’s meta-philosophical, cosmological, metaphysical, logical, and epistemological work (§1). However, it also leads us to what might seem to be a tension in Peirce’s account of the motives for inquiry. So the second goal is to track the source of this apparent tension, and to show how Peirce resolved it (§2). But the ultimate goal is to explain why Peirce’s warning against blocking the way of inquiry is no less important, given the condition of philosophy today, than it was when he offered it more than a century ago—perhaps even more so (§3).

Lorena Ham, [“An Aion-Kairos-Kronos Construction for the Continuity of Time and Identity.”](#) Session J-3 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 1.

This paper introduces an interpretation of the concept of identity as related to the concept of time by exploring the classical philosophical Greek concepts Aion, Kairos and Kronos, as well as Peirce’s continuum concept. Identity, as a semeiotic product, is reinforced, actualized, and regulated in the continuity of time.

Douglas Hare, [“Reconsidering the Neglected Argument.”](#) Session G-9 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 3.

In his 1908 essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” C.S. Peirce disparages his own argument—calling it a “poor sketch” or “table of contents” from which others might be able to “guess” his intentions. This short paper will attempt to fill in the sketch in more detail in order to do some guesswork as to why a brilliant logician would not attempt something similar to an updated version of Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence. An endeavor is made to clarify why Peirce would rather pursue a theory of religious experience which is open to any honest person, while

simultaneously tracing how the structural methodology of the act of musing upon the hypothesis of the reality of God, noting its practical effects upon believers, is compatible with his distinctive logic of science and lifelong preoccupation with the attempt to understand and acknowledge the absolutely infinite.

**Jérôme Havenel, [“Was Peirce’s Last Conception of Continuity a Failure?”](#)  
Session G-10 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Among Peirce’s evolution regarding the concept of Continuity, most commentators have focused their attention on the penultimate period, since the last period, which can be called “Topological”, has raised strong criticism among the best of Peirce’s commentators. In this presentation we will present what were Peirce’s goals, then we will try to assess to what extent he succeeded or not. We will also examine whether today’s logical and mathematical tools could have helped Peirce go further and will try to assess to which extent Peirce’s last conception of Continuity is, or not, a useful tool for philosophy.

**Rubén Darío Henoa Ciro, [“The Relationship between the Literary Text and the Scientific Text as a Means for the Development of Aesthetic Reasonableness in Math Teachers: A Teaching Strategy for Higher Education.”](#) Session I-8 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 2. (To be delivered in Spanish, with projected English translation.)**

The text proposes the aesthetic reasonableness as an interpersonal process to establish relationships between literature and mathematics, based on the Abduction Logic of Pierce (1839-1914) and some of his followers, such as Anderson (1987), Barrera (1971), Nubiola (1953), Zalamea (1959) and Oostra (1966), and Barthes’ “The Textual Analysis”. The strategy is applied on 300 students using means such as Edgar Allan Poe’s “A Descent into the Maelström”, a “Sound Image” of the narrative, a “Preguntario”, and a “Semantic Dictionary”. We found out that the students have difficulties to carry out abductive reasoning processes, and are not aware of the logical and creative possibilities that the relationship between literary and scientific texts can give to their formation process, even though they go through aesthetic experiences when the narrative affects them and when they set out surprising facts and abductions in various contexts.

**Diana Heney, [“The Methadone Man? Peirce vs. Price on Truth and Assertion.”](#)  
Session E-7 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 2.**

In his widely read and generally excellent article, “Truth as Convenient Friction”, Huw Price defends a pragmatist view of truth against aggressive forms of deflationism about truth, such as disquotationalism. One theme that animates Price’s paper is that the pragmatist view of truth that he is arguing for is *not* the Peircean version, which he finds objectionably ontological. I argue that Price overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Peirce’s view of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I offer my own explanation of Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I explain what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and why that criticism misses the target. Finally, I

argue that Peirce's version of the pragmatist theory of truth has greater explanatory power than the linguistically-oriented version put forward by Price.

**José Higuera Rubio, [“Semiophysics: a Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics for the 21st Century.”](#) Session H-9 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.**

A relational explanation of nature is mediated by the interpretation of the interactions of subatomic systems which is based on the sequences of their correlations. On this basis a convergent form of relational metaphysics can be introduced which is in accordance with quantum mechanics, as proposed by the philosophy of science of the 21st century. Peirce's reception of the Scholastic logic of relations and the Lullian correlatives -which considered by Lull the simple parts of nature- shows that this kind of logic has been present in the study of nature since the 13th century, and can serve as the basic structure for a semiophysics.

**Jaakko Hintikka, [“Which Mathematical Logic is the Logic of Mathematics?”](#) Session F-2 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.**

The main tool of the arithmetization and logization of analysis in the history of nineteenth century mathematics was an informal logic of quantifiers in the guise of the “epsilon–delta” technique. Mathematicians slowly worked out the problems encountered in using it, but logicians from Frege on did not understand it let alone formalize it, and instead used an unnecessarily poor logic of quantifiers, viz. the traditional, first-order logic. This logic does not e.g. allow the definition and study of mathematicians' uniformity concepts important in analysis. Mathematicians' stronger logic was rediscovered around 1990 as the form of independence-friendly logic which hence is not a new logic nor a further development of ordinary first-order logic but a richer version of it.

**Jesper Hoffmeyer, [“Biology: The Peircean Connection.”](#) Session F-6 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 1.**

Inquiry is not a disembodied process and the conditions that makes it possible are deeply buried in the process of organic evolution. Bioanthropologist Terrence Deacon suggested that the "teleodynamics" exhibited by living systems is, at least potentially, inherent in the fundamental physics of our universe. Teleodynamics here essentially means final causality, i.e., the general form of any process that tends toward an end state "irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way" (CP 1.211). The teleodynamics exhibited by living systems places cognition solidly in the stream of bodily semiotics, and phenomenology and science is challenged in symmetrical ways by this understanding: The taboo against final causality (science) and the rejection of the possibility to know the "thing in it self" (phenomenology) are interconnected errors reflecting a general failure to recognize the fundamentally semiotic nature of life and cognition.

Jesper Hoffmeyer, [“Commentary: Origin of Life = Origin of Semiosis.”](#) Session D-3 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.

Despite some apparently pansemiotic interpretations of Peirce's words, and although any physical phenomenon can serve as a sign, only processes like life and cognition can interpret things as signs, referring to or representing something they are not. It is because life is intrinsically self-referentially semiotic in its constitution that it can generate signs to serve as interpretants for extrinsic phenomena, thereby making them signs.

Auro Key Honda, [“Abduction in Peirce.”](#) Session G-2 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 1.

An analysis of the concept of abduction in Peirce shows that it underwent changes throughout his career. Initially abduction appears as a form of reasoning *a posteriori* in which the antecedent, the minor premise of the syllogism, is inferred. In a later period, Peirce conceives of abduction as an epistemological process of discovery, a faculty of the mind predisposed to discover the truth, albeit by chance and grounded in the monism of mind and matter. It is interesting to note that Peirce anticipates the ongoing discussion in neuroscience in its attempts to understand how the brain makes decision.

Christopher J. Hookway, [“Comments.”](#) Session E-1 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.

Christopher J. Hookway, [“Community, Inquiry and the Good.”](#) Plenary 3 (Thu. 1:30-3:00), Grand Ballroom.

In his 1868 paper 'Consequences of four incapacities', Peirce defended a communitarian conception of science: we participate in science as members of a community. The argument he used for this view was not a strong, and he never worked out a coherent account of community.. However he continued to defend the importance of *community*. His use of a socio/historical account of science provided an empirical or moral vindication of communitarianism. Moreover, his fellow pragmatist, Josiah Royce, gave lectures in community in works such as *The Problem of Christianity*. In doing this, he insisted that he was using ideas and resources from the writings of Charles S Peirce. Can we understand Royce as developing the account of community that Peirce needed in his work on science? Does his use of Royce's work give rise to epistemological problems? The paper evaluates the importance of Peirce's defence of communitarianism in the philosophy of science.

Kevin D. Hoover, [“Charles S. Peirce on the Science of Economics.”](#) Session B-2 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Lower Lock 2.

Peirce railed against the *deformation professionnelle* of political economists, but he never doubted that economics was in fact a science. The paper traces Peirce's engagement with economics; the place of economics within the larger structure of science; economics as a mathematical discipline; the importance that he places on *Ricardian Inference*, exploring two interpretations: as a particular form of mathematical inference and as a particular form of analogical reasoning, close to modern scientific model

building. Some of the key points are illustrated with an analysis of the two cases in which Peirce engaged in systematic applications of economic analysis.

**Nathan Houser, [“IUPUI and the Chronological Edition Work Years.”](#) Session J-2 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Max H. Fisch moved to Indianapolis in 1975 to help Edward C. Moore start the Peirce Edition Project (PEP) and set up the editing operation for the critical edition. Max was returning to Indianapolis where he had earned his B.A. in philosophy at Butler College—and while there he met the woman he married, Ruth Bales. Max was the foremost Peirce scholar of that time and his work was central for Peirce scholarship so, because of his presence in Indianapolis and the great accumulation of resources he and his team assembled for the edition, PEP soon became a principal destination for students and scholars of Peirce. In addition to his work for PEP and his continued biographical research on Peirce, Max carried on an extensive correspondence with scholars around the world (this was before the days of easy email access), taught advanced classes on Peirce and semiotics in Bloomington, and became a model research scholar for the School of Liberal Arts at IUPUI which had only recently become a four-year comprehensive university and was just beginning to develop a research culture. Max retired in 1991, after 16 years of service to PEP and IUPUI, and is still remembered by the older faculty members for his subtle intelligence and friendly manner—and for his scholarly example as a devoted and persistent researcher.

**Nathan Houser, [“Peirce’s Tragic Struggle with Destiny.”](#) Plenary 5 (Thu. 6:00-7:00), St. Anne’s Episcopal Church.**

I will give a memorial portrayal of Peirce that honors him but that reveals a deep tension running through the course of his life. The main source of this tension was Peirce’s dual commitment to two paths through life, one devoted to philosophy and the other to experimental science. Peirce’s talent and early training, and his father’s connections, led him into science and a career with the U. S. Coast Survey, where he worked for over thirty years. Through his work for the Survey, he made important contributions to astronomy and geodetic science and significantly improved the reputation of American science. But his heart was always with logic and philosophy. He had turned to philosophy in his early teens and before he turned thirty had made substantial contributions to logic and philosophy. Difficulties that grew out of the conflicting demands of his dual commitment, magnified by his own foibles and opposition from parties and circumstances beyond his control, prevented Peirce from achieving the destiny that should have been his. He suffered terribly in his struggle to keep it from slipping away but eventually found solace in his contrite fallibilism—in his acceptance of his limitations as an individual and in the belief that he was part of a great community of investigators working its way toward the truth. Peirce was certainly a great man of thought, but he was thwarted from fulfilling his potential by his own failings and by the failure of society to accommodate his genius.

**Nathan Houser, [“Peirce’s Cosmopolitan Thought.”](#) Session D-1 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.**

Peirce’s European experiences influenced the development of his thought and helped shape his philosophy. But probably more decidedly his thought was influenced by his contact with European scientists and philosophers. So to understand Peirce as an American philosopher it is necessary to grasp that he was profoundly influenced by European thought and culture and to inquire how his American and European experiences worked together to form his ideas and shape him into the world philosopher he became.

**Andrew Howat, [“Peirce, Grounding, Circularity and Regress.”](#) Session E-8 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.**

This paper is a contribution to the long-standing debate over the coherence of Peirce’s overall system of philosophy. It approaches that issue through the lens of a contemporary debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding. The central question concerns how we can take seriously what we shall call Peirce’s Rule - that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable - without being vulnerable to a vicious regress or equally vicious circularity. It argues that in Peirce’s early work he offers a quietist conception of grounding that provides a persuasive and ground-breaking answer to this central question. It then argues that in Peirce’s later work we find a metaphysical conception of grounding that fails to answer that question, and is thus inconsistent with his earlier work.

**Kathleen A. Hull, [“Out of His Life and Thought: Peirce as ‘Picture Thinker’ and its Implications for a Deeper Understanding of Mathematics.”](#) Session E-9 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.**

Does biography help us understand a thinker’s philosophy? By self report, Peirce was a strong visual thinker whose gifts in visual-spatial modes of thought directed much of his philosophical oeuvre. In this paper, we explore the view that his neurological proclivities allowed him to provide deep understanding of diagrams and geometrical intuition as fundamental methods of investigating and analyzing logical problems. For Peirce, words are not required for sharp thinking. This places him on the other side of the verbal/algebraic/symbolic modes of thinking as promoted by Logicism. A close analysis of “picture thinking” in high-functioning autistic persons offers insight into why visual modes of thought can be so powerful. Logicism is found to be bankrupt insofar as it cannot make sense of these extremes due to its commitment to the identity of mathematics and logic. Recent research in neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology are brought into the discussion.

Ivo Ibr, [“The Esthetic Basis of Peirce’s Pragmaticism.”](#) Plenary 4 (Thu. 3:30-5:00), Grand Ballroom.

Esthetics, as one of Peirce’s normative philosophies, does not have *Beauty* as its object, but the *Admirable*, as scholars of his work know. However, this distinction is not immediately apparent, since *Admirability* also carries within it the predicate of *Beauty*. What, then, would be the relationship between both these concepts? Why should the admirable qualify as an end in itself of Esthetics, and constitute the ultimate end of Ethics? What is the nature of esthetic experience, and how can it aid the identification of the Admirable? Based on the insistence that there is a net of concepts in Peirce’s philosophy, from Phenomenology to his Metaphysics, which provide a rich vocabulary to reflect on these issues, this essay seeks to show that there is in the very nature of pragmatism an ethicity that, while necessary, is insufficient, demanding that Esthetics provide the ends of the actions that constitute the *revelation* of concepts, in light of the Peircean categories regarded as structural for the relations between internal and external worlds, under a radically realist viewpoint.

Robert E. Innis, [“Dewey’s Peircean Aesthetics.”](#) Session D-2 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 1.

Although Dewey did not develop his pragmatist aesthetics by explicit expansion of the various Peircean schemes, it is not wrong-headed to speak of Dewey’s aesthetics as ‘Peircean.’ Dewey’s *experiential* aesthetics intersects with and expands in many ways Peircean concerns: the semiotic structure of an art work, the nature of interpretants, the ineffability of aesthetic significance, art works as abductive realizations of felt qualities, and so forth. This remarkable convergence is due to a shared insight into the centrality of ‘quality’ and ‘qualitative thought’ in all thought, something that Dewey discussed with reference to Peirce *after* publication of *Art as Experience*.

Masato Ishida, [“Was Peirce an Unconfused Pragmatist? Kant’s Phenomenalism and Peirce’s 1878 Pragmatic Maxim.”](#) Session H-8 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 2.

In 1902 Peirce said that he was led to his 1878 pragmatic maxim by reflection upon Kant’s First Critique. What is the specific connection between the First Critique and the pragmatic maxim? In order to understand Peirce’s account, this paper first attends to Kant’s doctrine of phenomenal substance, whose influence or thread of thinking can be traced through Peirce’s texts in the 1870s leading up to his 1878 pragmatic maxim. The paper then observes that Kant falls into epistemic dualism, which makes him a “somewhat confused pragmatist” in Peirce’s view. I argue that Peirce replaces Kant’s obscure notion of sign with a more consistent theory of signs, and that he rendered himself very nearly an unconfused pragmatist with his pragmatic maxim of 1878. Interestingly, however, Peirce appears not to have been entirely clear about the important consequences of his innovative view up to 1913.

**Adrian Ivakhiv, [“Peirce and the Film Viewer: Toward a Logico-Ethico-Aesthetics of the Cinema Event.”](#) Session I-10 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

This paper proposes two novel ways of applying Peirce’s triadic philosophy to cinema. The first builds on and revises a recipe set forth in Cubitt’s *The Cinema Effect* (2005), to distinguish three components, or “moments,” in the experience of viewing a film. It names these spectacle, for the immediacy of what is perceived, sensed, and felt; narrativity or sequentiality, for the way in which one thing is followed, replaced, and counterposed by another; and exoreference, for the way in which meanings are elicited through reference or resonance to elements of the viewer’s extra-filmic world. The second, more ambitious, method proposes an application of Peirce’s understanding of the normative sciences – aesthetics, ethics, and logic – to cinema spectation and reception. Together these approaches can contribute to assessing cinema viewing as phenomenological event (a matter of firstness), spectatorly, interpretive, and communicative practice (a matter of action, and thus secondness), and means by which human and nonhuman worlds are normativized, regulated, and transformed (thirdness).

**Tony Jappy, [“Distinguishing the Literal from the Figurative in Peirce’s Mature Conception of Semiosis.”](#) Session J-5 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 3.**

The paper addresses the problem of the distinction between literal and figurative signs posed by the exclusion of the icon and its three hypoiconic subdivisions from Peirce’s hexadic conception of semiosis announced in 1904. It shows through the analysis of a variety of verbal and non-verbal signs that although the hypoicons—the only “module” within the grand logic enabling the analyst to distinguish literal from figurative representation—are not explicitly identified in the later hexadic system, similar distinctions can be found by examining his 1906 discussion of the *dicsign* in which he distinguishes clearly between two complementary ways of representing the dynamic object and its represented form. In the paper it is taken as proven that the distinction between literal and figurative representations can be assimilated to that contrasting diagram and metaphor respectively, but the distinction is presented principally as a function of the number of universes of existence represented by any given sign.

**Tony Jappy, [“Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-systems.”](#) Session I-1 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.**

The period 1901-8 is notable for Peirce’s dissatisfaction with the concept of speculative rhetoric and his preference for that of methodeutic. Had it been retained, speculative rhetoric would have had an explanatory, interpretive function whereas methodeutic seems to be of a more controlling nature. This change in the scope and function of the third branch of the ‘philosophy of representation’ of 1903 coincided with a period of intense development in Peirce’s semiotics. After reviewing these theoretical mutations, the paper examines the influence of his hexadic sign-system on the blurring of boundaries and the changing concepts of the original 1903 trivium.



**Kipton E. Jensen, [“The Possible Evolves the Actual: Peirce and Royce on Hegel.”](#) Session G-6 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 3.**

Perhaps their earlier squabbles about mathematical logic, or Hegel, or about Royce’s alleged mishandling of Abbott, were of secondary importance by 1912, when Peirce no longer “rejected Hegel *in toto*.” In his prospectus to his *Principles of Philosophy*, which he sent to James in 1894, Peirce claimed that the principles he proposed “[bore] a close affinity with those of Hegel” and that “possibility evolves the actuality. So does Hegel” (CP 1.453). And so did Royce. Beyond their shared interest in logic, Peirce appreciated Royce’s “philosophy of religion” and “social philosophy” if not also his appropriation of the “secret of Hegel.”

**Yi Jiang, [“Peirce Study in China in the 21st Century.”](#) Session B-6 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 1.**

In China, Peirce has been considered to be the pioneer of American pragmatism, not only in academic circles, but in the public’s perception. Chinese scholars of Peirce are focusing on (1) the historical relation of Peirce to the pragmatist movement in the 19th century; (2) the contribution of Peirce’s logic to the philosophy of logic; (3) Peirce as a pioneer of philosophy of science in the 20th century; (4) the comparative study of Peirce’s semiotics and Saussure’s linguistics; and (5) Peirce’s unique place in the history of Western philosophy.

**Isabel Jungk, [“Iconicity in Linguistic Signs and a Semiotical Approach of Etymology.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.**

Peirce’s contribution to verbal language can be explored in the consideration of words as triadic signs. The twofold concept of the sign’s object and the relation between the sign and its object as shown in the ten classes proposed by Peirce can open original perspectives to understand linguistic signs. Words are usually considered arbitrary by linguistics but their potentiality is not restricted to conventionality and semiotical analysis can illuminate many aspects of symbolicity, indexicality and especially iconicity that otherwise would remain unnoticed, leading to a new approach of the etymology of words and scientific terms.

**John Kaag, [“Thinking through the Imagination: Peirce on Creativity.”](#) Session I-3 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

The seeds of an adequate theory of the imagination may have been sown by the German thinkers of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, through the writing of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. But I will argue that they germinated and grew in a nurturing American soil. They came to life, rather quietly, in inquiry, in logic, and in ontology in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. I will draw heavily on Peirce’s epistemology and metaphysics to argue that his work provides a way to round out and deepen the description of the creative process initiated by Kant.

**Mi-Jung Kang, [“Abduction, Forced Choice, and the New Unconscious.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.**

In the changing landscape of psychological study, Charles S. Peirce’s achievements on abduction created valuable groundwork for scholars studying the influences of the subliminal mind. Rather than focus on the argument as to whether abduction provides a reliable process of inference, I aim to defend the notions of abductive reasoning and forced choice proposed by Peirce with a new theory of the unconscious. I contend that the persuasiveness of Peirce’s thoughts on abduction is intensified by the idea of ‘the new unconscious’ popularly explored by contemporary neuroscientists.

**Bill Kartalopoulos, [“Developing a Peircean Semiotics of the Comics Page.”](#) Session B-8 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Hamilton 1.**

This paper begins to develop a Peircean analysis of the comics form, utilizing a concept of Peircean thirdness to identify the comics page as a global unit that functions as the site of ultimate significance in comics. The paper will briefly survey extant semiotic and semantic analyses of the comics form to demonstrate the absence of analysis that fully applies Peircean theory to the fundamental qualities of the comics page. Utilizing a well-known example, the paper will demonstrate the manner in which sophisticated comics pages gain semiotic significance as expressive structures upon having been interpreted by a reader, beyond the narrative content of their component words and images.

**Jeff Kasser, [“Weight of Evidence and the Doubt-Belief Theory of Inquiry.”](#) Session H-7 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 2.**

This paper shows that Peirce anticipated something worth calling Keynes’ distinction between the valence or balance of evidence, on the one hand, and its weight on the other. It briefly explains the connection between weight of evidence and stability of belief and argues that Peirce plausibly had such a notion of stability in mind in “The Fixation of Belief.” It then argues that, once we see that stability of belief is to be evaluated along two dimensions, we can state to make detailed sense of how Peirce can avoid the extremes of excessive doubt and excessive tenacity. Along the way, the paper suggests that Peirce might allow for the compatibility of full belief and genuine doubt.

**Mary Keeler, [“Exploring the Challenge of Reconstructing Peirce's Manuscripts.”](#) Session E-2 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Peirce scholars and Peirce-inspired technology researchers have the opportunity to collaborate in reconstructing Peirce’s manuscript fragments, using the capabilities that Peirce could only imagine when posing this practical question: “how much the business of thinking a machine could possibly made to perform, and what part of it must be left to the living mind.” We examine the nature and condition of his corpus, specify technology to organize data and create metadata structures for reasoning support of evidence-gathering and interpretation, and propose an “evolving transdisciplinary-crowdsourced catalogue” to relate Peircean concepts and reveal implicit connections, for continuously improving scholarship as reconstruction proceeds.

Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, [“Ignoring History: Free Will as a Non-Problem: A Debate Based on False Assumptions Critiqued by Peirce and Royce.”](#) Session D-7  
(Thu. 10:30-12:00), Hamilton 1.

Much philosophical angst over the free-will controversy was unnecessary if only more philosophers had studied the writings of Peirce and Royce who argued that the dogma of necessity,” had no scientific basis, and that the paradigmatic “mechanical laws” were ideal abstractions from concrete reality, to be seen as habits and the results of evolution. The opposition between nomological necessity or pure chance is a false dilemma; rather there is novelty, spontaneity, and chance in nature, although within the bounds of law. The views of Peirce and Royce allow better grounds for moving to the issue of free will as exhibited in the world of human experience, interaction and moral behavior, a world constituted as social at the core. They also are in accordance with contemporary notions of causal laws as intrinsic dispositional properties of objects as well as notions of evolution as a marriage of selection and self-organization.

Frederic R. Kellogg, [“Holmes, Peirce, Whewell and the Social Dimensions of Thought: Law and Science in the Formative Years of Pragmatism.”](#) Session C-8  
(Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.

C. S. Peirce and O. W. Holmes both reflect the influence of William Whewell, whose opposition to J.S. Mill shed light on the social dimensions of knowledge, applicable to natural science as well as moral and political philosophy. Whewell’s thesis envisions a reciprocal and research-centered growth of knowledge through a tension between the particular and the general. Holmes, in a comment that echoes J.S. Mill’s rejection of the syllogism and his notion of “reasoning from particulars to particulars,” adds an element of the emergence of generals from particulars, missing from Mill’s account. Holmes addresses how general rules are attained in a progression from particular judgments to consensually negotiated generals. The bearing of particular to general is not one of logical relation but consensual emergence, integration from repeated experience into a constantly developing system of classification.

Kenneth L. Ketner, [“Texas Tech and the Harvard Archives Work Years.”](#) Session J-2  
(Sat. 4:30-6:00), Lower Lock 2.

The Institute originated in 1971 under the encouraging influence of Professor Charles Hardwick. Among initial members were Hardwick, Max Fisch, Carolyn Eisele, Joseph Ransdell, Jarrett Brock, Christian Kloesel, Klaus Oehler, David Pfeifer, and Kenneth Ketner. This group, and other associated researchers, made notable lasting progress within Peirce Studies on a number of topics, summarized here.

Chihab El Khachab, [“The Incorporation of Peirce in Deleuze’s Cinema.”](#) Session I-10  
(Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.

This paper examines Deleuze’s incorporation of Peirce in his *Cinema* books, especially in *The Movement-Image* (1983). I start with an exposition of Deleuze’s main argument, followed by an analysis of the two main ways in which Peirce is appropriated by

Deleuze. First, I discuss Deleuze's terminological borrowing from Peirce, whereby Deleuze absorbs Peircian words into his semiotic classification all the while altering their original meaning. Second, I show how Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are central in understanding Deleuze's classification. The conclusion assesses what gains and losses in understanding are occasioned by Deleuze's incorporation of Peirce, both in terms of how Peirce contributes to Deleuze's argument, and how Deleuze might be useful in engaging with Peirce.

**Robert King, "[Signs of Imagination: The Value of Peirce for American Literary Studies.](#)" Session I-3 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

Peirce wrote that "the true poet is the true prophet," that "nothing is truer than true poetry" and that, more generally, "logic needs the help of esthetics." Philosophy requires inquiry, musement and abduction to imagine possibilities beyond rational, abstracted logic, the limits of convention and reason transcended by metaphorical thinking, including the literary imagination. While his work contains little commentary or criticism of literature, the proposed essay will describe the outlines of a Peircean understanding of the functions of literature and literary criticism, and conclude with what is lacking in much of the secondary accounts of Peirce on literature and the aesthetic—a sustained application to works of literature.

**Christopher Klemek, "[The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond.](#)" Session G-1 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 1.**

This panel will explore Murray Murphey's groundbreaking scholarship devoted to the philosophy of Charles Peirce, beginning with his landmark study of *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (1961), and continuing with the publication of numerous seminal books and articles over a period of 50 years. Panelists will discuss how Murphey transformed our understanding of Peirce's thought, illuminating its nuances and development, as well as its relationship to the work of other thinkers (such as Kant and Duns Scotus). They will also link Murphey's work on Peirce to his explication of broader themes in American history and the philosophy of history.

**Dennis Knepp, "[On Being and Education: Harris and Peirce on Obedience versus Cooperative Investigation.](#)" Session A-10 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

The 1868 debate between Harris and Peirce is a microcosm of our two educational systems. Harris believed that Being is a contradiction and so in K-12 education the student finds freedom through the negation of obedience. Peirce believed that Being is a sign and so the graduate school ideal is cooperative investigation of the publically accessible real. This can explain our difficulty in teaching Introduction to Philosophy to freshmen who just want to know the answers on the test.

William Knorpp, [“Smyth's Normative Interpretation of ‘The Fixation of Belief.’”](#)  
Session H-1 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.

Smyth’s Normative Interpretation of “The Fixation of Belief” aims to summarize and clarify Smyth’s novel and complex account of Peirce’s argument in *FoB*. This paper develops Smyth’s contention that Peirce employs Kantian second and third *Critique* strategies in conjunction with a “Cartesian Gambit” to provide a defense of certain logical sentiments that are required in order for us to employ the method of science.

Paul Kockelman, [“Material Substances and Semiotic Processes.”](#) Session F-3  
(Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.

This essay is about use-value: the meaning of a thing as part of a network of means and ends. More specifically, what are the social, semiotic and material processes whereby substances get utilized, unitized, and numericalized? Starting from three classic theories by Aristotle, Marx, and Heidegger, that understand things as indefinitely reticulated causal relations to other things, the stakes of such ontologies are shown. Taking inspiration from Peirce, these ideas are reinterpreted from a semiotic stance—demonstrating how instrumental meaning relates to other kinds of meaning, such as the price of a commodity or the propositional content of an utterance.

Catherine Legg, [“Perceiving Necessity.”](#) Session A-3 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 2.

Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (scholastic realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.

Catherine Legg, [“Perceptual Inferentialism: Rich Epistemological Resource or Contradiction in Terms?”](#) Session B-7 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 2.

Brandom presents a new approach to content, explicating it in terms of *inference* rather than *representation*. Legg (2008) argued that Brandom’s inferentialism fails to do justice to pragmatism’s potential by merely offering a “strong” inferentialism, which admits some non-inferential mental content. But a sticking-point is qualia such as red. Legg dismissed such content using Peirce’s early paper “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...”. However it’s worth considering the profound development which occurred in 1903 as Peirce embraced direct perception of Thirdness, resulting in a new distinction between the inferentially-embedded “perceptual judgment” and a more basic “percept” which apparently has some real role in determining content.

Javier Legris, [“Existential Graphs as Structural Reasoning.”](#) Session C-7  
(Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 2.

In this paper an attempt to build up a bridge between Peirce’s EGs and the current perspective in logic of Structural Reasoning is carried out. The aim of this paper is to suggest that Peirce’s Existential Graphs can be properly understood as a kind of Structural Reasoning. Instead of using sequent style systems, EGs use diagrams in order to formulate general properties of deduction and to define logical concepts. Instead of combinatorial analysis and recursion, EGs can be studied by topology. The basic conception is outlined in an informal way, without making a full exposition of the technical details, and the discussion will be focused on the Alpha system of EGs and the ‘scroll’ of the EGs will be used to express more an implication structure than a conditional operator.

James Jakób Liszka, [“Peirce’s Rhetoric as a Theory of Inquiry: The Issue of Solidarity versus Truth.”](#) Session I-1 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.

Although Peirce gives his rhetoric a variety of names and definitions, I argue it is primarily about a theory of inquiry, specifically, a community of inquiry. “The Fixation of Belief,” then, should be considered part of his rhetoric. There, Peirce contrasts the community of inquiry, the scientific community, as a truth-seeking practice, with communities that establish solidarity---“fix” beliefs—dogmatically or authoritatively. Closer analysis shows Peirce working through the tension between truth-seeking and the need to establish solidarity as a means of cooperation. I analyze Peirce’s attempts to create solidarity among inquirers without recourse to the methods he critiques in his famous article.

James Jakób Liszka, [“Revisiting Peirce’s Convergence Theory of Truth.”](#) Session J-4  
(Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 2.

Some scholars have argued that Peirce changed his views later in life concerning the epistemological status of his convergence theory of truth. His later views emphasized the *hope* that truth would be the end result of inquiry, as opposed to the more confident views early on that it would certainly be so. I argue that Peirce did not abandon that early confidence, although he made some qualifications to that claim. The argument is based on his nuanced view of certainty. Peirce delineated four types of certainty: absolute, mathematical, inductive, and practical. Although he never claimed his theory of truth was absolutely certain, it was mathematically certain, based on the law of large numbers. Moreover, there were a number of inductively certain scientific claims, understood as “established truths.” Collectively this provides a practical certainty for the success of inquiry. When Peirce’s three different senses of convergence are analyzed carefully, one can see the law of large numbers at their root.

**Luís Malta Louceiro, [“Peirce’s Architectonic in the Architecture of a Poem.”](#)**  
Session C-2 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.

Our goal here is to offer an analysis of Manuel Bandeira’s (1886-1968) 9-verse poem, “Teresa.” He was born in Recife (“Reefs”), Pernambuco State, in the North-East of Brazil, with its beautiful nearby Olinda (“Beautiful”) town -, by resorting to Peirce’s *Architectonic* and by posing a hypothesis: that the genuine *telos* of Peirce’s *Synechism* is twofold: a thorough “going *to*” - from *Firsts* (“Esthetics”) through *Seconds* (“Ethics”) to *Thirds* (“Logic”; or “Semiotics”); and yet, a Metaphysical “going *fro*” – from *Thirds* (“Religious Metaphysics”), through *Seconds* (“Cosmology”) back to *Firsts* (“Ontology”), which will refer us to the “motor” of Peirce’s *Synechism*, “Agape.”

**Giovanni Maddalena, [“Comments.”](#) Plenary 9 (Sat.2:45-4:15), Grand Ballroom.**

**Giovanni Maddalena, [“Complete Gestures as a Tool for Education.”](#) Session B-1 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Lower Lock 1.**

Classic pragmatists proposed different tools for inquiry and education based on continuity between theory and practice. However, they failed to understand the rationale of this continuity as a different conception of synthesis. Here I introduce a tool for education based on synthesis understood as “recognizing identity through change”. The tool is named as “complete gesture”, an action with a beginning and an end that carries on a meaning (from gero) , making us understand something new and not conceptual. The paper will present the phenomenological and semiotic characteristics of complete gestures (1) and will apply this tool to education (2).

**Marcelo Silvano Madeira, [“Charles S. Peirce’s Ontological Epistemology and the Co-Naturality between Thought and World.”](#) Session C-3 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

This communication seeks to clarify how Charles S. Peirce deals with the problem of cognizable/incognizable duality under the perspective of an ontological epistemology. It’s divided in two parts. In the first one, we will discuss how phenomena are classified by the phenomenological categories, focusing on their aspects that fall under Secondness. The second part aims to clarify how Peirce would answer to this line of questioning, seeking to refute the opinion that what is outside of consciousness is utterly incognizable.

**Mary Magada-Ward, [“What is the American Sublime? Ruminations on Peircean Phenomenology and the Paintings of Barnett Newman.”](#) Session F-7 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 2.**

It is my claim that a fruitful approach to exploring the significance of the abstract expressionist Barnett Newman’s attempt to paint the sublime is by appeal to Peircean phenomenology and the conception of “originativity” that it entails. In particular, I argue that Peirce’s explication of the three universal categories of Presence, Reaction, and Representation, together with his demonstration that there is no ultimate starting point for inquiry, explains those aspects of human subjectivity that, at the affective level,

are made manifest to us in encounters with Newman's paintings. This is most apparent, I contend, in Peirce's account of what he describes as "a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that here is a feeling one can comprehend, a reasonable feeling."

**Lorenzo Magnani, ["Abductive Virtues Vindicated: The Eco-Cognitive Model."](#)  
Session C-1 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.**

My perspective on abduction takes advantage of the wide Peircean philosophical framework, which approaches "inference" semiotically (and not simply "logically"): Peirce distinctly says that all inference is a form of sign activity, where the word sign includes "feeling, image, conception, and other representation". This semiotic view is considerably compatible with my perspective on cognitive systems as embodied and distributed systems. The backbone of this perspective can be found in my *EC-model* of abduction. It is thanks to this model that various cognitive virtues of abduction can be clearly and firmly vindicated.

**Asuncion L. Magsino, ["Grounding Peircean Realism on the Aristotelian Form."](#)  
Session I-4 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 2.**

As a logician, Peirce formulated the theory of sign as a tool to guide the development of the sciences. He undertook this project out of his devotion to the Truth. Although he spent more than fifty years on the study of signs, he distinguished his later doctrine as having a distinct Aristotelian influence, that is, of the scholastic kind. With this declaration, this paper attempts to expose the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the mature Peirce's phenomenology of Signs. Understanding the Aristotelian concepts of substance and accidents, act and potency, matter and form would help ground the claim to realism Peirce makes. It allows us to trace all ideas back to its origin or source, the Object. Thus we justify the Peircian semiotic definition of Truth as the stamp of reality in the mind. This is the realistic correspondence theory paraphrased in Peircian terms: Truth is Iconic.

**Robert Main, ["Habit, Hope and Progress."](#) Session C-4 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

This paper analyzes the dynamics of habit and hope in C.S. Peirce's account of evolution by bringing Peirce into conversation with inventor and theorist Raymond Kurzweil. I argue that, despite their notable similarities, Peirce and Kurzweil ultimately offer very different accounts of evolution and progress. Charting these differences helps us to better grasp the requirements of Peirce's evolutionary model, his notorious definition of truth and the paucity of his account of the human person. Moreover, it shows the continued relevance of Peirce's work in leading discussions of our scientific history and future a century after his death.



Anna Makolkin, ["The Triadic Continuum in Time: Aristotle, Vico and Charles S. Peirce."](#) Session G-7 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 1.

This paper proposes a comparative model of analysis, dealing with theories of signs and their interpretation in their *grand succession*, from Aristotle to Peirce via Vico, and vast temporal space. This temporal span of over two thousand years enables to establish the *running analytical motif*, the triad, which happens to be the *key cultureme* or the regular semiotic category.

Costantino Marmo, ["Peirce's Use and Interpretation of Medieval Logic and Grammar."](#) Session I-2 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.

The paper evaluates Peirce's interpretation of the Modists', Scotus' and Ockham's work, and explores his use of medieval theories. Peirce's translations of the beginnings of both T. Erfurt's *Grammatica speculativa* and Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, together with Peirce's lectures on Ockham, will be analyzed in some detail; some of Peirce's most relevant references to Duns Scotus and Ockham will be examined and discussed; a special focus will be given to a comparison between the medievals' and Peirce's theory of relations, as applied in particular to their theories of signs and signification.

Francisco Moacir de Melo Catunda Martins, ["Music: Semiotics and Meaning in Mozart's Die Zauberflöte."](#) Session G-5 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Hamilton 2.

Musical meaning is an object of study that relates the sensations that one feels with the musical aspects that have similarities with that feeling and is expressed in the musical score. This study aims to clarify the social relations of music and the role played by the musical score on it, such as how it is made and how it will influence the social subjects involved with music. If the musical score is a sign of the emotions similar to music, then it conveys musical signification related to those emotions. Some details about the rhythmic aspects of the musical score may explain some aspects of a vengeful personality clearly characterized in Mozart's *Die Zauberflöte* score.

Aaron Masecar, ["The Esthetics of Habit Development."](#) Session C-4 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.

Lately, work on Peirce has focused on his logic and cognitivist leanings. This paper will take a different direction and focus on the centrality of feelings for Peirce's understanding of habits and of his system of philosophy. This paper takes its direction from Peirce's claim that the study of the habits of feeling ought to be meant by esthetics. This work will show the relationship between habits, phenomenology, and the normative sciences and it will help to contribute to a better understanding of the system of Peirce's thought that underlies many of his disparate writings.

Michael May, [“Semiotics and Didactics of Graph and Model Comprehension in Enzyme Kinetics.”](#) Session C-6 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.

One of the application domains of semiotics that will undoubtedly gain importance in the 21st century is science, technology and mathematics (STEM) education. A shift in the conception of higher education already occurred in the 1980-ies with constructivist theories focusing on student learning. Whereas this shift was at first aligned with the growing influence of cognitive science, more recent studies stress the role of representational forms and situated discourse in science learning. In this paper the importance of semiotic analysis for the development of a didactics of chemistry and biochemistry will be indicated. Specifically Peirce’s conception of diagrammatic reasoning and sign relations will be used to explore recurrent problems with graph and model comprehension in chemical reaction kinetics and enzyme kinetics. The real significance of semiotics for STEM research and development will be in its actual use within the didactics of specific disciplines rather than as a general educational philosophy.

Rosa Maria Mayorga, [“Peirce and Cuba.”](#) Session A-6 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 1.

Although Peirce, as far as we know, did not visit Cuba (or any other Latin American country), he undoubtedly made the acquaintance of Cubans while stationed in Key West conducting gravity measurements. This paper tries to provide a snapshot of this period, the time of Cuba’s struggle for independence from Spain, and Peirce’s perspective on the war and his interesting remarks about the Cuban character.

William James McCurdy, [“Peirce’s Theory of Information and a New Diagrammatic Logic for Intensional and Extensional Syllogistic.”](#) Session E-9 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 3.

C.S. Peirce contended that the Law of the Inverse Proportionality of Intension and Extension of a Term is not, strictly speaking true. It could, however, be rectified by taking into account that the semeiotic relation is triadic rather than dyadic. The resulting generalization is that intension and extension are inversely proportional relative to information (of the term). This is Peirce’s Law of Information. Reflection on Peirce’s geometric analogy for this law suggests a new way to diagram the categorical syllogistic of three terms such that a single diagram of a categorical term, proposition, or argument simultaneously represents the intension, extension, and information of all the terms involved as well as their major logical equivalents.

Mark Migotti, [“Why Study Logic?”](#) Session B-9 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 3.

In this paper, I explore the interplay between Peirce’s ideas about the nature of logic and ideas about its distinctive value as a field of study in his *Minute Logic*. Looking chiefly at the opening sections of the work, and on the text entitled WHY STUDY LOGIC?, the second half of its second chapter, I focus on two of the ten “pre-logical opinions” that Peirce discusses: the claim that reasoning can be good or bad, and the idea that a better logic, a better theory of reasoning, will enable you to reason more effectively.

Steven A. Miller, [“Despite Peirce’s Valiant Efforts . . .”: Ethical Community in a Sellarsian Vein.](#) Session B-7 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 2.

Wilfrid Sellars identifies two premises necessary for establishing the reality of an ethical community of all rational beings: 1) Thinking of oneself as rational implies thinking of oneself as bound to epistemic oughts, and 2) Intending epistemic welfare implies intending welfare generally. Sellars indicates that the first premise is “not implausible.” The second however, “despite Peirce’s valiant efforts, remains problematic.” This paper endeavors first to show what Peirce’s valiant efforts were and then to suggest that Peirce may have done more to solve Sellars’ concern than Sellars himself realized.

Cheryl Misak, [“Peirce and Ramsey on Truth.”](#) Plenary 6 (Fri. 3:30-5:00), Grand Ballroom.

C.S. Peirce and William James brought pragmatism into being in the 1870's in Cambridge Massachusetts. By the early 1900's, James' version of it had become much discussed on both sides of the Atlantic - indeed, Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in Cambridge England were savaging James’ view of truth. But in the early 1920’s, the young Frank Ramsey was taking a serious interest in Peirce's neglected work. Had Ramsey lived past the age of 26, pragmatism’s fortunes would have been very different. For not only were Ramsey's important papers on truth and probability heavily and explicitly threaded with Peirce’s thoughts about the relationship between belief and habits of action, but at the time of his death in 1930, Ramsey was working on a book that would have delivered what I shall argue is the best version of pragmatism. Ramsey is usually taken to be a straightforward redundancy theorist. But his view is not that truth can be eliminated by asserting the sentences of which it is predicated. He takes his cue from Peirce and argues that all there is to the concept of truth is what we can get out of the practices of belief and assertion. But when we unpack the commitments we incur when we assert and believe, we find that our theory of truth must be substantive and normative.

Amirouche Moktefi, [“Peirce’s Inclusional Notation for Class Logic.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, several notations were in competition among logicians. Boole and his immediate followers used equational notations. However, Peirce and several of his contemporaries favored inclusional notations. In the early 1880 a dispute took place as to what notation should be adopted to represent the copula and incidentally on what is expected from a good notation, both on the grounds of suggestiveness, convenience and philosophical relevance. This short contribution discusses this neglected dispute and how Peirce’s notation stands among the symbolic schemes of the time.

**Amirouche Moktefi, [“Senility vs. Stupidity: On Peirce’s Image in Couturat’s Looking-Glass.”](#) Session A-8 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 1.**

Charles Peirce and Louis Couturat died one century ago. Although they both had faith in the development of the algebra of logic, their very tense relationship shows that they did not manage to work as members of a same community of research. Couturat is known to have been close to Russell, but it is not on behalf of logicism that he criticizes Peirce, held to have efficiently contributed to synthesize mathematics and logic. Couturat rather blames Peirce for his technical obscurity; but did he have the intellectual means to grasp Peirce's inventions? He also rejects pragmatism, without clearly perceiving that Peirce was not James nor Schiller.

**Juan Eliseo Montoya Marín, [“Peirce and Toulmin: Reasonableness, Between Abduction and Argumentation.”](#) Session H-7 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 2.**

This paper contains theoretical considerations about the common points between North American philosopher, C. S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) “reasonability” and English mathematician, S. Toulmin’s (1922-2009) “reasonableness”. Toulmin considers that respect for one’s opinion is the product of a sincere reflection about everyday experience, and Peirce shows to be profoundly convinced of the need of a tendency toward tolerance and inclusion. Both authors, in an independent and asynchronous way, put in evidence a need for dialogue between the natural and the social sciences to resolve genuine real life problems in different contexts, and of conscience over the universality of knowledge, inherited and fed by subjects and communities, for a better standard of living. Peirce materialises his proposal in abduction, while Toulmin does so in argumentative processes. Both authors take ethics as their base, the container of trust in humanity in an age of apparent hopelessness and fanaticism.

**Matthew E. Moore, [“The Future of Peirce’s Mathematics.”](#) Session D-6 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 1.**

Carolyn Eisele’s guiding conviction, that an understanding of Peirce’s mathematical work is essential to an accurate understanding of his philosophical programme, and a just assessment of his philosophical achievement, has now won the widespread acceptance it deserves. In this talk I will take Eisele’s central point for granted as a starting point, and ask where we should go from there. In particular I will review a few ways in which Peirce can be considered a mathematical philosopher, and ask which of these ways of being mathematical had a healthy impact on his thought, and which might have been less helpful.

**Matthew E. Moore, [“Theorematic Incompleteness.”](#) Session A-1 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

I have argued that a structuralist ontology for mathematics can be developed out of Peirce's fragmentary metaphysical remarks on mathematics; and that this metaphysical treatment of mathematics matches up nicely with his diagrammatic analysis of mathematical reasoning. This proposal invites the objection that, as a consequence of

Gödel's incompleteness theorems, we can never devise a system of diagrammatic reasoning that can capture a mathematical structure like the natural numbers or the set theoretic hierarchy. In this paper I will attempt to answer this objection, drawing on recent work by Frederik Stjernfelt which distinguishes between different levels of theorematic reasoning.

**Terry Moore, [“Experience and Aesthetics in Normative Accounts of ‘Fixation’.”](#) Session H-1 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.**

“Experience and Aesthetic Judgment in Normative Accounts of ‘Fixation’” focuses on evaluating the way in which Short and Smyth seek to defend their normative readings of “Fixation,” especially in relation to questions about antifoundationalism with regard to method. The former argues that Peirce is appealing to experiments in the imagination intended to produce experiences that engender the operative desire to seek objective and impersonal truth; the latter argues that, for Peirce, aesthetic or reflective judgments are the critical drivers of experimentalism in logic.

**Simone Morgagni, [“Affordances, Valencies and Values.”](#) Session J-3 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 1.**

We draw a parallel between Peirce's notion of valency in his logic and categoriology and the contemporary use of the concept of affordance in ecological phenomenology. Their interwoven study, from chemistry and mathematics to form perception, invites us into a realistic approach of values in the world, in the sense of dispositions to act. If affordances are not only in perception but in the world, the right method to clarify them cannot be but the pragmatist maxim.

**Greg Moses, [“How to Make our Satisfaction Clear: Critical Pragmatism, Semiotic and the Logic of Nonviolence.”](#) Session J-5 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 3.**

A naturalized, pragmatist theory of inquiry faces an ethical difficulty when theorizing the culmination of inquiry in the form of satisfaction or the recovery of a coordinated whole. The ethical difficulty arises when a terminating satisfaction or re-coordination is insufficiently distinguished from complicity with unjust structures. To seek a method that will test satisfaction against complicity, this paper will propose a semiotic approach. On the account here developed, inquiry, as an activity that involves thinking, neither begins with doubt nor ends with satisfaction, but must take itself to be thinking in signs. A terminating satisfaction shall be treated as a provisional icon in the Peircean semiotic schema. This icon, in turn, will be tested for significance as an index. At the indexical phase we may employ Alain Locke's principle of reciprocity in order to ask whether satisfactions point toward, or away from, reciprocal relationships.

**Charles F. Murray, [“Classification of the Four Methods in Peirce’s ‘The Fixation of Belief.’”](#) Session H-1 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.**

“Classification of the Four Methods in Peirce’s ‘The Fixation of Belief’” presents an alternative approach to Smyth’s reading of Peirce’s way of classifying the different alternatives to the method of science. It interprets these non-scientific methods organically. It argues that the three rivals can be classified as potential elements of the scientific method which grow, from three successive stages through which an inquirer might pass in search of fixing belief, into ways in which an inquirer using the scientific method shapes his or her logical sentiments in accordance with a logical ideal.

**Charles F. Murray, [“Platonic Sources for Peirce’s Selection of His Four Methods in ‘The Fixation of Belief.’”](#) Session I-5 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 3.**

This paper’s primary conclusion is that Peirce’s reading of Plato is a plausible source for his selection of the four methods examined in “The Fixation of Belief”. I rely on the work of Richard Smyth and Charles Murray on Peirce’s argument favoring the scientific method over its three rivals, which suggests a classification of the four in terms of growth of one method from another. I give a Peircean reading of Republic books VIII-IX, which reveals parallels between this classification and Plato’s account of the development of one soul from another, followed by the incorporation of soul types into a soul properly oriented toward a rational ideal. These parallels support this paper’s primary conclusion and, as a secondary benefit, resolve an apparent ambiguity in the Republic’s account of the soul’s composition.

**Douglas Niño, [“Peirce’s Abduction and Induction: a Proposal for their Explication.”](#) Session G-4 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Hamilton 1.**

The purpose of this paper is to propose and apply three criteria for understanding and distinguishing Abduction from Induction in Peirce’s thought. These criteria emerge from the examination of the evolution of these notions in Peirce’s manuscripts (MSS) from 1864 to 1914 (in opposition to the evolution proposed by the examination of the *Collected Papers* only, e.g. Fann, 1970). The application of these criteria yields the following results: differences in their *logical form*, dissimilarity in the *methodological constraints* for their requirement, introduction, and premises order and determination, and divergences in the *epistemic status* of their conclusions (according to the doubt-belief model).

**Jaime Nubiola, [“Scientific Community and Cooperation in Peirce’s European Letters.”](#) Session D-1 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.**

This contribution aspires to describe—with some documental support from Peirce’s correspondence of his first and second European trips— Peirce’s conception of science as a collective and co-operative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to find out the truth, whose lives are animated by "an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things". I will deal with that in two sections, first, on Peirce as an inventor and builder of research instruments around which scientific communities are built, and, second, on Peirce’s experience of cooperation in science.

**Bill O'Brien, [“Understanding the Sacraments in Light of Peirce’s Semeiotics.”](#)  
Session E-3 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.**

Since the High Middle Ages, hylomorphic theory has structured the official understanding of the sacraments in the Roman Catholic Church. This causes a problem insofar as philosophers and scientists today think less in terms of immutable, substantial realities than in terms of evolving principles. My paper draws upon Peirce’s semiotic metaphysics in order to show how his thought provides an adequate, coherent solution for reframing Catholic tradition regarding the sacraments in a way that interfaces more intuitively with current trends in philosophy and the sciences.

**David L. O’Hara, [“In the Neighborhood of Transcendentalism: Platonism, Idealism, and Transcendentalism in Peirce’s Thought.”](#) Session F-9 (Fri. 10:30-12:00),  
Merrimack 3.**

American Transcendentalism was in part a reaction to the powerful idea that all of life could be understood mechanically. In this paper I attempt to show that Peirce takes himself to be the conscious heir of this part of Transcendentalism, and that his idea of science is one that attempts to advance the mystical and creative elements of Transcendentalism while fostering inquiry into nature.

**Thomas M. Olshewsky, [“Peirce’s Intuitionism.”](#) Session D-4 (Thu. 10:30-12:00),  
Concord 2.**

Peirce’s semiotics serves as a bridge between the categories of his ontology and the pragmatism of his methodology. It also undergirds his anti-Cartesian stance. While this lays a basis for his rejection of intuition as immediate, unconditioned and incorrigible, it also lays the basis for different construals of linguistic, perceptual and rational intuitions. Recent studies have shown that the conception of intuition required for linguistics includes context-dependence, derivative development and constructive interaction. Once we embrace a notion of “fallibilistic intuition” and discriminate in Peirce’s own work between conception as a habit of action and awareness as a conscious focus, we find intuition not only compatible with his work, but put in a framework similar to mathematical intuitionists.

**Arnold Oostra, [“Was Peirce a Precursor of Intuitionistic Logic?”](#) Session D-4  
(Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 2.**

In this paper we identify three instances where Peirce came very close to the mathematical theory known as intuitionistic logic: in his axiomatization of propositional logic, in his existential graphs and in his logic of continuity.

**James A. Overton, [“C.S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Medical Imaging.”](#) Session C-6 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

The practices surrounding the diagnosis and treatment of prostate cancer are complex and rapidly changing. In this paper we present a pragmatist approach to prostate cancer, using a case study from the Image Guided Prostate Cancer Management project to demonstrate the complex semiotic of medical imaging. We then use Peirce's distinctions between deduction, induction, and abduction to distinguish several reasoning processes, both in the particular case of diagnosis and in the wider context of research. We close with a discussion of our work on biomedical ontologies and structured reporting for prostate cancer. Our conclusion is that a pragmatist approach illuminates and improves our practices in this field of medicine.

**Sami Paavola, [“Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.**

The poster presents a novel platform The Commens Digital Companion to Charles S. Peirce (<http://www.commens.org>) which was born 2012-2013 by merging Helsinki-based Commens site and Brazilian Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce together. New versions of the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms and the Commens Encyclopedia are presented. The site contains other new features like News, and Bibliography and resources and tools for helping to use and find materials in the site. The aim is to provide new possibilities for the user input and collaboration especially around the dictionary and the encyclopedia.

**Sami Paavola, [“From Steps and Phases to Dynamically Evolving Abduction.”](#) Session G-4 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Hamilton 1.**

In this paper interplay between Peircean abduction and modern literature on methodology is analyzed. Abduction is used in methodological discussions on qualitative methods, for example, in relation to grounded theory, case study methodology, and ethnography. Basic uses of abduction in this literature are presented. They provide a perspective on abduction treated dynamically besides more traditional outlooks on abduction as specific reasoning steps or as a first phase in methodology. Abduction gives especially means of seeing the role of theorizing and the interaction between theories and observations in methodology. A list of abductive strategies (seven in all) are presented which are in line with a dynamic view on abduction. Peirce provides elements for this kind of an interpretation even though methodetic was the vaguest and the least developed area of his theory of logic.

**Claudio Paolucci, [“From Maps of Cognition to ‘The Law of Mind’: Logic of Relatives, Semiotics and Theory of Proposition in C.S. Peirce.”](#) Session F-5 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 3.**

In this work I would like to show how "Logic of Relatives" and Synechism as "The Law of Mind" will substitute respectively the theory of proposition of the "New List" and the inferential model of the "Consequences", of which the synechism of "The Law of Mind"



is explicitly thought to be an “improvement” (CP 6.103). More in particular, I would like to show that i) Peirce used to call “Logic of Relatives” a structuralistic analysis of language; ii) this Logic of Relatives is exactly what – approximately 80 years later – will be called “actantial syntax” by two renowned French structuralists, Lucien Tesnière and A. J. Greimas; iii) how this structuralistic foundation of language and propositions changes radically the Peircean conceptions of semiotics and theory of cognition, previously founded on the theory of inference of anti-cartesian essays and on the “subject-predicate” structure of “On a New List of Categories”; iv) how this Logic of Relatives represents the condition of possibility of the peircean Synechism itself.

**Claudio Paolucci, [“Schemata, Signs, Representations, and Phenomena: Peirce, Kant, and Husserl.”](#) Session I-2 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 2.**

This paper looks at Peirce’s transformation of Kant’s schematism into a theory of signs; just as Kant’s *Schematismuskapitel* was, according to Peirce, a reconsideration of the distinction between the intuitive and the discursive, so Peirce’s semiotics is an *afterthought* in post-Kantian philosophy, for both sensibility and understanding are brought together again under the notion of *representamen*; the paper also suggests a comparison between classical phenomenology and Peirce’s semiotically-oriented phaneroscopy.

**Jesung Park, [“Derivation of Categories in Peirce’s ‘New List’: A Schematization.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.**

There is both substantial importance and descriptive difficulty in Charles S. Peirce’s 1867 paper “On a New List of Categories.” As a result of such difficulty, the paper does not easily allow any clear perspective on the whole. Therefore, I focus on the first half of the “New List” and visualize how categories are derived. This visual schematization can help clarify not only the process of category derivation but also the structure of elements in the process, which provides a clue to understanding the remainder of the “New List.”

**Woosuk Park, [“From Visual Abduction to Abductive Vision.”](#) Session D-5 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 3.**

For more than a century, abduction has been extensively studied in a wide variety of scientific disciplines. However, not much has been done in the field of visual abduction, except for the pioneering work of Paul Thagard and Cameron Shelley, and Lorenzo Magnani. Abductive vision has never been treated as a separate issue before Athanassios Raftopoulos’s recent research. This relative negligence is unfortunate in view of the fact that Peirce was arguably the first American empirical psychologist. I will discuss some open problems about visual abduction and abductive vision, thereby asking why Peirce counted perception as a kind of abduction.

**Kelly A. Parker, [“Foundations for Semeiotic Aesthetics: Mimesis and Iconicity.”](#) Session F-7 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 2.**

Mimesis was central to Western aesthetic theory from antiquity until the invention of photography and the rise of modern art in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but modern theories of aesthetics have found the concept of little positive use. Recent work on classical concepts of mimesis suggests a more nuanced, though still dualistic, notion of mimesis that extends well beyond “imitation” or “copying.” On these readings, mimesis is understood as a sophisticated representation of form—whether actual or ideal/fictional form—that transcends particular existents. Peirce’s account of iconicity provides the means for us to better articulate this more subtle notion of mimesis as representation of form.

**Kelly A. Parker, [“Peirce Schooling Royce: Methodology, Metaphysics, and Absolute Truth.”](#) Session G-6 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 3.**

Peirce's motive for inviting Royce to Arisbe was certainly to try to correct what he saw as three Royce's logical “slips” in metaphysics. First, Peirce identified a fondness for transcendental argument as “Prof. Royce’s greatest fault as a philosophical thinker” (Collected Papers 8.110). In Peirce's view, this methodological problem led to a second problem: Royce relied on unsupported metaphysical conclusions about the reality of the Absolute Mind and an objectively real world. Finally, Royce insisted that truth, where it obtains at all, is “absolute.” Peirce, however, insisted that we recognize permanent, objective indeterminacy in the experienced world.

**Christos Pechlivanidis, [“What is Behind the Logic of Scientific Discovery? Aristotle and Charles S. Peirce on Imagination.”](#) Session H-6 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

According to Charles S. Peirce imagination is a rational element that plays a creative fertile role in the construction of new hypotheses in science. Analogous to Peirce’s account of imagination is Aristotle’s analysis on the cognitive role of phantasia and its contribution in human reasoning. Aristotle correlates imagination and its products to the inductive progress of the mind from individual sensibles to universals. These ideas bring us to the concepts of imagination, insight and instinct developed by Charles S. Peirce, elements combined not with any form of induction, but with his idea of abduction. In this paper I show that both Aristotle and Peirce realized the cognitive role of imagination in the process of thinking and offered, each from his own philosophical perspective, significant explanations for what is behind the birth of new hypotheses in science.

**Jamin Pelkey, [“Peircean Evolutionary Linguistics: A Prospectus.”](#) Session G-3 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 2.**

Due to the enduring influence of Saussure (1916) and Bloomfield (1933), contemporary linguists generally approach language regularity and irregularity as a strict dualism or paradox. Fashionable theories, oscillating between formalism and functionalism, inevitably explain away one in favor of the other, or reduce one to the other. Processes

that mediate between the two receive less attention, and fully integrative accounts are still forthcoming. Building on Shapiro (1991, 2002), Anttila (1989, 1994) and others, we argue that Peircean process semiotics provides a framework for harmonizing these tensions. Modes of linguistic Thirdness (mediation) such as speech comprehension and grammaticalization harmonize the irregular variation of linguistic Firstness (quality) with the regular structural correspondences of linguistic Secondness (reaction). Mapping these distinctions onto Peirce's (1890-1892) categories of evolution and sign relations proper (following Thellefsen 2001), a radically integrative model of linguistic science emerges, one that blends competing perspectives and oppositional theories in an evolutionary framework.

**David E. Pfeifer, [“Inquiry and Peirce’s Fourth Grade of Clearness.”](#) Session B-4 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 2.**

The paper has four parts. First: a brief summary that outlines the revision of Peirce's thinking in the time period 1900-1902. In the April 1900 reviews of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual: First Series* and *Clark University, 1889-1899: Decennial Celebration*, we see the influence of Royce's thought in Peirce's rethinking his concept of inquiry. In 1902 in James Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, Peirce defined Pragmatism and stated explicitly the fourth grade of clearness and its role in inquiry. Second: a discussion of inquiry, purpose, the fourth grade of clearness and reasonableness. This second part develops Peirce's recognition that inquiry requires a purpose or goal and that inquiry cannot move forward without a goal. Third: a sketch of Peirce's reasons for claiming the importance of the fourth grade of clearness within inquiry. Fourth: a brief summary conclusion.

**David E. Pfeifer, [“University of Illinois and Early Biography Work Years.”](#) Session J-2 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Max Fisch joined the faculty at the University of Illinois in 1946; he officially retired in 1969, but remained in Urbana and on campus for several more years. This presentation illustrates the meticulous scholarship of Max Fisch with my personal examples of how he taught and worked with students. Further, as one who assisted Max Fisch in the early days of his work on a Peirce biography, I present examples of how he worked to prepare and produce the scholarship for which he is so well known.

**Heather D. Pfeiffer, [“Exploring the Challenge of Reconstructing Peirce’s Manuscripts.”](#) Session E-2 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Peirce scholars and Peirce-inspired technology researchers have the opportunity to collaborate in reconstructing Peirce's manuscript fragments, using the capabilities that Peirce could only imagine when posing this practical question: “how much the business of thinking a machine could possibly made to perform, and what part of it must be left to the living mind.” We examine the nature and condition of his corpus, specify technology to organize data and create metadata structures for reasoning support of evidence-gathering and interpretation, and propose an “evolving transdisciplinary-

crowdsourced catalogue” to relate Peircean concepts and reveal implicit connections, for continuously improving scholarship as reconstruction proceeds.

**Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, [“Guessing at the Unknown Unknowns.”](#) Session D-5  
(Thu. 10:30-12:00), Concord 3.**

Abductive reasoning and reasoning under fundamental uncertainty live conceptually on the same plane. Sciences thrive in ignorance: a scientist, never frightened of not knowing something, cultivates doubt and harvests the could-bes he finds in the perpetual turbulence of inquiry. Maybe the model of science is not hidebound in rationality, but in maintaining capacities for abduction, in formulating novel conceptions concerning general resolutions to act. I investigate how the move from the old ergodic thinking to the abductive ‘sampling the future’ may come about. How to identify guesses that are ‘gravid with young truth’?

**Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, [“Peirce’s \(and Other\) Systems of Modal Gamma Graphs.”](#)  
Session J-1 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Lower Lock 2.**

The 1903 gamma theory of existential graphs was Peirce's boutique of modal – including propositional, multi-modal, quantified – and higher-order logics. I define classes of transformation rules for the broken-cut gamma that correspond to a number of systems of modal logic, and derive the philosophically important implication that Peirce's preferred modal system appeared to be deontic. I also define semantic tableaux for the modal gamma graphs.

**Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, [“Steps toward Peirce’s World.”](#) Session E-2 (Fri. 8:30-10:00),  
Lower Lock 2.**

How would Peirce view the various possibilities computers and online communication now open up for representing and disseminating his “logic of the future”, his existential graphs? How can we exploit and extend today’s computer technology to implement his remarkable diagrammatic, iconic logic in the form he envisioned, and to make these implementations widely accessible for improved reasoning in research and education? Certainly, any online repository aimed at reproducing Peirce’s manuscripts in full should contain a new feature: animated graphs. I assess the foreseeable pedagogical values of a truly iconic approach to teaching logic, beyond discrete-symbolic systems such as Tarski’s World.

**Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, [“The Future of Logic.”](#) Session F-2 (Fri. 10:30-12:00),  
Lower Lock 2.**

What the logic of the future is going to be like? What is the future of logic, anyway? Von Wright predicted in 1994 that the impact of logic to philosophical concerns is going to recede. Maybe that is in part the fault of logic, or having wrong logic. While interest in logic as science has persevered, logic’s relevance to philosophy has indeed faded. EGs re-instantiate philosophical logic by analysing and generalising the notions of scope, identification, modality, abstraction etc. under the unifying efficacy of structure-

preserving diagrammatic languages, which unlike the symbolic, do not take fixed interpretations of these notions for granted.

**Francesco Poggiani, [“How Far Does Self-control Go? Peirce’s Mature Understanding of the Connection between Pragmatism and Critical Common-Sensism.”](#) Session E-4 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

This paper inquires into the general connection between Peirce’s pragmatism and his doctrine of Critical Common-sensism (CCS). In particular, my aim is to establish the peculiar position of the latter within Peirce’s mature account of the pragmatic maxim. I will argue that CCS is a necessary component of a thoroughly pragmatic conception of experience and normative inquiry. The capacity to recognize and accept the contextual and yet indubitable force of certain “original” beliefs is indeed part and parcel of the pragmatic effort to envision and promote the unceasing growth of concrete reasonableness in the world.

**José Santiago Pons, [“Is Law Second?”](#) Session E-6 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

Peirce usually claims that the Law is a clear and typical example of the category of Thirdness. However, between the years 1885-1896 he asserts on several occasions that Law is Secondness. This oscillation in the consideration of the Law has not been sufficiently clarified. Therefore, in this article I try to provide an explanation for this apparent contradiction.

**Luiz Adelino de Almeida Prado, [“Belief: A Starting-point in Philosophical Inquiry.”](#) Session G-2 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 1.**

In his critique of Cartesianism, Peirce not only rejects the possibility of reaching certainty by means of intuition but also opposes the idea that absolute truth can be attained by any other means. Because we are irremediably fallible, our certainties are always provisional and subject to rectification. Thus any inquiry must start from what we take to be certain, from that which does not arouse doubts in us — in other words, from our beliefs. In conceiving of belief as that upon which we are prepared to act, Peirce takes a path that leads naturally to pragmatism.

**Scott Pratt, [“Error and the Community of Science.”](#) Session G-6 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 3.**

Despite Peirce’s dismissal of Royce’s early account of error, both agreed on its importance and Peirce placed it at the center of his conception of induction. Royce recognized error’s place in induction, but viewed it as part of a larger problem and, in his late work, he presented it as a matter of the on-going operation of communities of interpretation. The resulting view operationalized Peirce’s conceptions of interpretation and error in the context of communities of science and widened their meaning in ways Peirce might have challenged. This paper imagines a conversation on error and community at Arisbe in 1913.

**Robert W. Preucel, [“Words and Things: The Semiotic Mediation of Culture.”](#)  
Session F-3 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.**

Having played an important role in the early days of postprocessual archaeology as an alternative to evolutionary approaches, semiotics fell into disrepute with the critique of structuralism and the turn towards cultural practice. There was a sense that actual meanings are inaccessible and that the best we can do is to identify the ways in which meanings were produced. Recently, archaeologists have reengaged with semiotics, via pragmatic anthropology and Peirce, as part of the theorizing of materiality. This paper charts this history and argues that this new approach offers promise for providing an entry into the semiotic mediation of culture.

**Uta Priss, [“A Pragmatist Theory of Learning.”](#) Session H-8 (Sat. 8:30-10:00),  
Merrimack 2.**

This paper suggests that Peirce's pragmatism might be a more suitable underpinning of educational research than the currently prevailing constructivism, in particular with respect to science and mathematics education. Using examples from the educational literature, a case is made for a notion of "truth", a pragmatist scientific method, Peirce's doubt-belief cycle and his semiotics and logic in relationship to educational theory. This paper does not present any in-depth discussion of philosophical issues but attempts to highlight the need for a better philosophical foundation of educational research in the hope of encouraging future research in this direction.

**Uta Priss, [“Exploring the Challenge of Reconstructing Peirce’s Manuscripts.”](#)  
Session E-2 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Peirce scholars and Peirce-inspired technology researchers have the opportunity to collaborate in reconstructing Peirce’s manuscript fragments, using the capabilities that Peirce could only imagine when posing this practical question: “how much the business of thinking a machine could possibly made to perform, and what part of it must be left to the living mind.” We examine the nature and condition of his corpus, specify technology to organize data and create metadata structures for reasoning support of evidence-gathering and interpretation, and propose an “evolving transdisciplinary-crowdsourced catalogue” to relate Peircean concepts and reveal implicit connections, for continuously improving scholarship as reconstruction proceeds.

**Harry Procter, [“Toward a Peircean Psychology: C.S. Peirce and G.A. Kelly.”](#)  
Session J-6 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Hamilton 1.**

This submission is part of a larger project in which the work of Peirce and the psychologist G. A. Kelly are compared. Kelly suggested that it was useful to consider anyone as functioning as a scientist, in the business of applying theories, making hypotheses and predictions and testing them out in the practice of everyday life. Peirce’s discussions of logic and inquiry deepens our understanding of Kelly’s metaphor by looking at what Peirce says about the process of science. The relationship between logic and psychology are examined in some detail. This enables us to radically reconstrue

Kelly's project as being more of a logical enterprise than has previously been understood, making it potentially compatible with Peirce's overall vision. Kelly's psychology potentially provides a working framework within which Peirce's disparate but valuable contributions to psychology can be assembled. This could facilitate the development of a more fully worked out Peircean psychology.

**Gabriel O. Pulice, [“The Proper Name according to C.S. Peirce and J. Lacan: Some Relationships.”](#) Session A-4 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 3.**

The proper name plays a privileged and special role for human subjects as it marks them as individuals, as subjects of law, and as members of the community, while it indicates their identity - in the sense of being identified in their singularity. In the psychoanalytic clinic, it is a fact that the role of the name becomes all important for the subject. Upon closer examination, the proper name does not appear to be a simple concept. Likewise, Peirce makes such a remark in his attempt to classify it within his systems of signs. Our aim is to discuss the proper name as conceived of by Lacan, and to enrich this conception with the semiotic and logical developments that Peirce put forth. Interesting connections may be traced that could open up new paths of research, which may contribute to clinical psychoanalysis as well as to rational understanding.

**João Queiroz, [“Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.**

The poster presents a novel platform The Commens Digital Companion to Charles S. Peirce (<http://www.commens.org>) which was born 2012-2013 by merging Helsinki-based Commens site and Brazilian Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce together. New versions of the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms and the Commens Encyclopedia are presented. The site contains other new features like News, and Bibliography and resources and tools for helping to use and find materials in the site. The aim is to provide new possibilities for the user input and collaboration especially around the dictionary and the encyclopedia.

**Michael L. Raposa, [“The Scholarly Legacy of Murray G. Murphey: Peirce and Beyond.”](#) Session G-1 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 1.**

This panel will explore Murray Murphey's groundbreaking scholarship devoted to the philosophy of Charles Peirce, beginning with his landmark study of *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (1961), and continuing with the publication of numerous seminal books and articles over a period of 50 years. Panelists will discuss how Murphey transformed our understanding of Peirce's thought, illuminating its nuances and development, as well as its relationship to the work of other thinkers (such as Kant and Duns Scotus). They will also link Murphey's work on Peirce to his explication of broader themes in American history and the philosophy of history.

**Ignacio Redondo, [“Finding One’s Place in the Work of Creation: Communication as Faith, Hope, and Love according to Peirce’s Cosmology.”](#) Session A-9 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 2.**

In this paper, the author sketches out three exploratory suggestions from Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology that may be of particular interest for the philosophy of communication. In particular, it shall be argued that some Peircean cosmological principles, such as tychism, synechism, and agapism, fit well with certain concerns and worries in contemporary communication theory, such as vagueness, indeterminacy, and contingency. First, three different conceptions of communication, modeled upon the three types of evolution that Peirce espoused in his cosmological writings of the 1890s, are presented: the anacastic, the tychastic, and the agapastic model of communication. Then, a fuller exploration of the agapastic model of communication is attempted, according to three main ideas: (1) Communication requires faith; (2) communication implies hope; (3) communication is love.

**Nicholas Rescher, [“Peirce’s Epistemological Eschatology.”](#) Plenary 7 (Fri. 5:30-7:00), Grand Ballroom.**

In developing his thesis that truth in matters of scientific inquiry is to be seen as what ultimately emerges in the course of inquiry, Peirce was driven increasingly to resort to idealization. On the issue of success in the cognitive enterprise, he was at first inclined to answer the question “Where?” with the response: “In the scientific community.” But further reflection drove him onwards from “the actual, now-existing scientific community” first to “the scientific community of the future” and finally to “the idealized scientific community.” And with regard to the question “When?” he was accordingly pushed on from “the present” to “the eventual future” to “the idealized long run.” This conceptual pressure towards a *focus imaginarius* outside of spatiotemporal reach ultimately led Peirce’s theory of truth into a reconciliation with German idealism that fit uncomfortably in precarious balance with his more robust initial pragmatism.

**Henrique Rochelle, [“Semiosis in the Communication of Dance as a Language.”](#) Session G-5 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Hamilton 2.**

This paper presents an investigation of the process of communication of Dance as a Language through semiotics structures, mainly the relevance of elements of thirdness in the organization of performance arts and their presentational mode. The association of the interpreter in choreography understanding elucidates some aspects of this particular language form, such as its relation to oral language accounts, the characteristic of a work open to varied interpretations, the problems of translating this experience to other sign systems, and the direct effect the body codependence inflicts in this process. This should demonstrate the possibility of debating Dance – and arts – through aspects of peircean theory other than the study of his esthetics, as the sign and its processes reveal and explain elements of this language.



**Niall Roe, [“Speculation Unbridled: Scepticism about the External World in Peirce’s Philosophy.”](#) Session I-7 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 1.**

It is widely accepted among those impressed by the philosophy of Charles Peirce that his system offers a fully satisfying suppression of scepticism. This paper provides a sketch of Peirce’s later work on experience and reality in order to contribute to exactly how he is able to put the external-world sceptic in his place. For it is striking that, despite his well-examined aversion to Cartesian philosophy, Peirce is sometimes seen to accept that “whether [my perceptions] are experience of the real world or only experience of a dream, is a question which I have no means of answering with *absolute* certainty.” The first section of this paper completes the sketch mentioned above, establishing the link between experience and reality for Peirce. The second section will use this link, as well as talk of critical-commonsensism, to show how Peirce puts the sceptic in a place of pragmatic insignificance

**Daniel Röhe Salomon da Rosa Rodrigues, [“Music: Semiotics and Meaning in Mozart’s \*Die Zauberflöte\*.”](#) Session G-5 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Hamilton 2.**

Musical meaning is an object of study that relates the sensations that one feels with the musical aspects that have similarities with that feeling and is expressed in the musical score. This study aims to clarify the social relations of music and the role played by the musical score on it, such as how it is made and how it will influence the social subjects involved with music. If the musical score is a sign of the emotions similar to music, then it conveys musical signification related to those emotions. Some details about the rhythmic aspects of the musical score may explain some aspects of a vengeful personality clearly characterized in Mozart’s *Die Zauberflöte* score.

**Cesare Romagnoli, [“C.S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Medical Imaging.”](#) Session C-6 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

The practices surrounding the diagnosis and treatment of prostate cancer are complex and rapidly changing. In this paper we present a pragmatist approach to prostate cancer, using a case study from the Image Guided Prostate Cancer Management project to demonstrate the complex semiotic of medical imaging. We then use Peirce’s distinctions between deduction, induction, and abduction to distinguish several reasoning processes, both in the particular case of diagnosis and in the wider context of research. We close with a discussion of our work on biomedical ontologies and structured reporting for prostate cancer. Our conclusion is that a pragmatist approach illuminates and improves our practices in this field of medicine.

**Vinicius Romanini, [“Semeiosis as a Living Process.”](#) Session H-3 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

Biosemiotics is the branch of biology interested in understanding life as semeiosis, where meaning and interpretation play the central role. But we believe that biosemiotics also needs a scientific metaphysics to reach its purposes. Here we present a logical diagram, named solenoid of semeiosis, structured to represent the relations among the aspects of

the sign. We then apply this schema to living processes in general, beyond the usual biological definition. Our conclusion is that the scientific question about the biological meaning of life and the metaphysical question about the logical meaning of life might have the same answer.

**Vinicius Romanini, [“The Periodic Table of Classes of Signs.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.**

The poster presents the evolutionary *rationale* underlying a classification of 66 possible classes of signs developed from Peirce’s mature semeiotic, although in a somewhat different vein. The Periodic Table of Classes of Signs is shown to be a natural consequence of a dynamic flow of semeiotic information as described by the four periods of the Solenoid of Semeiosis: grounding, presentation, representation and communication. As information becomes habitual in each of the periods we then see the evolution of the four phases of any research about the real: perception, inquiry, deliberation and scientific methodetic.

**Philip Rose, [“Peirce’s Cosmology Made Clear, Then Extended \(Deriving Something from Nothing\).”](#) Session B-10 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Hamilton 2.**

Much of the confusion regarding Peirce’s cosmology relates to the question of how something could be said to have come from an original, chaotic state of nothing. Such confusion can be allayed by contextualizing Peirce’s “Guess” in the broader light of his other cosmological works, including his work on the Categories. When so framed, Peirce’s cosmological attempt to derive something from nothing turns out to be reasonable enough to be further extended to the question of how the Categories themselves may have come about.

**José Renato Salatiel, [“Some Remarks on Peirce’s Tychism: Ontological Chance and Logical Possibility in its Greek Sources.”](#) Session G-2 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 1.**

Unlike most philosophers in his time, Peirce argued that chance is ontological, that is, a real property of the world. In Peirce’s work, one can point out two direct influences: Aristotle’s theory of *accidental causes* and the Epicurean doctrine of *clinamen*, which, nevertheless, do not exhaust the total implication of the Peircean conception. To the Greeks, there was no such thing that did not have a cause operating in the universe. Otherwise, we propose that the most important contribution of the Greeks assimilated by the Peircean theory of chance is the Aristotelian concept of *real possibility*.

**Vera Saller, [“Perception, Experience and Unconscious in Peirce and Psychoanalysis.”](#) Session C-9 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Hamilton 1.**

A short list of themes from the contemporary debate on non-conceptuality will serve us as a guide while showing the pre-eminence of the Peircean account of perception over the contemporary discussion. The main points are the argument of demonstrative concept and the capacity for recognition. The discussion of the pragmatist approach of perception takes us to the automated unconsciousness. The author concludes with a

comparison of the Peircean account of the categories of First and Second with the psychoanalytic unconscious. Three originally psychoanalytical concepts are stressed, namely the drive, deferred action and the symbolization after Wilfred Bion. They turn out to be fruitful in our endeavours to overcome obsolete body-mind-dichotomies.

**Jim Scow, [“Solving Peirce’s Solution to the Liar Paradox.”](#) Session I-9 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 2.**

Emily Michael rightly calls Peirce’s 1865 solution to the liar paradox paradoxical. I will defend Peirce’s solution and remove its paradoxical features. Peirce’s solution is to argue that the liar sentence fails to express a proposition. This solution initially seems to block the liar paradox, but further discussion by Peirce leads to concluding that the liar sentence is both true and false. Parsons’ work on the strengthened liar will help to avoid this unwanted consequence.

**Demetra Sfondoni-Mentzou, [“Peirce and Aristotle: A Neo-Aristotelian Version of Scientific Realism.”](#) Session I-4 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 2.**

Peirce developed a rigorous defense of scientific realism in an age when the dominant trend was that of positivism. He thus put forward a realism both of theories and of entities, based on his ontological categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. In this context, what I propose to do is to shed light on (a) Peirce’s intimate connection with Aristotle’s philosophy, as I will be focusing on the role of *Thirdness*—which functions through the idea of potentiality—in some of the most significant aspects of Peirce’s thought, i.e. his views on scientific theorizing, laws of nature, time, and Tychism (b) the deep kinship of Peirce’s thought with some basic ideas of scientific realism as we understand it today in light of the discoveries of contemporary science. My subsequent aim will be to show that we can derive rigorous arguments in defense of scientific realism today by an appeal both to Peirce and Aristotle.

**Michael Shapiro, [“Reconceiving Linguistics in the Light of Pragmatism: Language Analysis as Hermeneutic.”](#) Session G-3 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Concord 2.**

The prevailing conception of language as rule-governed behavior *tout court* has driven linguistics into barren byways which are powerless to EXPLAIN SPEECH AS IT IS MANIFESTED IN NATURE. This sterility can be overcome by postulating as a fundamental principle the idea that the locus of linguistic reality is the ACT, the CREATIVE MOMENT OF SPEECH—a moment made possible by the existing structure of language with its general rules but which transforms that structure, so that linguistic structure is itself always in flux, always being modified by acts of speech. Hence the goal of theory is **THE RATIONALIZED EXPLICATION OF LINGUISTIC VARIETY.**

**Sun-Joo Shin, [“Mystery of Deduction and Peirce’s Abduction.”](#) Session A-1 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

How we come up with a hypothesis and the mystery of deduction share some interesting features, and those are the essence of Peirce’s abductive reasoning, I claim. Peirce’s abduction has been considered to be a process independent of both inductive and deductive reasoning. My new understanding is that abductive reasoning is needed both for inductive and interesting deductive reasoning. Focusing on how abduction gets in the picture of deduction, I locate the mystery of deduction.

**Richard Shusterman, [“The Aesthetic Imperative: Reflections after Peirce.”](#) Session D-2 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 1.**

C.S. Peirce wrote very little about aesthetics, and he confessed to knowing too little about the field to be confident in venturing views about it. My paper will argue, however, that his writings were not only influential for the development of pragmatist aesthetics but also surprisingly pertinent and propitious for pragmatism’s contemporary expansion of the aesthetic field into the projects of somaesthetics and the ethical art of living.

**Michael Silverstein, [“Comments.”](#) Session F-3 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Concord 1.**

**Seymour Simmons, [“C.S. Peirce and the Teaching of Drawing.”](#) Session B-8 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Hamilton 1.**

This paper reviews the various forms and functions of drawing in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, then considers implications of Peirce’s work for teaching drawing at the university level and in general education, K12. Peirce is presented as providing support for a cognitive conception of drawing, in which drawing is taken as a vehicle for creative, critical and reflective thinking applicable within and beyond the arts, including to STEM subjects, science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Peirce does this in three ways: he exemplifies this model in his own use of drawing; he provides evidence for this model in his early research on bistable images, and he offers theoretical frameworks in his pragmatism and semeiotics to explain how drawings facilitate creative problem solving and the making of meaning. Each of these aspects have implications for teaching.

**Robert Sinclair, [“Comments.”](#) Plenary 6 (Fri. 3:30-5:00), Grand Ballroom.**

**Aud Sissel Hoel, [“Photography as Measurement Technology.”](#) Session H-4 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

Contemporary accounts that investigate the evidentiary force of photographic images frequently evoke the Peircean notion of index. I develop an alternative account by exploring Peirce’s notion of the diagram-icon, and assimilate Peirce’s unique way of integrating the observational and the intellectual, the iconic and the symbolic, captured in his notions of “diagram” and “diagrammatic.” Thus construed, photography exhibits

a dual agency: it delineates the object of knowledge and institutes a new mode of perceptual access to it. Conceived as a measurement technology that integrates quantitative and observational modes of measurement, photography acquires a generative dimension, while retaining its forceful element.

**Clancy Smith, [“The Gospel of Greed: Ruminations on a Possible Peircean Critical Theory.”](#) Session D-8 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Merrimack 2.**

Responding to Horkheimer’s critique of pragmatism, my paper excavates numerous passages which indicate that far from being antagonistic to the Frankfurt School’s pursuits, Peirce was sympathetic to the concern that capitalistic values indoctrinate citizens through belief manipulation, violating Peirce’s “First Rule of Reason,” and manifesting most prominently in both his critique of the “Gospel of Greed” and his critique of the “method of authority” in “Fixation of Belief.” Nascent in the conditions of his prescribed scientific method is a necessary social arrangement (a radically free, democratic, egalitarian and unlimited community of social individuals) and, as such, despite Peirce’s insistence that philosophy-science not be subordinated to socio-political concerns, Peirce is offering a nascent critical theory that may bridge the divide between the Frankfurt School and their American counterparts.

**Lee Smolin, [“Laws Must Evolve to be Explained: A Physicist’s Perspective on a Proposal of Peirce.”](#) Session A-5 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Lower Lock 1.**

Two people may claim both to be naturalists, but have divergent conceptions of basic elements of the natural world which lead them to mean different things when they talk about laws of nature, or states, or the role of mathematics in physics. These disagreements do not much affect the ordinary practice of science which is about small subsystems of the universe, described or explained against a background, idealized to be fixed. But these issues become crucial when we consider including the whole universe within our system, for then there is no fixed background to reference observables to. I argue here that the key issue responsible for divergent versions of naturalism and divergent approaches to cosmology is the conception of time. One version, which I call temporal naturalism, holds that time, in the sense of the succession of present moments, is real, and that laws of nature evolve in that time. This is contrasted with timeless naturalism, which holds that laws are immutable and the present moment and its passage are illusions. I argue that temporal naturalism is empirically more adequate than the alternatives, because it offers testable explanations for puzzles its rivals cannot address, and is likely a better basis for solving major puzzles that presently face cosmology and physics. Temporal naturalism also makes it possible to develop Peirce's observation that "laws of nature must evolve if they are to be explained."

**John F. Sowa, [“Bringing Peirce into the Mainstream of Cognitive Science.”](#) Session E-2 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Scholarship in analyzing and editing Peirce's voluminous writings has increased awareness of his work among professional philosophers; but its fundamental implications could revolutionize nearly every branch of modern cognitive science: psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. The

challenge for those who recognize the breadth, depth, and power of Peirce's vision is to convey glimpses of that vision to busy scientists, who currently cite Peirce only in occasional footnotes. Without the time or patience to study dusty tomes outside their field, they will study something that brings Peirce's revolutionary insights into their most pressing concerns.

**John F. Sowa, [“Peirce Improved on His Successors.”](#) Session F-2 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.**

Peirce claimed that existential graphs represent a “moving picture of the action of the mind in thought.” Some psychologists believe that EGs are a good candidate for a “natural logic” that could be supported by the same neural mechanisms as perception. The EG notation and operations are a simplification and generalization of Gentzen's natural deduction, Gentzen's clause form, Kamp's discourse representation structures, Hinitkka's game theoretical semantics, and the argument frameworks for nonmonotonic reasoning. Sometimes, the solution to a research problem with the algebraic notation can be seen at a glance with EGs. Peirce's claim was justified.

**Stephen Sparks, [“Peirce, Kierkegaard and Theosemiotics: Framing the God-Relationship.”](#) Session J-3 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Concord 1.**

Comparative studies of the philosophy of religion of Charles Peirce and Søren Kierkegaard are rare. In this paper I shall argue that both Peirce and Kierkegaard contribute to a theosemiotic framework that can help us 1) avoid overweighting either subjectivity or objectivity in our understanding of what Kierkegaard calls our “God-relationship,” and 2) keep us from the Procrustean bed of an overly restrictive evidentialist or intellectualist epistemology, paying attention to the larger human context of theistic belief.

**Marco Stango, [“Vagueness and Developmental Teleology. Peirce on the ‘Role’ of the Human Being.”](#) Session E-4 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

By considering Peirce's account of Critical Common-Sensism in “Issues of Pragmaticism” (1905), I sketch how Peirce's tenets about CCS should be understood in relation to Peirce's understanding of the developmental teleology of the human being. In particular, I show that the way in which the teleology of the human being develops is a determination of the objective vagueness of his/her final cause, in which also indubitability and instinctuality play a fundamental role.

**Frederik Stjernfelt, [“Iconicity of Logic.”](#) Session F-2 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.**

A central argument for Peirce, when constructing the EGs, is that of the iconicity of logic. Peirce took logic representations to be icons of logical structure which is why such representations may be measured on the degree to which they adequately represent. This paper reviews the iconic aspects of Existential Graphs.

**Frederik Stjernfelt, [“Types of Theorematical Reasoning.”](#) Session A-1  
(Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

What does Peirce's different exemplifications of the peculiarity of Theorematical reasoning boil down to? How should the distinction be told apart from distinctions such as those between easy and difficult problems, or between first and later proofs of the same theorem? What are the implications of the distinction for Peirce's concept of diagrammatical reasoning? What, if any, is the contemporary relevance of Peirce's distinction?

**Preston Stovall, [“Purpose, Command, and What Might Have Been.”](#) Session B-7  
(Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 2.**

Robert Brandom adopts and develops Wilfrid Sellars' views about the relationships among dispositions, the identification and individuation of objects, and uses of subjunctive conditionals. After showing that these views have roots in C.S. Peirce, I argue that Peirce's discussion of imperatives deserves more attention. My contention is that the role for imperational discourse in purposive contexts illuminates the rational will as a power to institute causal order in human activity. I conclude that human purposes and values are made real in the world in virtue of our causing ourselves to be creatures whose activities are intelligible only in those terms.

**Cassiano Terra Rodrigues, [“Peirce's Naturalism: The Continuity of Instinct and Rationality and the Heuristic Power of Abduction.”](#) Session C-3 (Thu. 8:30-10:00),  
Concord 2.**

Peirce's argument for abduction as the only inferential form with a heurctic power to make us capable of discovering something new is widely known and has been discussed from several perspectives. But it is unusual to see presentations of his theory of abduction in connection with his theory of instincts and his critical common-sensism. The aim of this presentation is to lay down some terms for such a connection, linking the evolution of human rationality, the logical form of abduction, and the connection between explanatory hypotheses for new or striking facts and our already established knowledge.

**Claudine Tiercelin, [“C.S. Peirce and the Possibility of Metaphysical Knowledge.”](#)  
Plenary 8 (Sat. 10:15-11:45), Grand Ballroom.**

Peirce's attitude towards metaphysics is well known: on the one hand, pragmatism was meant to clarify the pseudo-problems metaphysics had generated and to get rid of the “puny, rickety and scrofulous” state it was in, because of its remaining for too long in the hands of “professional theologians” or “seminarian philosophers”; on the other hand, Peirce thought that, once purified, metaphysics could be done in a perfectly scientific, realistic and even systematic way. The aim of the talk is to show how such an attitude not only makes perfect sense, but is very fruitful today, as a possible reply to what has been called, after C. Peacocke, the “Integration Challenge” any rationally inclined metaphysician has to face, namely: how to reconcile a plausible (epistemological *and* metaphysical) account of what is involved in the *truth* of statements of a given kind

with a credible account of *how* we can know those statements, when we do know them. After presenting the challenge, I shall spell out the main components a decent reply should involve, which I have defended in several places (*Le Doute en question: parades pragmatistes au défi sceptique* (2005), *Le ciment des choses: petit traité de métaphysique scientifique réaliste* (2011), or more recently in *La connaissance métaphysique* (2012)). Relying on many views Peirce himself held on meaning, realism, dispositions, causation and the laws of nature, but also on belief, doubt, inquiry, scientific method, abduction, etc., I shall argue that a genuine “metaphysical knowledge” can indeed be achieved, midway between temerity and humility, provided : 1) it relies on a careful conceptual analysis and on the continuous critical massaging of our folk (or commonsensical) intuitions; 2) it trusts the *a posteriori* results of science without indulging into some kind of naturalized or scientific metaphysics; 3) it still aims, within the framework of a basically pragmatist, realistic and fallibilist strategy of knowledge viewed as inquiry, at the fixation of true beliefs and commits itself not only to scientific realism but to the metaphysical determination of the real dispositional nature of properties and laws.

**Alessandro Topa, [“‘A Transition to the World of Spirit’ - Categoriality, Normativity and Processuality: A Schillerian Matrix of Peircean Themes.”](#) Session A-9 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 2.**

What exactly does Peirce mean when he says that, in Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, the three categories, “in an almost unrecognizable disguise, played a great part”? What is this disguise? And what parts do these playful categories play? In this paper, I intend to show that by distinguishing between the conceptual manifestation and an architectonic function of categories, we can understand to which extent Schiller shaped both Peirce’s conception of the categories as universal, elementary, ordinal modal elements of semiosis and his methodological use of them as constituents of the phenomenal, the normative, and the processual, anticipated in Schiller’s threefold use of categories as moments of logical determination, psychological drives and stages of teleological processes.

**Edison Torres, [“L465: Charles Peirce’s Unrealized Visit to the Glenmore Summer School of the Cultural Sciences.”](#) Session A-10 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Merrimack 3.**

In 1905, Peirce drafted his Lecture I to the Adirondack Summer School 1905, the only one written of four planned lectures for the Glenmore Summer School of the Cultural Sciences, the institution founded by Thomas Davidson in 1890. However, according to Peirce biographers these lectures were never delivered, which has been called “one of Peirce’s major disappointments late in life”. In this brief essay, I shall first recount the circumstances of such event, then I try to explain why Peirce never gave said lectures.

**Jürgen Trabant, [“Embodiment in Vico and Peirce: Poiesis, Praxis and Semiosis \(with Tullio Viola\).”](#) Session G-7 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 1.**

That the philosophies of Giambattista Vico and of Charles S. Peirce are philosophies of signs is evident at first sight. Vico has no term for his sign philosophy, the term *sema*, however, appears a couple of times. Peirce takes up the Greek term *semeiotics*, already



used by Locke for the designation of his theory of knowledge. The parallelism between the most important Italian philosopher and the most important American philosopher has already been noticed by Max H. Fisch (1969) but there is as yet no thorough comparative study of the strikingly parallel thinkers in totally different philosophical contexts.

**Miroslava Trajkovski, [“Reasoning by Signs: Peirce and Aristotle.”](#) Session H-6 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

Three basic kinds of reasoning Peirce relates to three basic kinds of signs. Deduction to an index, abduction to an icon, and induction to a symbol. This underdeveloped claim I analyze through Aristotle’s semiotics. I will argue that in deduction, abduction and induction, middle terms are index, icon and symbol, respectively.

**Linda Treude, [“Peirce and Knowledge Organization.”](#) Poster Session, Foyer, Grand Ballroom.**

This poster illustrates the application potential of Peirce’s Existential Graphs in the field of Knowledge Organization. In the background the arbor scientiae visualizes the principles of traditional Knowledge Organisation systems. In traditional systems as classifications or thesauri representation of objects or documents are generated following certain logical rules. The expressible relations in such systems are: Equivalence, associations and hierarchic orders. Now based on the Existential Graphs and with modern information technology multiple semantic relations are expressible. Previous appliances of the EGs as the Conceptual Graphs are presented and the application in Semantic Web representation systems is shown below.

**Julián Fernando Trujillo Amaya, [“Real Possibility and Peirce’s Pragmaticism.”](#) Session E-6 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 1.**

The central purpose in this paper is to demonstrate the fundamental role of the notion of possibility in the consolidation and formulation of Pragmaticism. Traditionally, pragmaticism has been presented as the term used by Peirce to talk about his pragmatic conception, in order to differentiate his perspective from that of other pragmatists. However, Peirce's pragmatism has not always been the same nor have the differences with other pragmatic concepts, constituting its distinctive nature. Pragmaticism is undeniably an attempt by Peirce to establish the specific differences in his conception of pragmatism and an attempt to offer an adequate interpretation of his initial formulation of the pragmatic maxim. My thesis is that pragmaticism is the central axis of Peirce's mature philosophical conception and that the notion of possibility is its fundamental characteristic.

**Giovanni Tuzet, [“Is Qualitative Induction a Kind of Induction?”](#) Session E-5 (Fri. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

In one of his papers Peirce distinguishes three kinds of induction: Crude Induction, Quantitative Induction, and Qualitative Induction. The third is not based on the experience of a mass (as the first), nor on the experience of a definite collection of instances (as the second), but on a “stream of experience” of different parts whose evidential value must be critically scrutinized. To illustrate the dynamics of Qualitative Induction, Peirce uses the example of an investigator who starts from a hypothesis and tries to construct a thesis out of it, considering the evidential weight of the hypothesis, elaborating some conditional predictions from it and testing them. The paper discusses the idea of Qualitative Induction asking whether it is a genuine kind of induction, or a form of abduction, or something else, and claims it is the final inductive step of scientific reasoning in complex evidential cases.

**Evelyn Vargas, [“Perception as Inference.”](#) Session A-3 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 2.**

In an article originally written as a “letter to the Editor”, Peirce remarks that what distinguishes his pragmatism from that of James’ is that James regards percepts as signs. Peirce’s claim synthesizes his new achievements in semiotics as well as his long-term reflections on James’ psychology. Peirce will object that James’ interpretation of the perceptual process as a case of association cannot account for perceptual judgment. As I expect to show this apparently collateral difference represents more profound disagreements concerning perception and its cognitive role.

**Francisco Vargas, [“A Model for Peirce’s Continuum.”](#) Session C-7 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Merrimack 2.**

Late XIX century mathematicians provided useful and rigorous definitions of what is meant as a Continuum, a concept that goes back in an explicit way to Aristotle. Nevertheless, Peirce didn’t see these and previous definitions as capturing the whole sense and the real properties of a “true continuum”. Peirce’s doctrine on the continuum occupies a very central role in his metaphysical system. For him, continuity is “the master key of philosophy”, underlying his views on different realms of phenomena from Cosmology to Psychology and Logic. It is thus not strange that he pursued all over the development of his thought a definition about what he meant by this concept. We examine some of the properties that the philosopher considers as fundamental for it’s definition and provide a construction, in a Set-theoretical context, of what could be considered as a model for them.

**Michael Ventimiglia, [“Peircean Creativity in the 21st Century: The Case of Burning Man.”](#) Session I-3 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Concord 1.**

This paper shows how the conditions for the growth of mind are realized in one of the most vibrant and innovative rituals of contemporary American culture—the Burning Man festival. The paper examines how an environment that blends freedom with the constraint of shared communal *teloi* can nurture the creative imagination and assists in

the actualization of imagined possibilities. Further, since Peirce understood the self to be an idea, subject to the same Law of Mind and patterns of growth as all cosmic ideas, his philosophy is perfectly suited for explaining the widely reported personal transformation of Burning Man participants.

**Amadeu Viana S. Andrés, [“Round Table on Vico and Peirce: A Comparative Approach \(with Tullio Viola\).”](#) Session G-7 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 1.**

In this round table we inquire into the particular battle for origins of both philosophers, conditioned as it was by their experience at different sides of the XVIIIth Century, i. e. the great partition between humanities and natural sciences. To get the discussion started, we will try to understand the *new sciences* of Vico and Peirce and their similar concerns about invention, against the broad context of their particular interests and constraints; and inversely, how both philosophers were able to connect the evolution of signs to social and mental conditions and, consequently, to state that we live in a world of signs that has evolved in us.

**Carlos Vidales, [“A Semiotic Multi-level Approach for the Study of Theoretical Relativism in Communication Research.”](#) Session J-6 (Sat. 4:30-6:00), Hamilton 1.**

The paper presents a methodological approach for the study of theoretical relativism in communication research based on Peirce’s semiotics and the multi-level approach to the emergence of semiosis in semiotic systems proposed by Charbel El-Hani, João Queiroz and Claus Emmeche. It focused its attention in how theory can be studied as semiotic system and how texts can be presented as chains and networks of chains of triads, which is also an attempt to identify the evolution of Dynamical Objects. The paper also presents an example of the methodology proposed.

**Rodrigo Vieira de Almeida, [“Some Reflections on the Ontological Aspects of the Symbol and its Relationship to the Cognoscibility of God, within the Religious Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce.”](#) Session C-3 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 2.**

This article aims to offer a reflection on the ontological dimension of the symbol and its relationship with what we may call the Religious Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce, namely, the cognoscibility of God. To achieve this goal, the article will be divided into two parts. Part one will describe, at two different moments, the emergence and development of the ontological conception of the Peircean symbol. This, in turn, leads directly to the second part, which aims to clarify some elements of the ontological role of the symbol for the possibility of knowing God’s reality.

**Tullio Viola, [“Embodiment in Vico and Peirce: Poiesis, Praxis and Semiosis \(with Jürgen Trabant\).”](#) Session G-7 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 1.**

That the philosophies of Giambattista Vico and of Charles S. Peirce are philosophies of signs is evident at first sight. Vico has no term for his sign philosophy, the term *sema*, however, appears a couple of times. Peirce takes up the Greek term *semeiotics*, already used by Locke for the designation of his theory of knowledge. The parallelism between

the most important Italian philosopher and the most important American philosopher has already been noticed by Max H. Fisch (1969) but there is as yet no thorough comparative study of the strikingly parallel thinkers in totally different philosophical contexts.

**Tullio Viola, [“Peirce’s Philosophy of Action and its Current Interpretations: An Aristotelian Approach.”](#) Session D-7 (Thu. 10:30-12:00), Hamilton 1.**

Peirce’s presence in current debates on the nature of action (both in philosophy and in the social sciences) reveals a somewhat paradoxical trait. On the one hand, his ideas have been often used to locate the main purport of actions in the unconscious dispositions of the subject, thus emphasizing the importance of a perspective external to actors in interpreting behavior. On the other hand, it also seems possible to draw from Peirce’s writings the opposite view of a primacy of the rationality and conscious intentions of actors over the external viewpoint of observers. This paper suggests a way to harmonize these two readings through a new appraisal of the importance of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy (and in particular, of what I shall call the “transitional” nature of Aristotle’s notion of *hexis*) for Peirce’s definitions of habit and belief, his formulation of the pragmatic maxim, and his reflections on perception, unconscious reasoning, and *logica utens*.

**Tullio Viola, [“Round Table on Vico and Peirce: A Comparative Approach \(with Amadeu Viana\).”](#) Session G-7 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 1.**

In this round table we inquire into the particular battle for origins of both philosophers, conditioned as it was by their experience at different sides of the XVIIIth Century, i. e. the great partition between humanities and natural sciences. To get the discussion started, we will try to understand the *new sciences* of Vico and Peirce and their similar concerns about invention, against the broad context of their particular interests and constraints; and inversely, how both philosophers were able to connect the evolution of signs to social and mental conditions and, consequently, to state that we live in a world of signs that has evolved in us.

**Mariana Vitti Rodrigues, [“The Role of Information in Abductive Reasoning.”](#) Session B-3 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Concord 1.**

The objective of this work is to analyze the concepts of information and abduction in the context of the creative processes of scientific discovery, stressing the relevance of Charles S. Peirce’s work on contemporaneity. The central question here can be formulated thus: what is the role of information in scientific discovery? In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, we shall analyze the semiotic concept of information and its relation to the abductive reasoning, arguing that scientific discovery can be understood as a form of application of abduction in an endeavor to expand the informational universe.

Maria Celeste de Almeida Wanner, [“Theoretical Elements in Peirce’s Semiotics toward a Reflection on the Nature of Photography.”](#) Session C-2 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 1.

This paper proposes a reflection on a series of photographs by Brazilian Modernist novelist, Mário de Andrade (1893-1945), taken in Recife, in 1927 and published in a travelogue entitled “The Apprentice Tourist” for a famous Newspaper from São Paulo City -, and to analyze them in the light of Peirce’s *Semiotics* -, in their indexical and iconic nature and as an object of Art -, by also resorting to scholars like Sontag, Rosalind Krauss, Nöth and Ljunberg. Andrade was particularly interested in the highly personal capacity of Photography to capture or restate the past, to build self-narratives and identities.

Robert Whitaker, [“Implicit Agapism in Peirce’s ‘Neglected Argument’.”](#) Session G-9 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Merrimack 3.

I argue that the key to understanding Peirce’s “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (NA) is found in another of his essays, “Evolutionary Love.” I maintain that without the insights of that essay, the NA seems rather unimpressive and mysterious, which may account for its relative neglect to date. I argue that the “three universes of experience” which form the domain of the NA, correspond to Peirce’s three modes of the development of the universe, discussed in “Evolutionary Love.” This connection, together with the attitude of “play” from which the NA proceeds and its connection to agapism, allows us to make sense of the almost shockingly confident claims Peirce makes for the NA, including its assumed universal persuasiveness.

James Wible, [“Charles S. Peirce on the Science of Economics.”](#) Session B-2 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Lower Lock 2.

Peirce railed against the *deformation professionnelle* of political economists, but he never doubted that economics was in fact a science. The paper traces Peirce’s engagement with economics; the place of economics within the larger structure of science; economics as a mathematical discipline; the importance that he places on *Ricardian Inference*, exploring two interpretations: as a particular form of mathematical inference and as a particular form of analogical reasoning, close to modern scientific model building. Some of the key points are illustrated with an analysis of the two cases in which Peirce engaged in systematic applications of economic analysis.

James Wible, [“Peirce’s Economic Model in the First Harvard Lecture on Pragmatism.”](#) Session B-2 (Wed. 2:45-4:15), Lower Lock 2.

One of the distinguishing features of Peirce’s first Harvard lecture on pragmatism was a mathematical model of the profit maximizing insurance firm. The insurance example seems to be his most elaborate illustration of the pragmatic maxim. That model offers multiple lines of calculus which are very creative and are also non-standard and idiosyncratic. Here it will be argued that the primary argumentative function of the economic model was to underscore Peirce’s more mathematical and non-psychological

conception of pragmatism. The economic model may have contributed to James's categorical displeasure with the first lecture.

**Aaron Wilson, [“Habit, Semeiotic Naturalism, and the Unity of the Sciences.”](#) Session C-4 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

“Semeiotic naturalism” is the view that many different sciences are directly relevant to answering philosophical questions in semeiotics, which it regards as the unifying questions of the multidisciplinary science of Semeiotics. Such a science also requires unifying concepts which play key roles in many different areas of semeiotic research. I argue that Peirce's concept of habit is such a concept. After distinguishing between a wide and a narrow concept of habit in Peirce, I argue that at least the wide concept applies in many different sciences, and, for Peirce, is crucial to the explanation of semeiosis at all levels of explanation.

**Aaron Wilson, [“How Peirce ‘Expands our Perception’.”](#) Session I-7 (Sat. 1:00-2:30), Hamilton 1.**

In this paper I argue that, on Peirce's account of perception, we can perceive many things that are commonly thought not to be perceptible, including but not limited to kinds, habits or dispositional properties, modal properties, and sign relations. My argument turns on Peirce's criteria for what counts as perception and what does not, his views about perceptual judgments, his adherence to the doctrine of immediate perception, his analysis of the predication of concepts (i.e. his pragmatism), his claims in the 1903 Harvard lectures that we directly perceive Thirdness, and his realism about kinds, habits, modality, and sign relations—among a few other points.

**Mirjam Wittmann, [“The Image behind the Scene.”](#) Session H-4 (Sat. 8:30-10:00), Concord 3.**

What was the impact of photography on Peirce's philosophy? And how did Peirce in particular had an impact on photographic indexicality? In my paper I will analyze his practices, uses and functions of photographic images which will on the one hand shed light on objectivity in the mid-nineteenth-century sciences, and on the other hand show the metaphorical character that photography has for the philosophical question of indexicality and imagination. The relation between indexicality and photography will illustrate how the rise of photography reflects the relation between image and idea.

**John Woods, [“What Abduction Does to Knowledge.”](#) Session C-1 (Thu. 8:30-10:00), Lower Lock 1.**

The epistemological nub of Peirce's account of abduction is his insistence that the reasons that support an abductively drawn conclusion are entirely lacking in evidential force, and afford no basis for believing it. A good abduction is good reasoning but also reasoning that is epistemically inert. For this reason, Peirce urges that abduced propositions not be believed. In fact, however, sometimes they *are* believed and sometimes they are *true*. The question this raises is “What now is their epistemic status?”

Present-day epistemology provides sharply conflicting answers to it. But what stands out is that each answer carries high *internal* costs. In this paper, I'll try to make some headway with this.

**Fernando Zalamea, [“Comments”](#) Session G-10 (Fri. 1:30-3:00), Lower Lock 2.**

**Fernando Zalamea, [“Geometry and Plasticity.”](#) Session F-2 (Fri. 10:30-12:00), Lower Lock 2.**

EGs are situated at the center of a unique geometrical constellation, where topology (Burch), category theory (Brady & Trimble), intuitionistic logic (Oostra) and complex variables (Zalamea) intersect. Beyond the rigidity of the "linguistic turn" and open to many diagrammatic possibilities akin to the plasticity of a "visual turn", EGs may become the natural logic of space-time deformations that the future requires.

**Fernando Zalamea, [“Peirce’s Continuity: Mathematical and Logical, Then and Now.”](#) Plenary 9 (Sat. 2:45-4:15), Grand Ballroom.**

We will present Peirce's main architectural hypothesis for knowledge –the existence of a continuous protogeometry of Mind and Nature– and explore its mathematical and logical developments, along both Peirce's Continuum and the Existential Graphs. We will review the central ideas that Peirce said ("then") and that the commentators have said ("now"), both on the continuum and the graphs. We will then reveal some mediations between them, state some open problems, and sketch an arborescence of the work done in the last century.

**Oscar P. Zelis, [“The Proper Name according to C.S. Peirce and J. Lacan: Some Relationships.”](#) Session A-4 (Wed. 1:00-2:30), Concord 3.**

The proper name plays a privileged and special role for human subjects as it marks them as individuals, as subjects of law, and as members of the community, while it indicates their identity - in the sense of being identified in their singularity. In the psychoanalytic clinic, it is a fact that the role of the name becomes all important for the subject. Upon closer examination, the proper name does not appear to be a simple concept. Likewise, Peirce makes such a remark in his attempt to classify it within his systems of signs. Our aim is to discuss the proper name as conceived of by Lacan, and to enrich this conception with the semiotic and logical developments that Peirce put forth. Interesting connections may be traced that could open up new paths of research, which may contribute to clinical psychoanalysis as well as to rational understanding.

**Liu-hua Zhang, [“Peirce on the Phenomena of Reasoning.”](#) Session B-6  
(Wed. 2:45-4:15), Merrimack 1.**

After giving a Peircean phenomenological reading of “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?,” this paper shall make some comments on the relevance of Peirce’s logic to contemporary discussion of philosophy of logic, including the difference between mathematical logic and philosophical logic, anti-psychologism in logic, the future of pragmatism as a theory of reasoning, and the relation of Peirce’s work with Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology.

**Greg Zuschlag, [“Moving Beyond ‘High’ and ‘Low Christology’: Peirce’s Contribution to Gelpi’s Chalcedonian Christology.”](#) Session E-3 (Fri. 8:30-10:00),  
Concord 1.**

This presentation sets out to first describe the current crisis in contemporary Christology between those who advocate for a “low” Christology, which emphasizes the humanity of Jesus over his divinity, versus those who endorse a “high” Christology which focuses almost exclusively on his divinity at the expense of his humanity. After laying out the problem, the presentation then attempts to show how Don Gelpi’s use of Peirce’s triadic metaphysics allows him to offer a solution to said crisis by hypothesizing that Jesus possessed a divine autonomy and a human freedom, which together constitute a unified will.